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Preface 
My first thinking on the subject of rural institutions and 
organisations goes back to my days as a student at IRMA, the 
Institute of Rural Management, Anand. That was when I started 
thinking about what made a vibrant, robust resource users 
organisation. Professor Tushaar Shah's notions o f swayambhoo, or 
self-governing, self-replicating organisations left an indelible impact 
on my mind. 
This received further consolidation during my experience with 
TERI , the Tata Energy Research Institute, New Delhi where my 
exposure to the analysis of water management problems and issues 
shaped my thinking on the need for local level institutions for 
water management. T E R I provided an atmosphere that was very 
conducive to learning, intellectual development and independent 
research and fostered a stimulating exchange of ideas among young 
researchers. It is my days at T E R I to which I am really indebted, 
because they cultivated in me a research orientation, and allowed 
me to learn with a free and adventurous mind. In fact, it was my 
association with the Resource and Development Economics group that 
fostered my desire for further learning. 
My thinking on the subject further evolved during my first six 
month stay at Wageningen University as part of the Matching 
Technology with Institutions (MTT) Ph.D Programme. My research 
orientation underwent a change from a prescriptive, instrumental 
perspective on rural institutions to more o f a process perspective, 
seeking to understand their behaviour and evolution. I also became 
conscious o f the need for an inter-disciplinary orientation. With a 
basic training in economics and rural management, I wanted to 
explore more about the implications of design or irrigation 
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technology for institutional development. This was clearly 
something my own educational training and professional 
experience had so far not equipped me to do. I also wanted to 
know more about how legal institutional frameworks, social 
relationships and technology interacted in the working of local level 
institutions. In this thesis, I have essentially tried to capture these 
domains of interaction. 
It is here that I owe an intellectual debt to the members of my 
supervisory team. They provided overall direction to this research, 
brought to it their own expertise and experience and lent it its 
inter-disciplinary character. Dr. Peter P Mollinga taught me how to 
think about outlets and hydraulic structures and irrigation design. 
My thoughts on legal pluralism were shaped through my 
interactions with Professor Dr. Franz von Benda Beckmann. 
Professor Linden Vincent helped me expand my ideas at the 
writing stage and analyse my empirical material more systematically. 
Professor Gopal Naik gave specific suggestions at various stages of 
my research and helped me stay focussed. The advantage of a team 
as this one was that it helped keep a balance between different 
perspectives and ways of doing research and kept me from falling 
in the trap of spending too much time just exploring one issue or 
theme in my research. 
I also thank Peter Mollinga for his efforts and drive in keeping 
the MTt group together. The regional workshops that he 
organised served as a useful monitoring tool to track progress and 
the feedback that I received helped me complete my thesis in time. 
My participation in the MTI Programme brought me in close 
interaction with several other researchers. What developed was a 
cohesive group and we shared as much fun and laughter together 
as we shared our research experiences. With great fondness will I 
remember my association with R. Manimohan, Shree Prakash 
Singh Rajput, Puspa Raj Khanal, Esha Shah, Anjal Prakash, Suman 
Gautam, Amreeta Regmi, Bala Raju Nikku, Preeta Lall, Jyothi 
Krishnan and G Mini. The series of regional workshops that we 
attended brought us together as a well-knit group with an 
interesting range of experiences to share. 
In the course of my field work, invaluable support was 
provided by the SOPPECOM team at Pune, Maharashtra with 
whom I interacted on several occasions, in person, as well as via 
email. In particular, I thank Dr. R.K.Patil, Dr. S.N. Lele and Mr. 
Sane for patientiy answering many of my questions on several 
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attention, this research would have never been possible. 
I thank Vikram Dayal, my friend and colleague at TERI , for 
stimulating discussions on research through our association in 
T E R I and in the course o f my Ph.D research. At Wageningen, I 
acknowledge the brief, but interesting exchange of ideas with Joost 
Oorthuizen, Margreet Zwarteveen, Jeroen Warner and Jeroen Vos. 
Trudy Freriks and Gerda de Fauw provided valuable administrative 
support and made my stays in Wageningen smooth and 
comfortable. 
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nieces, for the welcome breaks they provided from my work. 
Finally, I thank God for his blessings, kindness and generosity. 
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Irrigation has played an important role in India's agrarian 
development and transition and in achieving self-sufficiency in 
food production. It is estimated that though only 28% of India's 
cultivated land is irrigated, it produces 56% of her agricultural 
output (GOI 2000). Agriculture, in turn, employs 75% of India's 
labour force, though it produces only a third of her GDP. Until the 
1950s and 1960s, an increase in agricultural production was 
attained chiefly through an expansion in the area under cultivation. 
Having reached the ceiling for expanding the land under 
cultivation, increases in production since then have been achieved 
through increases in yield and cropping intensity (GOI 2000; Vyas 
1994). In particular, the spread of irrigation, through private 
tubewells and canal water helped sustain cropping intensity in the 
northwest, which became the cradle of the green revolution. 
It has been argued that irrigation in India has lived up both to 
its productive and protective role in terms of its impact on 
agricultural productivity, farm incomes and protection against 
drought (Dhawan 1988). As the incidence of rural poverty has been 
found to be inversely related to both the rate of growth of crop 
output and the irrigation factor, planners and policy-makers have 
seen investment in irrigation as an indirect instrument for 
eradicating rural poverty. Thus, there has been a huge resource 
commitment: since independence, over Rs 600 billion or US $80 
billion (in constant 1980 prices) have been invested by the 
government (World Bank 1999a). Together with China, India's 
irrigated area now exceeds that of other countries. 
However, as elsewhere in the world, there has been widespread 
disenchantment with the performance of canal irrigation systems in 
India (World Bank 1999a, 1991; Mitra 1996; Saleth 1996a, 1996b; 
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G O I 2000). The commonly cited problems in India's irrigation 
sector have been the widespread incidence of salinity, alkalinity and 
waterlogging, inequity between the head and tail reaches, the poor 
state o f repairs and maintenance and the widening gap between 
irrigation potential created and utilised. There are also financial 
constraints. It is estimated that the cost o f creating 1 hectare of 
irrigation potential rose from Rs 8620 in 1950-51 to Rs. 29587 by 
the year 1992-93 (GOI 2000). As an ultimate constraint, it is 
estimated that even when all of India's irrigation potential is 
utilised, half of her cultivated land would still be rainfed. 
There has now been awareness of problems in the planning 
and functioning of canal irrigation systems in India for more than 
three decades (Mollinga 2000). Over this period of time, the focus 
o f the debate has varied; it has moved from an emphasis on 
physical infrastructure and aclministrative issues to include agro-
ecological, institutional and developmental concerns. 
This book concerns itself with Irrigation Management 
Transfer, often advocated by policy-makers as a solution to the ills 
o f the irrigation sector. Irrigation Management Transfer (IMT) is a 
term used to denote a variety of initiatives in devolving 
management responsibility and authority from the state to the 
irrigators (Turral 1995). 1 This devolution usually takes place to 
farmers' groups called variously as water users associations 
(WUAs), water user organisations or farmers' organisations for 
irrigation. Moves towards devolution of authority and 
responsibility to users have been led largely by financial pressures, 
both internal and externally imposed by international lending 
agencies, on governments which have been either unable to finance 
recurring costs of irrigation or to recover costs by collecting fees 
from water users.2 Irrigation Management Transfer has thus come 
to be seen as a way to relieve governments of financial burdens and 
to improve productivity and sustainability of irrigation systems 
(Kolavalli and Brewer 1999; Kloezen 2002). 
In India, policies and programmes for establishing WUAs are 
at different levels of formulation and implementation in 13 states 
(Ballabh 2002). 3 Through this research, I seek to contribute to a 
. better understanding of the implementation of these policies in two 
Indian states, namely, Haryana and Maharashtra (Map 1.1).4 I 
examine how a policy intervention translates into practice. What 
happens when a policy seeking to establish WUAs comes to the 
ground? I describe how the implementation process is shaped by 
Haryana and Maharashtra on the map of India 
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the perceptions of the actors involved, their relationships with each 
other, as well as how they are able to articulate their interests and 
pursue them further in the implementation process. The practical 
constraints and bottlenecks to policy implementation are discussed. 
T o facilitate this analysis, I distinguish between a linear model 
o f the policy process and an interactive one (Thomas and Grindle 
1990). 5 A linear or rational model supposes that a reform proposal 
gets on the policy agenda for government action, a decision is 
made on the proposal and the new policy or institutional 
arrangement is implemented, either successfully or unsuccessfully. 
An interactive model, that has influenced the approach adopted in 
this book, on the other hand, views policy reform as a process, one 
in which interested parties can exert pressure for change at many 
points. Understanding the location, strength, and stakes involved in 
these attempts to promote, alter, or reverse policy reform initiatives 
is central to understanding the outcomes. Thus, a policy reform 
initiative may be altered or reversed at any stage in its life cycle by 
the pressures and reactions of those who oppose it. 
The analysis o f the process of policy implementation is 
particularly of relevance in the state of Maharashtra. This state, 
along with the neighbouring state of Gujarat, is considered to be a 
cradle o f co-operation, with a wide variety of institutional forms in 
all agrarian sectors. Then, in such an environment, why have 
efforts at forming WUAs in canal irrigation been limited in their 
scale? There is resistance among the actors - the farmers as well as 
the Irrigation Department- who benefit from the status quo and 
thwart efforts at WUA formation. While two NGOs have made 
some efforts at WUA formation, they are constrained in their 
ability to produce reform at a scale larger than a local one. 
The analysis of the implementation process in the state of 
Haryana suggests that state governments contemplating WUA 
establishment need a greater clarity about what they seek to 
accomplish through WUA formation, apart from this being done 
primarily under persuasion or pressure from donors and funding 
agencies. To be implemented successfully, a proposal for change 
must find acceptance among the affected constituencies - in this 
case the farmers as well as the irrigation bureaucracy- who need to 
be convinced that change is indeed necessary. 
Introduäion 5 
An Interdisciplinary Perspective on Water Users Associations 
This book seeks to contribute to developing an inter-disciplinary, 
sociotechnical perspective on the analysis of the organisational 
dynamics o f water users associations.6 These dynamics are shaped 
by technology and social relationships. From this perspective, there 
are two sub-questions: (1) what are the implications of technology, 
or the design of canal irrigation, for the establishment and working 
of WUAs and (2) what are the organisational dynamics of water 
users associations, or how do WUAs behave as organisational 
entities? T o answer the latter of these two questions, I have 
examined aspects of the local context in which the water users 
associations are embedded. Patterns of elite dominance and 
leadership, internal power structures and conflicts inside the WUAs 
as well as the context of rule enforcement and violation have been 
explored. Equity in water distribution has been examined. 
The theoretical framework for this book highlights two levels 
of interaction (1) between the water users and the bureaucracy, 
mediated by the technology, social relations and rules for water 
distribution and (2) among the users, where, too, the interactions 
are mediated by the technology, social relationships, and rules for 
water distribution. The relationship between the users and the 
bureaucracy is mediated by technology at two levels. The first is the 
design principles. In protective canal irrigation, a concept that is 
explained in the following chapter, this is through some form of 
rationing or distribution of scarce water supplies. The second 
interface is through the tangible forms of technology: outlets and 
hydraulic structures. This interface is further shaped by the rules, 
norms and practices for water distribution. 
Implications of technology for WUA formation 
In this book, I examine the relevance of two different design 
settings - the shejpali system of water distribution prevalent in 
Western India and the warabandi system prevalent in Northwest 
India and Pakistan - for establishing WUAs. The design of canal 
irrigation shapes the organisational structure that is needed for its 
operation and to that extent has relevance for establishing WUAs. 
Further, it influences the extent to which water management and 
distribution practices can change by forming water users 
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associations, and the extent to which control relations between the 
users and the bureaucracy can be altered. 
Shejpali is partially a demand-based system in which the 
Irrigation Department allocates water in consideration of a farmer's 
request according to his land, crops, and need. It is practiced in the 
states o f Maharashtra and Gujarat in Western India. Under shejpali, 
it is optional for an irrigator to take water in a season, and at the 
start of the season he has to file an application indicating the area 
and crop, and number o f watering turns desired. Water is supplied 
to the farmers' fields through gated pipe oudets. 
Warabandi, on the other hand, is a supply driven system. Water 
is allocated to a farmer as a right based on his land area within the 
Cultivable Command Area. A farmer is then allotted his share and 
turn according to a pre-determined rotation schedule specifying the 
day of the week, time, and minutes of duration for which he will 
take water. There are no gates at the oudet. The flow of water from 
the oudets is supposed to be directed to one field at a time as per 
the water distribution schedule. The water is supposed to flow day 
and night for the allotted number of days. Farmers operate 
warabandi below the oudets. The government's main role is to 
assist in preparation of the water distribution schedule and in 
settling the disputes among the farmers. While a detailed discussion 
and comparison of warabandi and shejpali is reserved for chapter 2, 
the differences between the two systems are summarised in table 
1.1. 
As will be shown in chapter 2, warabandi and shejpali also have 
different contexts of water scarcity. In this book, the implications 
of these different systems of water distribution for establishing 
WUAs are examined. In particular, I focus on the implications of 
the different types of oudet structures: the gated pipe oudets in use 
in shejpali vis-á-vis ungated proportional dividers (open flumes and 
adjustable proportionate modules) in warabandi. 
Oudets are .a very important structure in a canal system 
(Mahbub and Gulhati 1951). Firsdy, they are the points through 
which water is distributed from the minors and taken to the 
farmers' fields through watercourses. Since the crucial question in 
irrigation is whether farmers get water at the time, place and 
quantity that they desire, and this factor is shaped by the oudet 
structures, they are a subject of interest for irrigators as well as 
engineers. Secondly, they are the points where the management o f 
the canal system moves from the hands of the public 
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aclministration to the farmers. Thus, an outlet structure is the point 
of transfer of responsibility and hence of great significance in 
Irrigation Management Transfer programmes. Thirdly, oudets are 
the signposts of struggle, their design being altered and re-altered 
through the balance of power representing interactions among the 
involved actors (Mollinga and Bolding 1996; Mollinga 1998a). For 
this reason, a difference in oudet structures is also a starting point 
for understanding conflicts around water. 
TABLE 1.1: Shejpali and warabandi systems: a comparison 
Criteria Warabandi ShejpaR 
Outlets Ungated proportional 
dividers 
Gated pipe oudet 
structures 
Staff requirements Smaller Higher 
Role of irrigation 
agency 
Preparing the distribution 
schedule 
Releasing water as per 
farmers' applications 
Engineering and 
managerial control 
required 
Limited Higher 
Choice of crops Free Restricted 
Scope for farmer 
involvement 
Implementing the 
schedule; limited role in 
financial or managerial 
responsibility above the 
outlet 
Higher: possibilities of 
involving farmers at 
different levels of system 
operation 
An approach to rules, law and institutional frameworks 
Institutional frameworks are approached from the perspective of 
post-institutionalism (Benda Beckmann F von, 2001). This 
perspective problematises the relationships between the rule 
aspects, the normative legal institutional framework, the social 
relationships that develop in their context and the social practices 
diese rules purport to regulate and which maintain or change the 
relationships and the normative institutional framework. This could 
be contrasted with new institutional economics approaches 
followed by authors like Ostrom (1990, 1992) and Tang (1991, 
1992) that focus on institutions as "rules in use" for resource 
appropriation and management. In this book, I show that rules are 
8 Institutions, Technology and Water Control 
important in that they have enabling and constraining aspects. 
However, they are mainly mobilised as resources by individuals to 
accomplish certain objectives. Further, the ability of individuals to 
mobilise rules as resources is shaped by social relationships, 
especially the relations of power. An inter-disciplinary perspective 
on rules also shows that in canal irrigation, rules for water 
distribution are an expression of a certain configuration of 
technology and social relationships. Rules are embedded in design 
and social relationships. 
Further, rules and law are approached from the perspective of 
legal pluralism. Benda Beckmann, F von (1988) reserves the 
concept of legal pluralism to denote the "duplicate nature of 
institutions, rules, and processes, as also the relationship between 
different normative systems".7 Legal pluralism is an umbrella 
concept indicating the condition that more than one legal system or 
institution co-exist with respect to the same set of activities (Benda 
Beckmann, F von 2001). Legal pluralism helps us understand the 
interface of different sets of laws and normative systems with 
regard to the same set o f activities. As a concept, legal pluralism 
comes particularly to the fore in examining water distribution in 
this book, when I examine the water distribution system under 
warabandi irrigation. 
Human agency and social interaction are explored through the 
concept of power? This concept is used in an absolute sense and in 
a relative sense. In an absolute sense, it refers to a transformative 
capacity, as defined by Giddens (1984). There is an assumption that 
as actors, human beings have certain goals and purposes. They seek 
to act in a way that produces the outcomes that they desire. 
Further, a certain outcome would not have existed if individual 
actors had acted otherwise. In a relative sense, power is seen as 
exercised through regularised relations of autonomy and 
dependence (Giddens 1979,1984). 
Related to the concept of power is that of control. The 
Concise Oxford Dictionary defines control as ". . .(to) dominate, 
command". In essence, control is a form of exercise of power. 
Mollinga (1998a) distinguishes three dimensions of water control 
(1) technical (2) organisational and (3) socio-economic and 
political control. Technical control implies "guiding-manipulating-
mastering of physical processes." Essentially, it is exercised through 
the operation of physical artefacts, such as the canal irrigation 
system. Organisational control is the "commanding-managing of 
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people's behaviour." It pertains to organising and co-ordinating a 
set of activities among people. Socio-economic and political 
control relate to "the regulation of social processes and that of 
people's labour" (Mollinga 1998a: 28). These forms of control are 
inter-related. Technical control wields social and managerial 
control: a change in technical control relations between the users 
and the bureaucracy translates into a change in managerial and 
social control relations. 
Power and control relationships in local water management 
shape the exercise of accountability.9 Accountability relationships, 
in this book, are discussed at two levels. The first level is between 
the WUA management body and the WUA members. The exercise 
of accountability relationships between the WUA members and 
their leaders is shaped by power relationships. The location of 
WUA leaders in village networks that allocate resources and inputs 
may enable them to evade accountability to other WUA members. 
The second level at which accountability relationships is discussed 
is between the water users and the Irrigation Department. An issue 
that is raised is whether the formation of a water users association 
allows a set of mutual accountability relationships to develop 
between the irrigators and the Irrigation Department. Does the 
formation of WUAs seek to make the Irrigation Department 
accountable to water users for water delivery, or do water users 
associations merely remain arms of the bureaucracy carrying out 
certain functions that are delegated to them? 
An essential aspect of the organisational dynamics of WUAs 
that is shaped by technology and social relationships is equity. 
Equity is a value-laden concept with different meanings and 
connotations. It derives its meaning in the socio-economic milieu 
of society with its values, beliefs, traditions and established 
principles of social behaviour (Paul and Kulkarni 1984). In the 
case of irrigation, it may refer differentiy to equal allocations of 
water between head and tail-enders, allocations proportional to the 
size of land-holdings, an equal amount of water allocated per acre 
per family or to preferential allocations to smaller farmers vis-á-vis 
larger farmers. It could also refer to the availability of water as per 
design, or as per crop water requirements. The failure to consider 
equity from the farmers' point of view is understood to be a major 
cause of much of the relatively poor performance associated with 
system rehabilitation and modernisation (Levine and Coward 
1989). 
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In the Indian literature on irrigation, equity has been studied 
both for canal and ground water. A distinction is made between 
spatial and inter-personal or inter-class equity in gains from 
irrigation (Dhawan 1989). Studies of groundwater irrigation point 
to the pre-emption of the resource by the rural elite (Chambers, 
Saxena and Shah 1989; Shah 1993; Nagaraj, Frasier and Sampath 
1999; Moench 1994). 1 0 In the case of canal irrigation, a major 
concern identified is the over appropriation of water by head-
enders (Rao 1984; Dhawan 1989; Mitra 1986). 1 1 
The subject of equity inside water users associations, however, 
has received relatively litde attention. In this book, equity in water 
users associations is examined at two levels (1) the nature of 
relationship among the actors in the water users associations 
particularly in terms of the relationship between WUA leaders and 
other members and (2) equity in water distribution itself. 
This book examines the relationships between these different 
dimensions of control, power and accountability relationships in 
the context of local water management as a form of local resource 
management. Van Steenbergen (1997) defines local resource 
management as the management of the resource by the users 
themselves. It is to be distinguished from collective action that is 
defined in terms of the effort of a group or category of people to 
accomplish a common or shared objective, from which the 
members of the group would stand to benefit. 
These issues, namely the interaction between the social, 
technical, and organisational dimensions of water control, and 
between the legal institutional framework and rules and social 
relationships inside the water users associations, receive relatively 
litde attention in the existing approaches to studying water users 
associations.12 These bodies of work make valuable contributions 
to our understanding of water users associations, but are silent on 
several aspects of their internal dynamics as well as the nature of 
relationships among the WUA members and their relationships 
with the irrigation bureaucracy. 
A major critique of the prevailing literature on water users 
associations is the limited treatment of technology. The implications 
of the design of canal irrigation for establishing WUAs have received 
very litde attention.13 In this book, the term technology is used in the 
sense of the design characteristics of canal irrigation and their 
physical manifestations such as oudets and hydraulic structures. This 
book makes a case for mainstreaming discussions of technology into 
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debates on Irrigation Management Transfer, by arguing that 
technology is an important consideration that influences the extent 
to which water management and distribution practices can change by 
forming WUAs and control relations between the users and the 
bureaucracy can be altered. 
Research Sites and Methodology 
In Maharashtra, fieldwork was carried out on the Minor No. X of 
the Mula Right Bank Canal of the Mula Irrigation system.14 The 
Mula Dam was built late in the 1960s to harness the waters o f the 
Mula river, a sub-distributary of the Godavari river system (Lele 
and Paul 1994). The Mula river rises in the Western Ghats and 
flows to the east for about 160 km. and meets the Pravara river, a 
tributary of the Godavari, at Newasa in Ahmednagar district (Map 
1.2). The dam has a gross storage capacity o f 767 million cum (M 
cum) and a live storage capacity of 609 M cum. It is located 60 kms 
upstream of the confluence and was completed in 1971-72 to 
irrigate 80,800 ha in 149 drought prone villages of the district.15 
In Haryana, research was carried out pardy on the Western 
Yamuna Canal System and pardy on the Bhakra Canal system.1 6 
The Western Yamuna Canal is the older of the two and irrigates 
mainly the eastern parts o f the state (Map 1.3). It diverts the waters 
of the Yamuna river. Constructed originaEy in the pre-British 
times, this modern canal system is one of the earliest British 
engineered systems in India (Brewer et al. 1999). The Bhakra system 
built since independence stores the waters of the Sudej river in the 
Bhakra reservoir, designed to irrigate the western parts of the 
state.1 7 
There were two criteria that guided my site selection. First, I 
wanted to compare a WUA in warabandi irrigation with one in 
shejpali to look at the implications of technology, or the design of 
canal irrigation, for WUA establishment.18 Second, I was looking 
for WUAs that already had some sort of an institutional history 
that would enable an interesting exploration of their organisational 
dynamics. In Maharashtra, the Lakshmi Narayan WUA came 
closest to this criterion. In Haryana, it was the Rampur WUA. In 
Haryana, I chose one more, the Sitapur WUA, because it made an 
interesting comparison with the Lakshmi Narayan WUA in terms 
of the extent to which control relations did or did not change with 
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WUA formation, and how that related to the technology, or design 
of canal irrigation.19 
During my fieldwork, I visited the selected research sites across 
the different irrigation seasons. I used a mix of qualitative research 
tools such as direct observation, semi-structured interviews, relying 
on key informants and studies of written records. I interviewed 
four categories of actors: farmers and members of the WUAs, 
members of the irrigation bureaucracy (the Irrigation Department 
and other state organisations such as the Command Area 
Development Authority), facilitators and Non Government 
Organisations and representatives of donors and funding agencies. 
Another set of research activities comprised observations along the 
canal, minors and watercourses, to observe water distribution 
practices and the strategies employed by farmers to improve water 
control, as well as their interface with the irrigation bureaucracy. 
I used the case study method of research. A case study is an 
empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon 
within its real-life context when the boundaries between 
phenomenon and context are not clearly evident and in which 
multiple sources of evidence are used (Yin 1984). A case study is 
used to 'paint a portrait o f a particular social phenomenon' (Hakim 
1987: 27). The case study method of research differs from a 
sample-based study. A case study seeks not to generalise to a 
population, as would a study based on a sample, but to a theory. 
The focus, thus, is not on statistical generalisation, but analytic 
generalisation (Yin 1984). 2 0 Case studies are often considered to be 
the most flexible of all research designs. This is largely because of 
the ability of the case to draw from a number of sources of data. 
I have worked with the principle of grounded theory. A grounded 
theory is one that is inductively derived from the study it 
represents. Thus, data collection, analysis and theory stand in 
reciprocal relationship with each other (Strauss and Corbin 1990). 
It is a process whereby model building and information are 
constandy interchanged (Majchrzak 1984). Research proceeds 
through an empirico-inductive process with theories and tools that 
the researcher brings into dialogue with the evidence.21 
Plan of This Book 
This book has seven chapters. In chapter 2, the warabandi and 
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shejpali systems of water distribution are described. This chapter 
provides a brief review of the state of research in these systems and 
of the issues and debates surrounding their operation. 
Chapter 3 is the first of the empirical chapters. This chapter 
provides the legal and policy framework under which the WUAs 
that I selected function. It describes the process o f policy 
implementation for WUA establishment in Haryana and 
Maharashtra. 
Chapter 4 addresses the research question: how does 
technology, or the design of canal irrigation, matter in establishing 
WUAs? I show that discussions o f technology are important in the 
debates on Irrigation Management Transfer, since the design of 
canal irrigation influences the extent to which water management 
and distribution practices can be changed through WUA formation 
and the extent to which control relations between the users and the 
bureaucracy can be altered. 
Chapter 5 focuses more closely on the following of the 
research questions, namely on an exploration of the organisational 
dynamics o f the water users associations studied. The embedded 
nature of the processes of local water management is described. I 
describe the organisational dynamics of the Rampur WUA and 
how they relate to other aspects of social organisation-the division 
of society into social units, domination by local elite, the 
reproduction of power relations inside the water users association 
and the embedded nature of conflicts.2 2 
T o understand the internal dynamics of the water users 
associations, it was necessary to look at the internal processes of 
water distribution and at equity, from that perspective. This is the 
subject of the next chapter, chapter 6. 
In chapter 7 the summary and conclusions of this research are 
presented. I show that understanding the technical design 
characteristics of canal irrigation is important for understanding the 
prospects for policy reform initiatives. The potential for reform 
varies with the technology for water distribution. Shejpali and 
warabandi systems have a different potential for reform. Three sets 
of policy reform measures are described: water rights reform and 
market creation23, pricing, and Irrigation Management Transfer. I 
conclude the chapter by discussing some avenues for further 
research on protective irrigation and on irrigation management 
reform. 
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Notes 
1 The terms Irrigation Management Transfer, Irrigation Management 
Turnover and Participatory Irrigation Management are often used 
interchangeably to describe the process of devolution of management 
tasks to irrigators. In the Indian context, the use of the term Irrigation 
Management Transfer has been confined to the academic community 
(Brewer et al. 1999; IIM(A)-IWMI 1999; Pant 1999, 2000; Kolavaffi and 
Brewer 1999). The term Irrigation Management Turnover has been barely 
used in the Indian context. Instead, Participatory Irrigation Management 
is the more widely used term. Participatory Irrigation Management, or 
PIM, "refers to the involvement of irrigation users in all aspects of 
irrigation management, and at all levels" (EDI 1998:9). Its use is widely in 
vogue among academics (Jairath 1999; Parthasarathy 2000; Raju, Meinzen-
Dick and Gulati 2000; ISS 1999; Brewer and Sakthivadivel 2000), the 
bureaucracy (Ailawadhi and Bansal 2001; Mathur and Sibal 2000), and 
NGOs and training organisations (Lele 2000; IRDAS-WALAMTARI 
1999). Multilateral organisations such as the World Bank have done their 
bit to popularise this term (EDI 1998; World Bank 2000). The usage of 
the term has received a boost from its use in the wider international arena 
with the establishment of INPIM, the International Network on 
Participatory Irrigation Management, and later, the establishment of 
IndiaNPIM, or the Indian Network on Participatory Irrigation 
Management. 
2 In countries such as Mexico, these reforms emerged as a strong reaction 
against a long period of extensive state intervention followed by a series 
of political and economic crises in the 1980s and 1990s, radically 
dirninishing the size and scope of state intervention (Kloezen 2002). For a 
review of IMT experiences, see also Wijayratna and Vermillion (1994), 
Svendsen and Nott (1997), Brewer et al. (1999), and Korten and Siy 
(1989). 
3 For a review of the thinking regarding user involvement in irrigation 
management in the Indian context, see Pant and Verma (1983), Ambler 
(1994), Maloney and Raju (1994), and Hooja and Joshi (2000). See also 
Parthasarathy (1998) and Brewer et al. (1999). 
4 The other states marked on this map have been referred to elsewhere in 
this book. 
5 See also Crosby (1996), Brinkerhoff (1996), Hogwood and Gunn (1984) 
and Long and van der Ploeg (1989). 
6 The sociotechnical approach developed at the Irrigation and Water 
Engineering Group of Wageningen University, the Netherlands, seeks to 
combine scientific knowledge, practical engineering skills and social 
understanding in the analysis of irrigation processes and interactions 
(Vincent 1997). For more on the evolution of this approach, see Kloezen 
and Mollinga (1992) and Mollinga (1998a). For applications of this 
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approach, see Kloezen (2002), Wahaj (2001) and Pradhan (1996). 
7 Essentially, writings in this field of work question the legal centrist 
perspective that all legal ordering is rooted in what is called state law. It is 
recognised that there are multiple regulator)' orders and that these are 
omnipresent. For a review of different theoretical issues and debates 
around the concept of legal pluralism, see Woodman (1998). See also 
Merry (1988), Vanderlinden (1989), Griffiths (1986), Spiertz and Wiber 
(1996) and Benda Beckmann, F von (1989). For applications of the 
concept of legal pluralism to water rights and distribution, see Meinzen-
Dick and Bakker (2001), Bruns and Meinzen-Dick (2000), Spiertz (2000), 
Vermillion (2000) and Spiertz and de Jong (1992). 
8 This could be contrasted with the rational, utility maximising postulate 
used by authors like Ostrom (1990, 1992) and Tang (1991, 1992). For a 
discussion and critique of the concepts of human agency in the irrigation 
management literature, see Mollinga (1998a, 2001a). 
9 The significance of the concept of accountability has increased in the 
context of recent debates on decentralisation and local governance. For 
conceptual treatments of accountability, see Paul (1992) and Blair (2000). 
For a discussion of accountability issues in irrigation, see Merrey (1996), 
Vos (2002), Kloezen (2002), Malano and Hofwegen (1999) and Mollinga 
(1998a). 
1 0 A more recent analysis of agrarian change and groundwater markets in 
Gujarat is provided by Dubash (2002). Dubash argues that groundwater 
markets are embedded in and shaped by ecological and social 
characteristics, irrigation infrastructure, history and class power. 
1 1 In the context of protective irrigation in South Asia, discourses on 
equity focus on the discrepancy between head and tail reaches of the 
system, both with regard to discharges from the canal as well as the 
quality of groundwater supplies (Kijne and Vander Velde 1992; Bhutta 
and Vander Velde 1992; Latif 1993). See chapter 2. 
1 2 A review is provided by Zwarteveen (1999). See also Kloezen (2002), 
Uphoff (1986), Ambler (1994), Maloney and Raju (1994), Gulati, 
Meinzen-Dick and Raju (1999), Meinzen-Dick, Raju and Gulati (2000, 
2002), Brewer et al. (1999), Shah (2000), Vermillion (1999), and Kolavalli 
and Brewer (1999). 
1 3 See also Horst (1987, 1998). Horst argues that in discussions on 
Irrigation Management Transfer, technology has received very little 
attention. At best, physical rehabilitation of systems is considered, taking 
the existing technology as given. For a discussion of the implications of 
irrigation management tasks and roles for the organisational structure, see 
also Yoder (1994) and Martin and Yoder (1987). 
1 4 Some sites were also studied briefly on the Waghad and jayakwadi 
projects in the exploratory phase. I have changed the names of the water 
users associations that I studied as well as the villages and minors or 
distributaries on which they are located to protect the identity of the 
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research sites. The names of some of the members of my study have also 
been changed for the same reason. 
1 5 Agrarian change and development was brought into Ahmednagar 
district, where my research site was located, by the sugarcane revolution 
of the early 20th century. This district has a strong proliferation of co-
operatives in several agrarian sectors. For a review, see Baviskar (1980). 
See also Attwood (1987,1992,1995) and Chithelen (1985). 
1 6 Sites on the Bhakra Canal system were studied only briefly in the 
exploratory phase. 
1 7 For further details on these systems, see Malhotra (1988). The research 
sites are located in Rohtak and Jind districts of the state. In Haryana, 
agrarian change was brought about through the green revolution in the 
1960s and 1970s. With an emphasis on the use of high yielding varieties of 
seeds in optimum combination with other agricultural inputs, increases in 
production during this phase were achieved primarily through increases in 
productivity. For a review of the effects of the green revolution, see Paul 
(1989), Kumar (1989), and Sen (1974). In more recent years, the 
ecological sustainability of the green revolution has been put to question. 
See Rao and Gulati (1994) and Joshi and Tyagi (1991). 
1 8 For more on comparative research see Yin (1984). For a review of 
comparative research in irrigation, see Vos (2002). 
1 9 That explains the difference in the presentation of data in these two 
WUAs in this book. 
2 0 However, as the number of cases increases, the principle of analytic 
generalisation tends to be replaced by that of statistical inference (Hakim 
1987). 
2 1 In operational terms, this meant that I tried to theorise about what I 
saw in the field. The process of defining and developing key concepts was 
carried out through the course of my fieldwork. 
2 2 The organisational dynamics of the Lakshmi Narayan WUA are 
presented in chapter 4. The thematic focus of that chapter, however, is on 
the changing of control relations between the users and the bureaucracy. 
The dynamics of the Lakshmi Narayan WUA are taken up again for 
discussion along with those of the Rampur WUA in chapter 5. 
2 3 The subject of water rights in joindy managed canal irrigation has, in 
fact, received relatively little attention in the Indian context (Mollinga 
1998a). 
2 
In this chapter, the warabandi and shejpali systems of water 
distribution are described. The first objective of this chapter is to 
describe what these forms of water distribution entail. The second 
objective is to provide a brief review of the state of research in 
these two systems. Through this chapter, I provide the 
technological context of my research sites. 
In section 1, the concept of protective irrigation is introduced. 
I describe its genesis as a specific form of irrigation under colonial 
rule with certain policy objectives. The technical design, 
organisational and socio-economic characteristics of protective 
irrigation are presented. I describe their conflict with farmers' 
objectives. In Section 2, the warabandi system of irrigation 
prevalent in Northwest India and Pakistan is introduced. Its basic 
premises and operation are discussed. I review some of the 
literature on the experience with this system to assess its merits and 
demerits. In Section 3, I describe the operation of the shejpali 
system and compare it with the block system. 
The chapter concludes in section 4 with a discussion of some 
of the discourses surrounding protective irrigation. I examine why 
the understanding of protective irrigation is essential to 
appreciating irrigation management concerns and how this 
understanding is central to my research. 
Protective Irrigation: Concept, Evolution and Characteristics 
Protective irrigation is a specific form of large-scale canal irrigation 
found in the semi-arid, drought prone areas of the Indian sub-
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continent (Mollinga 1998a). These irrigation systems are designed 
and operated such that the available water in the rivers or 
reservoirs is spread diinly over a large area in an equitable manner. 
The objective is not to match water supply with crop water 
requirements. Instead, the goal is to reach as many farmers as 
possible, and to protect them against famine and crop failure, 
which would otherwise occur in regions o f low and erratic rainfall. 
This is to be distinguished from the dominant design practice in 
irrigation engineering, which is to design irrigation systems so that 
water supply covers the full crop water requirements, either 
completely by irrigation or in addition to rainfall ([urriëns, Mollinga 
and Wester 1996). 
The concept of protective irrigation emerged as an element of 
British colonial irrigation policy in the 1 9 * century (Mollinga 
1998a). At that point o f time, protective irrigation undertook to 
supply limited quantities of water to subsistence-oriented farmers 
growing traditional food crops. This would protect crops and 
livelihoods from drought, prevent famine and social unrest, and 
secure colonial rule. 
Thus, "Protective works, as their name implies, exist primarily 
for protection against famine, not to bring revenue to the state" 
(Narain 1922: 272). Similarly, as Attwood (1987) put it, when 
protective irrigation works were constructed in the Deccan in the 
early 20 t h century, the 'protective nature' of Indian canal systems 
implied that (1) the canals were intended to protect food crop 
production against droughts over as wide an area as possible and 
(2) they were not required to be self-financing. In other words, the 
authorities did not expect to recover the full interest on capital 
costs from irrigation charges. 
After independence, protective irrigation became part of the 
government's policy for agrarian development, with an emphasis 
both on growth and equity objectives: production and productivity 
increase and the spread of the benefits of development over 
different sections of the population and different regions (Mollinga 
1998a). It has since guided the construction of canal irrigation 
projects in the phase of planned economic development. In 1987, 
the National Water Policy stated thus: "the irrigation intensity 
should be such as to extend the benefits of irrigation to as large a 
number of farm families as possible, keeping in view the need to 
maximise production" ( G O I / M O W R 1987: 9). In evaluating the 
contribution of irrigation to India's economic development, it has 
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been argued that irrigation has lived up both to its productive and 
protective role (Dhawan 1988). 
Historical origins of the concept 
The principle of protective irrigation has had different meanings in 
a historical context (Mollinga 1998a). As noted above, the concept 
emerged under British colonial rule, at a time when the sub-
continent was regularly struck by severe famines. The colonial 
authorities did not use the term protective irrigation at that time, 
but used the term "area protected" instead. This was to be 
distinguished from "irrigated area". An area was considered 
"protected" when a certain percentage of it received water to 
protect it from drought and crop failure. In the 1860s, a norm of 
42.5% of the area came to be accepted as "protected" in the 
Punjab. 
In the last quarter of the nineteenth century, the term acquired 
a second meaning, when protective irrigation systems came to be 
distinguished from productive irrigation systems. In the first half o f 
the nineteenth century, irrigation schemes had been geared 
primarily towards a maximum return on a rrunimum investment. 
This had generally been very remunerative, with a return of up to 
some times as much as 69.5% on the capital expenditure 
(Whitcombe 1983 and Stone 1984 cited in Bolding, Mollinga and 
Straaten 1995). These irrigation systems were called "productive 
irrigation systems." 
However, some changes took place after 1860, as the Imperial 
Crown took over ruling India from the East India Company 
(Mollinga 1998a). For irrigation development, this had certain 
implications. It led to a change in the way public works were 
financed, the establishment of an independent Public Works 
Department and a change in irrigation policy. This change in 
policy was formulated after the report of the Indian Famine 
Commission (1878-80), that drew attention to the indirect returns 
related to irrigation in terms of protection against famine. 
The Famine Commission of 1880 defined the general policy 
that the British Government should adopt in dealing with famines 
(Narain 1922). It emphasised the need for anticipating famines and 
being prepared for them beforehand. It insisted on the government 
direcdy taking steps to prevent famine and provide relief. As 
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measures of protection against famine, it recommended the 
extension of irrigation and railways and an encouragement of 
diversification of occupations. 
In 1879, a productivity test had been introduced for decision-
making on the investment in canal irrigation. A per cent figure had 
been fixed that was the cut-off for accepting new projects; the 
others were rejected. Those approved were called 'productive' 
irrigation systems Qurriens, Mollinga & Wester 1996). The Famine 
Commission, however, recommended constructing schemes with 
lower returns as well apart from productive irrigation schemes, 
with the aim chiefly of preventing famines and cutting on famine 
costs. These systems were referred to as 'protective irrigation 
systems'. A Famine Fund was created to this effect. The whole idea 
was further consolidated and given real momentum by the Indian 
Irrigation Commission of 1901-03. 
Protective irrigation works came to play an important role 
under British rule. Writing about the state of India's economy then, 
Narain (1922) wrote thus: " Famines have been frequent under 
British Rule, but thanks to the chain of protective railways, and the 
great irrigation works, they do not cause so much suffering now as 
they did in the past. Very great progress has been made in famine 
protection and farnine relief" (Narain 1922: 243). Further, "It 
would be difficult to overestimate the value to the country, o f these 
fine systems of irrigation works which may be said, with some 
slight reservations in respect of the Cauvery works in Madras, to 
have been entirely created by the British Government within the 
last eighty years. They irrigate annually over 11 million acres, and 
completely protect from farnine an area which, except in the 
Madras and Orissa deltas, may be said to vary from two to four 
times the area annually irrigated. In some parts, as in Sind, there 
can be no cultivation, and therefore no population, without canal 
irrigation. In others, the effect of the works in mamtaining or 
raising the level of the subsoil water, on which the well irrigation 
depends, is of the utmost value and importance. The value of the 
crops irrigated by the canals in a single year is about equal to the 
whole capital cost of the works, and in years of famine, the 
produce of the irrigated area, being largely available for transport to 
distressed tracts, becomes an important item in the general food 
supply of the country" (Report of the Indian Irrigation 
Commission 1901-03 cited in Narain 1922: 290). 
At present, the term protective irrigation has a third meaning. 
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It is used to indicate a form of large-scale irrigation, specific to the 
drought prone areas of the Indian sub-continent, and having 
particular technical, organisational and socio-economic 
characteristics. These characteristics are described in the following 
section. 
Technical design characteristics 
The goals of protective irrigation were sought to be realised 
through operational targets such as low irrigation intensity and high 
duties (or low water allowances) Qurriens & Landstra 1990). 1 By 
planning irrigation of part of the irrigable areas under canals only, 
and by limiting irrigation on a particular piece of land to one crop 
per year, the water is spread over a large area, and only part of the 
area commanded by the canal is irrigated. By designing a large area 
to be irrigated per unit discharge, supplementary irrigation is 
implied. The intensity of irrigation in many systems is less than 
100%, thereby lending them a characteristic of 'water-constrained 
systems' (Tilak and Rajvanshi 1991: 1). 
A further design characteristic is the supply orientation. Water 
supply into the system is not determined by actual, and fluctuating, 
demands in the field. Fine-tuning supply to demand, which is 
needed to maximise yield, is not aimed at. The supply orientation 
combined with the desire to keep the systems as cheap as possible 
(because they were unproductive systems yielding litde revenue) 
has led to a minimum of regulating devices for controlling water 
levels between the intake of the system (weir or dam) and the 
oudet command areas at the farmers' level (Mollinga 1998a). 
Organisational characteristics 
The above specific technical design characteristics translate into 
certain organisational and institutional characteristics. Since the aim 
is not to match supply with demand, control structures are limited. 
Thus, these systems have low management intensity (Jurriens, 
Mollinga and Wester 1996). 
The second organisational characteristic, apart from the low 
management intensity described above, is that of hierarchy 
(Mollinga 1998a). The supply orientation of protective systems fits 
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well with the top-down organisational structure of the Irrigation 
Department. This structure is based on the principle of upward 
flow of information and a downward flow of instructions. 
The third organisational characteristic is the institutional form 
of the rationing of irrigation water. Since these systems aim to 
spread water over a large area and number of farmers and the 
amount of water that a farmer is entided to receive is insufficient to 
cover full crop water requirements, implicit in their operation is a 
system of 'scarcity by design' (Jurriens, Mollinga and Wester 1996). 
This 'designed scarcity' necessitates a system of institutional 
rationing of water, spreading out limited supplies over a large 
number of farmers over a large area, where the objectives of an 
individual farmer may differ from those of system management. 
Where water is too limited to meet the demands of farmers, it 
may be rationed through controls over supply: by controls over the 
amount of water which flows to the fields, with the farmers being 
left to decide which crops they will grow within the constraint of a 
fixed water supply. This is the Northwest Indian model (Wade 
1976). In addition to supply side controls, there may be demand 
side controls, controls over the types of crops that may be grown, 
and over the areas on which they may be grown. This demand -
oriented method is used in much of the Deccan plateau,2 including 
Maharashtra. In South India, the control strategy for protective 
irrigation is localisation.3 
Socio-economic characteristics 
On account of its ability to contribute to the policy goals of equity, 
maximisation of farm output and agricultural incomes, the concept 
of protective irrigation has guided the construction and operation 
of large-scale canal irrigation systems in the phase of planned 
economic development in India (Mollinga 1998a). Economically, 
protective irrigation strives for high output per unit of water. A 
protective cropping pattern of light crops increases the total 
agricultural output of the irrigation system, as compared to 
concentrated irrigation. From a national policy perspective, thus, 
protective irrigation makes sense because (i) it increases agricultural 
output given the availability of a limited quantity of water (ii) it can 
generate more employment than wet irrigation, and (iii) it spreads 
the benefits of irrigation over a large number of producers. 
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Conflict with farmers' objectives 
These basic characteristics o f protective irrigation, however, imply 
an inherent conflict with the farmers' objectives. While the design 
and operation of protective irrigation systems is guided by the goal 
of maximising production per unit of water, farmers seek to 
maximise production of cash crops per unit o f land (Mollinga 
1998a). 
Table 2.1 contrasts the case of protective and productive 
irrigation. 
TABLE 2.1 Protective and Productive Irrigation 
Technical characteristic Protective Irrigation Productive Irrigation 
Irrigation intensity Low (around 100%) High (200% and more) 
Duty (acres/cusec) High (low water supply) Low (meeting crop 
water requirements) 
Crops Low water demanding High water demanding 
(sorghum, millet, (rice, sugarcane) 
oilseeds, etc.) 
Operational design Supply- oriented Demand -oriented 
Organisational 
characteristics 
Water availability Planned scarcity, Planned sufficiency, no 
requiring rationing rationing needed 
Cropping pattern Prescribed, or Farmer's choice 
controlled by 
government (except 
under warabandi 
system) 
Water flows Constant Varying with demand 
Socio-economic 
characteristics 
Yield optimisation per Unit of water Unit of land 
Benefits Spread Concentrated 
Major objective Food security/poverty Agricultural growth 
alleviation 
Farm labour Emphasis on family Emphasis on wage 
labour labour 
Orientation Towards subsistence Towards the market 
Source: Mollinga (1998a) 
On account of this inherent conflict, the original objectives of 
protective irrigation have rarely been achieved in practice. In 
Northwest India, these systems were designed to irrigate mainly 
wheat; in recent years, rice and sugarcane have emerged as 
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important crops (Jurriens, Mollinga and Wester 1996; Brewer et al., 
1999). In the early decades, the combination of a warabandi system 
with light crops such as wheat allowed the systems to work as 
designed (Jurriens 1993). Later, however, with the onset of the 
green revolution, the introduction of high yielding varieties o f seeds 
and the consequent commercialisation of agriculture, there 
occurred many changes in cropping practices. Farmers wanted to 
irrigate in two seasons instead of one. They wanted to irrigate all 
their land as against the low planned intensities, or at least more 
than planned. The initial high design duties, thus, became 
inadequate with the desire for more productive irrigation and the 
increase in rice cultivation. 
In their study in South India, Jurriens and Landstra (1990) note 
how the Irrigation Department was forced to find a compromise 
between the two objectives. The official duties were too high 
relative to the crop water requirements. Farmers wanted to take 
more water than they were entided to according to the prescribed 
duties. Thus, upstream farmers took more water than authorised, 
leaving too litde for the downstream farmers. Farmers took extra 
water to cultivate paddy instead of a light crop. They also tended to 
(1) irrigate all the land in both the seasons, instead of only part o f 
the land in each season (2) irrigate good land which was not 
localised and (3) supply water according to actual crop needs 
instead of the official duties. 
In a similar study for the Mula System in Maharashtra, Mitra 
(1986) notes that the area cultivated under different crops was 
different from that specified in the designed cropping area, with 
the highest discrepancy being for area under sugarcane. 
The Warabandi System 
Warabandi, prevalent in Northwest India and Pakistan, is a system 
of water distribution that is designed so that every farmer is entided 
to receive a pre-determined share of water in proportion to the size 
o f his land-holding (Malhotra, Raheja and Seckler 1984; Malhotra 
1988; Berkoff 1990; Bandaragoda 1998). As a system of water 
distribution, warabandi covers an area of about 24 million hectares 
of irrigated land in these two countries (Bandaragoda 1998). 4 
'Warn' means turn and 'bandi' means fixation. Thus, warabandi 
means fixation of turns (WALMI 1998a; Bandaragoda 1998). It 
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implies a rotational method of water distribution.5 The cardinal 
principle underlying the warabandi system of irrigation 
management is that the available water, whatever its quantum, is 
intended to be allocated to cultivators in equal proportion to their 
Culturable Command Area (CCA), and not only to some of the 
farmers in the command to meet their total demand. This is 
intended to impose water scarcity conditions in the system. 
The warabandi system is more than one hundred years old 
(Malhotra 1988; Malhotra, Raheja and Seckler 1984). Its origins can 
be traced to the late nineteenth century when large-scale canal 
systems direcdy fed from the rivers were constructed in Northwest 
India. Beginning in the 1880s, the British built a series of perennial, 
all-season canals, by controlling their flows over permanent weirs. 
The building of these canals was motivated largely by the political 
imperatives of consolidating state rule in the region (Gilmartin 
1994); the link between canal building, agricultural setdement, and 
political control was seen as being central to the construction and 
consolidation of state power. The expansion of the Indus basin 
irrigation system was seen by British officers as the key to 
expanding cultivation, increased government revenue and 
enhanced government prestige and control. It was also seen as a 
means of extending the contours of a scientific administration. 
Water supply in the rivers of Northwest India is perennial, but 
it is erratic, with variations from season to season and year to year 
(Malhotra 1988). Two options were available to the then British 
Government. The first would have been to confine the canal 
irrigation to such limited area as could be fully supported with the 
lowest available supply, leaving no gap between supply and 
demand. This would maximise production per unit of land, though 
not the production per unit of water. The other option was to 
extend distribution to a much larger area than could be supported 
by the lowest available supply and have perpetual scarcity 
conditions. This would also have meant that the resultant 
agricultural production and insurance against famine would have 
been at their optimum. The production would have been the 
maximum per unit of water available, though not per unit of land. 
Thus, "It would have a greater social appeal" (Malhotra 1988: l ) . 6 
Irrigation developments under British rule in the 19 t h century 
were characterised by a trial and error approach that served to 
define and develop a coherent irrigation policy, management and 
technology (van Halsema 2002). The early British systems were 
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essentially man-made river diversions that diverted water from the 
riverbeds to be picked up and used by farmers on their land. The 
development of the distribution network and command area were 
left to the farming communities who had to build their own supply 
canals and connect them with the government main or branch 
canal. 
This connection consisted of a simple open-cut along the 
banks o f the canal. Thus, there was littie or no control on water 
being taken up by each farmer or village channel. This process was 
regulated by the financial needs o f the farmers to build a channel 
and invest in irrigated agriculture. This, in turn, meant that 
agriculture was limited to only those who could afford it. The early 
development of irrigated command areas, therefore, was confined 
to a narrow strip along the government main and branch canals. 
This led to serious water distribution problems as head-enders 
started taking larger quantities of water and expanding and 
intensifying cropping at the cost of tail-end farmers. This was 
perceived as inequitable and called for further extension of control 
by irrigation authorities. These considerations ailminated in the 
passing of the Canal and Drainage Act (1873). 
By virtue of this Act, the irrigation engineers, through the 
office of the Canal Officers, were put at the centre stage o f 
irrigation development and management by empowering them to 
shape and take control of regulation of water distribution through 
technical as well as administrative means. This Act empowered the 
government to take over existing Rajbulas (secondary or distributary 
level canals) and remodel them to distribute water among different 
watercourses. In all new developments the distributary canal would 
henceforth be built and completed by the government before 
irrigation water would be supplied. 
Another consequence of this Act was that the management 
domain of the Irrigation Department and water users were defined. 
An outlet was defined by law as the delivery point where 
government water was delivered to the community. The oudet 
itself was defined as government property. All regulation of water 
upstream and through the oudet became the management domain 
o f irrigation authorities. In order to regulate water distribution and 
secure water delivery to the extremities of the command area, 
Canal Officers were empowered to close off temporarily the water 
supply to tertiary units to implement Tatils (rotation schedules). 
Section 37 o f the Act contained a provision for Canal Officers to 
Warabandi and Sbejpali as Forms of Protective Irrigation 29 
regulate water flows through outlets as deemed fit by them. 
Through the increases in the managerial control that the Act 
conferred, the irrigation authorities could seek the optimisation of 
command area development and tighten their grip on performance 
indicators.7 Though this Act enhanced the management capabilities 
to control the parameters of irrigation, the actual regulation on the 
ground was severely hampered by the technical inabilities of the 
irrigation authorities to control silt and discharges.8 The "unstable 
channels" that resulted from the occurrence of silt and scouring 
would effectively have varying water allowances. This meant that 
irrigation authorities could not fix the irrigation parameters in their 
operational management, but instead had to continuously adapt 
them to the new and changing capacity of the canals. One solution 
was found in replacing the open-cut oudets by Colabas (A colaba 
was a single pipe of standard size with a diameter of six inches or a 
multiple of the standard). 
However, their discharge would frequentiy vary either as a 
consequence of changing water levels in the supply canal due to 
scouring or silting or by excessive silt clearing in the watercourse by 
water users so as to increase the hydraulic head.9 Since the rate of 
water delivery at the oudet could not be controlled, the irrigation 
authorities could not be committed to formal allocation. In this 
process of continuously trying to stabilise the irrigation canals, the 
test of fair and proper water distribution seems mainly to have 
consisted of securing a reasonable water delivery to tail-end areas 
(van Halsema 2002). 
At this stage, British Engineers were conscious of two major 
problems of water distribution in the Indus basin. The first was the 
fluctuations in supply levels that were intrinsic to run-of-the river 
schemes. The second was the gradual rising and falling of full 
supply water levels due to silting, and scouring of the canal bed. 
British engineers sought to address this problem through the 
creation of two oudets. The first was the APM or the Adjustable 
Proportionate Module and the second was an open flume. Both 
these outlets comprise a narrow throat and a sloping sill. In the 
APM, in addition, a rounded block is placed on top of the throat to 
create an orifice. The discharge through these outlets depends on 
the upstream water level and the width of the throat and in the case 
of the APM, also on the height of the orifice, but not on the 
downstream water level. These innovations enabled the Irrigation 
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Operation of the warabandi system 
Since the water supply is inadequate to run the whole system 
continuously, warabandi works through a system of rotation (Tyagi 
and Mishra 1990; Malhotra 1998; Malhotra, Raheja and Seckler 
1984). This system of rationing works at three levels. First, a main 
canal carries the water from the source, which may be a river or a 
reservoir. The main canal feeds two or more branch canals that 
operate by rotation and may or may not run full supply. This is the 
primary distribution system and runs throughout the irrigation 
season with varying supply. Branch canals supply water to a large 
number of distributaries, which must run at full supply level by 
rotation. The distributaries operate by eight-day periods. This is the 
secondary distribution system. 
Distributaries supply water to watercourses through ungated, 
fixed discharge oudets. Watercourses are designed to run at full 
supply when the distributary is running full supply and its water is 
allocated by the farmers through the warabandi schedule. This is 
the tertiary water distribution system. A period of seven days (168 
hours) is divided among the farmers in proportion to the size of 
their land-holdings. An eight-day period for running the 
Department to fix the water allowances o f each canal by carefully 
mamtaining its regime balance. 
The technical rationing of irrigation water could now be based 
and implemented on the regime carrying capacity of each canal (the 
water allowance) and the command area it served. This required the 
Irrigation Authorities to extend their aclministrative control further 
and formalise the discharges through the outiets as well as the 
command area of each chak (tertiary unit). Subsequent remodelling 
of canals was frequendy undertaken between 1890 and 1947. In 
remodelling, the allocation of water in terms of relative water 
supply per unit of command area had first to be conducted and 
formalised aclrninistratively before it could be implemented. This 
process became known as chakbandi. This also meant doing away 
with the system of tatilling. Water distribution below the oudets 
was left to the farmers through the system of warabandi. The 
Irrigation Department would intervene to prepare a pucka (formal) 
warabandi schedule when disputes arose, to manage water 
distribution below the oudet. 
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The organisational set-up under warabandi 
There are two establishments for irrigation management, that is, 
Engineering and Revenue and both work under a single command 
(Malhotra 1988). The Engineering Establishment is responsible for 
the maintenance and operation of all works relating to the main 
canal, branch canals, distributaries and oudet. The Revenue 
Establishment is responsible for recording the area irrigated and 
the preparation of water bills for individual farmers and passing on 
the same to the District Collector for realisation. In addition, it 
distributary ensures a rniriimum of seven-days running for each 
watercourse including the most distant from the distributary head. 
The eighth day is needed for filling the distributary. Water 
deliveries are controlled by time and are proportional to land. 1 0 
Main and branch canals are operated with variable flow (e.g. in 
response to variable river flows), but distributaries and minors are 
intended to be operated either full ON or full O F F (with reduction 
in flow to at most 80-90% of design) (Berkoff 1990). When main 
and branch canals run full, which is the normal case so long as river 
flows exceed diversion capacity, all lower channels also run full. 
When main/branch canals run less than full, lower channels 
operate in rotation such that the sum of discharges in ON channels 
equals the branch discharge less losses. 
Along the main or branch canals, gates are needed to control 
changes in flow. At the distributary head, O N / O F F gates are 
needed to facilitate rotation of channels in response to less than full 
supply in the main and branch canals but not to modify flow. 
Below the distributary head, the system is ungated with 
proportional division. Flow levels are supposed to be monitored 
twice a day at key points, and when tail flow falls below full 
discharge, supply is considered to be inequitable and appropriate 
action needs to be taken to increase supply or to close channels to 
ensure ON channels remain at full supply. 
Below the outiet, the warabandi schedule is supposed to be 
followed by the farmers. The government's main role is to assist in 
preparation of the roster and in settling the disputes. Farmers are 
allowed free use of groundwater and freedom to plant whatever 
they want following their own assessments of the availability of 
water. 
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helps in deciding all disputes and conflicts relating to the 
distribution of water, alignment of watercourses and transfer of 
areas from one outiet to another. 
The adniinistrative unit under warabandi is known as a 
Division. An Executive Engineer heads it. An average Division has 
70, 000 hectares of Culturable Commanded Area. A Division 
comprises 3 to 4 Sub-Divisions, each of which is headed by a Sub-
Divisional Officer, who is the junior most officer. A Sub-Division 
may have 3 to 4 Sectional Officers to help him. For the revenue 
work, a Sub-Divisional Officer is assisted by 2 to 3 Zilledaars 
(revenue officers) and 10 to 12 Irrigation Booking Clerks assist 
each Zilledaar. Each Division has one Deputy Collector who 
supervises the work of Zilledaars in a Division. 
Along the canals the gates at the head of distributaries are 
operated by the Regulation Beldaars (helpers). The gates are opened 
on the basis of a telegram from the office of the Irrigation 
Department. The Taar Baku (Telegram Officer) delivers this 
telegram on the basis of an instruction from the X E N (Executive 
Engineer). The X E N sends the indent to the Regulation Beldaar. 
The duty of the Canal Patrollers is to guard the oudets during 
the day as well as the night time. Each Patroller has a shift o f 8 
hours. His duty is to inspect the oudets and siphons. Should there 
be a water theft or tampering with an oudet, he is supposed to 
report the same to the J E (Junior Engineer). The J E is then 
supposed to send a telegram to the SDO (Sub-Divisional Officer), 
indicating that action needs to be taken. At some places, ghaats 
(banks) have been made to allow people to swim, wash clothes, or 
to bathe their livestock. When some other place along the canal is 
used for this purpose, the Canal Patroller is authorised to stop it. 
The copy of the pucka warabandi schedule is kept with the Nahari 
Patwaari (irrigation revenue officer) who has a direct interface with 
the farmers.11 The Irrigation Department gives the task of desilting 
the canal on contract. This is done twice a year. 
Scarcity by design under warabandi 
Water allowance, capacity factor and irrigation intensity are the 
expressions of 'scarcity by design' in the operation of the 
warabandi system. Each unit of CCA is allocated a certain rate of 
flow of water called the water allowance. Its value is a compromise 
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between demand and supply. For instance, in the case of the 
Bhakra project in North India, the value of this allowance at the 
oudet to the watercourse is 2.4 cusecs o f water per every 1000 
acres o f CCA (0.17 1/s.ha) (Malhotra 1988; Malhotra, Raheja and 
Seckler 1984). 
No distributary operates for all days during the crop season: 
the ratio that the operating period of a distributary bears to the 
total period of the crop is called its capacity factor. This is again a 
compromise between demand and supply and is separately 
designed for each of the sub-periods. For example, in the Bhakra 
canal system, the designed mean capacity factors for kharif (the 
irrigation season comdding with the monsoons) and rabi (the 
winter season) are .8 and .72 respectively, which means that during 
these seasons, each distributary may receive full water for about 
144 and 129 days respectively, i.e. for about 273 days a year. 
The above values of water allowance and capacity factors do not 
ensure irrigation for 100% of the Culturable Commanded Area. 
The ratio of the irrigated area to the total Culturable Commanded 
Area is known as the intensity of irrigation. Its value in case of the 
Bhakra canal is 62% per year, or about 30% per season. 
When the distributary is running FSL (Full Supply Level), the 
watercourse draws its full (authorised) discharge. The capacity of 
the watercourse varies from 1 to 3 cusecs, depending upon the 
command area (WALMI 1998b). The value of the water allowance 
at the watercourse head is 2.5 to 3 cusecs per 1000 acres of the 
Culturable Command Area. 1 2 
T o ensure that the stream size below the oudet is appropriate 
for handling by farmers (say 25-40 1/s), chaks are relatively large 
(100-300 ha). I f the chak is 100 ha, and allowance is .2 1/s.ha, then 
the farmers receive 20 1/s for 1.68 hours per hectare; if chak size is 
200 ha, they receive 40 1/s for .84 hrs. 
Delivery capacity per hectare (allowance) is very low, about 
.10-.15 1/s.ha at the oudet (300-400 acres/ cusec). This is 
considered insufficient even if given continuously to meet the 
theoretical crop water requirements for more than perhaps 20-30% 
of land in kharif and 35-45% in rabi (Berkoff 1990). In a study of 
the Pabra Distributary of the Bhakra Project, in the Hissar district 
of Haryana, Malhotra, Raheja and Seckler (1984) conclude that for 
an average of 3-4 irrigations per field, the system of warabandi and 
the amount of water available provides adequate irrigation to 25-
30% of the CCA; leaving 7 0 % of the CCA as rainfed. This, the 
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authors argue, corresponds to the design objectives of the 
warabandi system. 
On the Western Yamuna Canal, where the research sites for 
this book are located, the allowance is 2.4 cusecs per 1000 acres on 
the Bahlot sub-branch, 2.86 Cusecs per 1000 acres on the Butaana 
Branch and 2.57 cusecs per 1000 acres on Rohtak Distributary at 
the level o f the oudet. 1 3 The designed irrigation intensity is 6 0 % 
for the entire year.1 4 
An important aspect of the studies of some of this irrigation 
system is the limited description of their technical design 
characteristics (furriens and Wester 1994). One problem with 
documentation of design data in some of the studies is that it is not 
stated at what level it applies; similarly, when intensities are given, 
we do not know how they vary across the seasons (Jurriens and 
Wester 1994). This limits the usefulness o f these studies. 
Evaluation of the warabandi system 
A fall-out of the system of water rationing under warabandi is that 
the farmer is the master o f his water budget. He is supposed to 
choose his crop profile to suit water availability. Unlike the 
localisation practices in South India and shejpali o f west India, 
there are no cropping restrictions. Water is allocated in proportion 
to land and farmers are free to use their allocation as they want 
(Berkoff 1990). 
The warabandi system is considered to have some virtues 
(Gustafson and Reidinger 1971). The opportunity to receive water 
is rationed in a way that could be considered 'fair', since each piece 
of land is designed to get its proportionate amount. The other 
possible benefit is that this model of running a distributary and its 
watercourses involves human control only at the distributary level 
head, leaving the oudet at the watercourse head automatic. Since 
the possibilities of human intervention in the operation of the 
system are small, Gustafson and Reidinger argue, the possibilities 
of corruption could be limited.15 The rules of water distribution are 
'public knowledge' and each farmer is sure of his rights (Reidinger 
1974). 
On the negative side, however, the system's result is an 
unpredictable and unreliable water supply (Gustafson and 
Reidinger 1971; Latif 1993; Tilak and Rajvanshi 1991; Jairath 1985; 
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Malhotra 1988). The physical design of the system, the design of 
the watercourse oudets, and especially the canal rotations all 
interact to produce a relatively unreliable water supply from the 
farmers' point of view. " Indian agriculture has been described as a 
gamble with the monsoons; in canal irrigated areas, it could be 
described as a gamble with the canal as well" (Gustafson and 
Reidinger 1971: A-158). 
In a system that is entirely centrally controlled, the main 
weakness of the system is considered to be the lack of 
predictabüity, certainty, and controEabüity of the canal water supply 
by the farmer and the inability to match water supply with crop 
water requirements. A major disadvantage of this system, as 
designed, is that the volume of water available to a farmer is 
independent o f the stage o f crop growth and he is forced to either 
take his turn (whether needed or not) or to forego it. Another 
drawback is that it does not permit crops with high variations in 
water requirements in sub-commands. This is typically offset by the 
use o f groundwater. However, in saline areas, the cropping patterns 
do face effective constraints. 
Canal water deliveries in these systems have been known to be 
unreliable because of a number of factors (Latif 1993; Jairath 1985). 
These include drought conditions, limited storage, breaching, high 
losses and manual intervention and malpractice. Farmers are 
confronted with several problems: these include the absence of 
information about canal closure, illegal canal cuts, and breaches and 
water thefts by the use of siphons and pipes on the canals and 
distributaries. An important problem that is cited by Jairath (1985) 
is that of corruption and inefficiency in addressing irrigators' 
problems - such as alteration of the size of oudets and their level. 
The actual state of maintenance of the canals is also found far from 
satisfactory. The bureaucratic functioning of the Irrigation 
Department, Jairath argues, takes up a high proportion of the funds 
for the organisational working, leaving a small proportion for the 
operation of the system. 
Another drawback of the system is that there is no knowledge 
as to how much water each farmer gets (Malhotra 1988). Further, 
there is no provision in the system to compensate any individual 
farmer who does not receive water in his turn, even when it is for 
factors for which he is not responsible (WALMI 1998b; Malhotra 
1988). I f for any reason a farmer is unable to receive his share of 
water, this system does not provide a method of compensating him 
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for the loss. Similarly, if the flow of water is less than the 
authorised flow because of a technical defect, the loss suffered on 
this account, too, is not compensated. Thus, "A primary virtue of 
the rationing system is that all recipients apparendy share both 
water and insecurity equally" (Reidinger 1974: A-100). 
The responses of farmers to a system of scarcity take three 
main forms: digging of tubewells, intra-seasonal and inter-seasonal 
exchange or sale of time turns, and intervening along the canal or 
the distributary (Gustafson and Reidinger 1971; Jairath 1985; 
Reidinger 1974; Bhatti and Kijne 1990; Meinzen-Dick 2000a; 
Reidinger 1994). 
One response of farmers to this system has been the increase 
in the number of tubewell structures. The opportunities for more 
intensive agriculture in the wake of the green revolution and 
increasing population pressure have created demand for more 
water and more flexible deliveries (Meinzen-Dick 2000a) than can 
be provided through the warabandi system. In contrast to rigid 
warabandi schedules, farmers with tubewells can irrigate their fields 
more frequendy in periods of peak demand throughout. The 
increase in water supplies made possible through ground water 
development at the watercourse level means that the designed low 
cropping intensities can be overcome. 1 6 
Another response of farmers is the exchange or sale of turns 
among themselves (Reidinger 1992, 1974; Jairath 1985) ." A third 
response is the interference of farmers direcdy at the level o f the 
distributary by modifying the dimensions of the oudets, the use of 
flexible siphoning pipes at night and cuts in the banks o f the 
distributaries (Rinaudo, Strosser and Thoyer 1998; Jairath 1985; 
Wahaj 2001). 
Other criticisms of the warabandi system relate to actual 
patterns of equity in water distribution (Kijne and Vander Velde 
1992; Bhutta and Vander Velde 1992; Latif 1993; Khan 1991; 
Malhotra, Raheja and Seckler 1988; Bhatti and Kijne 1990; Tyagi 
1993). 
There are wide variations between the discharges actually 
realised between head and tail reaches (Bhutta and Vander Velde 
1992). These variations occur at the level of the main canal and 
distributary as well as along the watercourses. 
A criticism of the system from an equity perspective is that this 
system delivers an amount of water among irrigators that is unequal 
along tertiary channels. Under the existing rotational system, 
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The Shejpali System 
Shejpali is partially a demand-based system in which the 
transmission losses along the channel are not considered. A 
constant time per unit area is allocated to the farmers regardless o f 
their locations along the watercourse. This results in decreasing 
amount of water delivered to the downstream farmers (Latif 1993). 
Farmers receive proportionate running time, but not necessarily 
proportionate quantities of water. This makes the water 
distribution system inequitable. Losses tend to increase towards the 
tail reaches. Thus, it is argued that the system rations time, or the 
opportunity to receive water, rather than water itself (Reidinger 
1974). 
Absorption losses in watercourses below the oudets have been 
found to be as much as 2 5 % of the supply at its head (Malhotra, 
Raheja and Seckler 1984). Drawing upon a study in Pakistan, Khan 
(1991) estimated that the irrigation efficiencies in the watercourse 
command range from about 55 to 65%. Bhatti and Kijne (1990) 
report that farmers pay an equal amount per acre cultivated with a 
specific crop, though downstream farmers receive 20-30% less 
water with lower yields for similar cropped areas. l ining of 
watercourses is seen as one remedy but some losses would still 
remain (Malhotra, Raheja and Seckler 1984). 
There have been some proposals to modify the warabandi 
system on equity and allocative efficiency grounds (Chaudhry and 
Young 1990). Chaudhry and Young propose a modification of the 
standard warabandi practice to attempt to account for losses in the 
watercourse so that an equal supply of water could be achieved per 
acre. They call it "warabandi by quantity". 
T o conclude the discussion on warabandi, it is a simple system 
to understand and follow, with few levels of managerial and 
organisational control. This would become clearer when it is 
contrasted with shejpali in the following section. However, its 
weaknesses stem from the fact that it is meant to be a centrally 
controlled and supply driven system that does not meet crop-water 
requirements, either in terms of volume or liming of water 
supplies. Under this setting irrigators devise their own strategies to 
secure greater flexibility in water delivery as well as to get extra 
water. 1 8 
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government agency allocates water in consideration of a farmer's 
request according to land and crops. The word shej means turn and 
pali means water; thus, shejpali is essentially a system of taking 
turns for water. Unlike the warabandi system described above, 
under shejpali, a farmer has the option in a season to take water or 
not, and beforehand he has to file an application indicating the area 
and crop, and number of watering turns that he requires. 
Irrigation works in the Deccan are fundamentally different 
from those in the North, where wide alluvial plains have been 
formed by great deltaic rivers with perennial flows (Gandhi 1979). 
The rivers in the Deccan arise in the valleys close to the ridge 
formed by the Western Ghats, flow in an eastward direction and 
are dry or practically so for 7 or 8 months of the year. These rivers 
flow during the monsoons only, and artificial means of conserving 
water are needed to store the waters for use for the rest of the year. 
Further, there is wide variation in the soil type and the cropping 
patterns across canal commands. Both these factors give rise to a 
system in which rainwaters need to be stored for the rest of the 
year and distributed through a system of water budgeting, with 
water distribution schedules being prepared to supply water to 
crops. Thus, the topography of the region and the practice of 
taking particular types of crops are cited as the major factors 
behind getting the shejpali system established on the Deccan canals 
(Gandhi 1979). 1 9 
Evolution of protective irrigation in Western India 
An imperative to provide protective irrigation in Maharashtra 
emerged under British rule with the frequent incidence of drought 
and famine in the state. Till the late 19 t h and early twentieth 
century, the British government had followed a policy of 
promoting the development of wells through the grant of takkavi 
loans (Attwood 1987). By the 1860s, however, the British realised 
that small-scale irrigation works such as wells and tanks had a 
major pitfall, in that they were essentially seasonal in character. 
Monsoon rains recharged the wells and tanks annually, and the 
absence of rains meant that they would dry up. The British 
perceived a solution in storing the abundant rainfall in the coastal 
areas and transporting it over long distances into the famine prone 
parts of the state. 
Warabandi and Shejpali as Forms of Protective Irrigation 39 
The British government realised that without storage 
reservoirs, irrigation systems in the state could not afford a 
reasonable measure of protection against drought, or support crops 
at critical periods of their growth (GOI 1972). Thus, the period of 
construction of reservoirs began. This led to the construction of a 
storage dam at Khadakvasla and the Mutha system of canals, a tank 
at Ekruk near Sholapur and of the Lekh Canal from the river 
Pravara. 
However, protective irrigation systems remained rather 
unpopular in the Deccan (Bolding, Mollinga and Straaten 1995). 
There was a lack of interest both on part of the government as well 
as the farmers. In fact, one paradox of protective works in the 
Deccan was that although they were built in response to a 
devastating series of famines, they failed initially as protective 
works; and it was this failure that caused them to be treated more 
as productive works, with markedly greater success (Attwood 
1987). A case in point is the Nira Left Bank Canal (Attwood 1987; 
Bolding, Mollinga and Straaten 1995). 2 0 
On the one hand, there was a problem of 'unwanted water 
'(Attwood 1987). In ordinary years, a food crop would mature with 
the available rainfall, mainly because of the water retaining 
capacities of the black cotton soils. Farmers saw irrigation as 
unnecessary and financially unattractive. The marginal contribution 
of irrigation to drought resistant subsistence food crops did not 
justify the cost and effort of bringing them under irrigation. There 
was a lack of capital to employ the additional draught power 
necessary for the preparation of the fields. Thus, in the event of a 
drought, farmers would wait till the last moment for rain; if the 
rains would fail, there would be a sudden demand for water, which 
the canal would be unable to supply. 
Secondly, it was difficult for the PWD, the Public Works 
Department, to control the behaviour of irrigators who did not 
follow the regulations for water distribution. This led to wasteful 
use of water and created problems of waterlogging and salinity. 
The PWD could not control a large number of water distribution 
points. It was difficult to deal with a large number of individual 
applicants and to establish how much should go where. The 
resultant irregular and unpredictable water supply further deterred 
cultivators from entering into irrigated agriculture. For those 
already involved in irrigation, the irregularities and uncertainties 
induced them to take as much water as possible, whenever they 
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could. This perpetuated the vicious circle of irregular supplies. 
T o overcome these weaknesses, the engineers of the Bombay 
Presidency's PWD came up with what is called the Block System 
with M V Visvesvaraya as its chief architect and advocate. A block 
is a portion or a part of land for which long-term irrigation 
sanction is given (Lele and Patil 1994). The system emerged from 
the old Phad system (a farmer managed irrigation system practiced 
in Dhule and Nasik districts o f the state).2 1 
Under the Block System advocated above, there were three 
main components. 
(1) Concentrate irrigated areas in blocks, fix the demand for 
irrigation water of these blocks and promote the production of 
a remunerative crop like sugarcane on part of the area 
(2) Control the distribution of water and avoid corrupt practices 
and cultivator interference by the invention of a machine that 
discharges fixed quantities of irrigation water and 
(3) Sell water by volume to cultivators to avoid waste o f water and 
ensure its economic use by market principles 
More specifically, the Bombay Block System included the 
following features. 
(1) In a number of villages nearest to the head of the canals, one 
or two consolidated blocks would be formed, the total area 
being between one-fourth to one-third of the total culturable 
area. Within these blocks, a maximum of one-third of the area 
was allowed to be devoted to sugarcane. On the other two-
thirds, food crops would be grown, in rotation with sugarcane. 
Water would be supplied for 12 months for the sugarcane and 
eight months for the food crops. Blocks would be established 
in multiples of 1.5 acres: one half acre for sugarcane and one 
acre for food crops. 
(2) Each individual cultivator would enter a signed contract in 
which he would agree to take water in this block for a period 
of six years. The government in turn would guarantee to 
deliver the water. However, the cultivators participating in a 
block would have to make a joint application for water. 
(3) The block would be charged at a fixed rate per acre regardless 
o f the crops grown. 
The introduction of the block system had specific social, 
economic and ecological effects. These effects included the 
stabilisation of sugarcane production, an increase in food grain 
production and the stabilisation of food grain prices and the 
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growth of a sugarcane economy. At the same time, it led to the 
emergence of an agricultural elite, the overuse of water by a select 
few and its environmental consequences in terms of waterlogging 
and salinity. 
The block system was administratively simpler since it reduced 
the number o f control and application points (Bolding, Mollinga 
and Straaten 1995). The cane blocks made canal irrigation more 
intensive and less wasteful. Food production and employment also 
stabilised after the block system was introduced (Attwood 1987). 
Since a fixed proportion of the land was devoted to the cultivation 
of food crops, there was an increase in food grain production. 
Food prices also stabilised. The cultivation of sugarcane led to an 
increased use of bullocks on account of their use in ploughing, 
processing and transport. It also led to an increase in the 
production of sorghum, since sorghum was a source of fodder as 
well as a food crop. 
However, the block system never totally took off as intended 
(Bolding, Mollinga and Straaten 1995). First, land consolidation, 
concentrating irrigated land in contiguous blocks, proved to be 
impossible. A pattern of land holding as existed in the bandhara or 
phad system from which the block system was derived could not 
be enforced from the outside by the government. The scattering of 
land belonging to a block made control over the one-third/two-
third division between sugarcane and food crops more difficult. 
Farmers also expanded sugarcane cultivation mdiscrirninately. A 
scattered, instead of a consolidated block also provided more 
spatial opportunity for expansion of sugarcane cultivation to 
adjacent plots not belonging to the block. Scattered blocks 
impaired the control of water supply. Essentially, the government 
was unable to exert sufficient managerial control over water. With 
constant trial and error, there was a failure to design an appropriate 
module for the delivery of volumetric supplies of water. For the 
same reason, the third element of the design, namely, volumetric 
supplies never came into effect. 
Another issue was the politics of water distribution (Bolding, 
Mollinga and Straaten 1995). A disproportionate share of the 
benefits of irrigation was put in the hands of a few who succeeded 
in having their lands registered under the blocks. There was a 
failure to control the water distribution accurately; local officers 
were unable to withstand pressure from farmers to extend the 
water supply period. The monopoly of perennial irrigation in a 
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concentrated area near the head reaches of the canals created the 
problem of waterlogging and salinisation.22 
Nevertheless, one long-term effect of the establishment of the 
Deccan canals was the expansion of the "irrigation frontier" 
(Attwood 1992: 75). Traditionally, sugarcane had been grown only 
on small plots under well irrigation. With the introduction of the 
Deccan canals in the 1880s, farmers discovered profits in 
sugarcane, which they processed into gul (jaggery). The Malts, who 
practiced garden cultivation, migrated from the Pune Saswad 
region into the Nira valley after the Nira Canal was opened. They 
met a society that was unwilling to take up high-cost cultivation. 
Local cultivators did not apply this water to traditional subsistence 
crops and were slow to take up sugarcane, since they lacked the 
capital and expertise needed for such an expensive crop. The canal 
waters were under-utilised. Thus, the Malis found along this valley 
a society unprepared for high-cost farming and an abundant supply 
of water and land waiting to be used. 
The addition of canal irrigation to a large portion of the Nira 
valley was equivalent to a multiplication of the land area, since one 
acre under perennial irrigation was equivalent in value to many 
acres o f dry land.23This created what could be called an irrigation 
frontier. This frontier stimulated cash cropping, innovation, 
migration, and industriaUsation on an unprecedented scale. The 
Marathas, Dhangars and Brahmans (the local inhabitants) started 
imitating the Malis. 
In fact, the construction of river fed canals in the Deccan 
region, particularly the Godavari and Pravar Canals in 1918 and 
1920 respectively, watering most areas in Ahmednagar district, was 
to later play a vital role in the development of the sugar industry in 
the region in the 1930s (Chithelen 1985). The spread of canal 
irrigation helped the rich peasants to move into commercial 
cultivation. Along with irrigation, the organising of co-operative 
credit societies led to a further consolidation. These two schemes, 
promoted by the British rulers, were to later set the ground for 
introduction of and shift into sugarcane cultivation and eventually 
for setting up of co-operative sugar factories in Ahmednagar 
district in the 1950s (Chithelen 1985). 
The shejpali system at present 
The dominant water distribution system in Maharashtra is shejpali 
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(Lele and Paul 1994). The block system prevails mosdy in the older 
systems, viz., those built before independence.24 The phad system 
exists in some systems in the Nashik region. 
Shejpali is a form of an arranged water delivery schedule. The 
rationing of scarce water is sought to be achieved through crop 
zoning, by sanctioning the types and areas of crops, which may be 
grown. It is thus a method of water control in which the demand 
for water is regulated. It is different from the localisation system of 
the south in two respects (furriens, Mollinga and Wester 1996). 
First, there is interaction between the farmers and the Irrigation 
Department concerning the area they want to be localised (i.e. 
sanctioned), as the farmers can indicate which crops they want to 
irrigate. Also, each year the sanctioned area is revised on the basis 
o f new requests.25 Second, the Irrigation Department commits 
itself to realising the water delivery schedule that is drawn up 
before the start of the cropping season and thus manages the water 
flows. 
In irrigation under shejpali, the following sets of terms are 
commonly used (WALMI 1998b). 
Duty is the area irrigated by one-cusec flow of water flowing 
throughout the base period. 
Delta is the depth (in cms) of water required to bring the crops 
to maturity. 
All DC (Area Irrigated per day per cusec) is the area of mixed 
crops irrigated by one cusec of water flowing throughout the day 
(24 hrs). This is essentially considered to be duty on a "day" basis. 
Base period: It is the total number of days in a season. The 
seasons, their dates of commencement and end and total number 
o f days in a season are as under: 
Kharif: July 1 to October 14: 106 days 
Rabi: October 15 to March 29: 137 days 
Hot weather: March 1 to June 30: 122 days 
Irrigation year: July 1 to June 30: 365 days 
Rotation period: Canal design is generally based on rotational 
water supply to crops. The rotations are 14 days in Kharif, 21 days 
in rabi and 10 days in hot weather. In the peak period, which 
occurs in the rabi season, the canal is assumed to run continuously. 
In kharif and hot weather seasons, canal closures of 4 days and 3 
days are assumed. The flow period is thus 10 days in kharif and 7 
days in hot weather. The latest practice is to assume rotation of 14 
days for all seasons with 7 days ON and 7 days OFF. 
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Design allowance: This is the discharge during flow period, 
required to irrigate one hectare of land measured in 1/s.ha. e.g. if 
design allowance is 1.25 1/s, it means one hectare of land will be 
irrigated with a continuous discharge of 1.25 1/s in flow period. 
Intensity of Irrigation is the ratio of area planned to be irrigated 
(considering the water availability and the project cropping pattern) 
and the total service area, that is the CCA. 
In the shejpali system, farmers request water before the 
cropping season by representing the Irrigation Department with 
proposed cropping patterns.26 These proposed cropping patterns 
are partly sanctioned by the Irrigation Department and the farmers 
are then entitied to irrigation supplies for these crops. The 
distribution of the sanctioned water is in rotation, taking into 
account the requirements of the sanctioned crops. 
A Preliminary Irrigation Programme is prepared at the start o f 
the season, and the crops that are to be grown as well as the area 
under each is announced, based on the water in the storage. A 
quota is fixed for each canal and the quota is further distributed 
over the outiets. For each oudet, the Canal Inspector prepares a list 
o f sanction-holders, indicating their sanctions in terms of acreage. 
On the basis of the A I / D C , he calculates the total time for which a 
particular oudet is required to run and prepares a palipatrak (time-
table) for each oudet indicating the definite date that a certain 
sanctioned area is to be irrigated. 
I f water is available over and above the amount needed for the 
sanctioned requisitions, applications are invited from farmers for 
the other crops they want to grow. Areas are then partiy 
sanctioned, with proportionate reduction of the areas proposed by 
the farmers being made if the demand exceeds the available water 
supply. Once crops are sanctioned, farmers receive an irrigation 
passbook in which their sanctioned area and the first irrigation date 
are indicated. 
Thus, irrigation water supply under shejpali is effected only to 
those farmers who apply for getting water in response to the 
notification issued by the Executive Engineer (EE) before a 
season. The E E collects all applications and if there is adequate 
water, sanctions all the apphcations or appEes cut in case of 
shortage of water. The appEcation is also rejected if the farmer is a 
defaulter on past payments or if he has not maintained the field 
channel. 
The Canal Inspector is then supposed to fix a certain time and 
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location in the command of each minor where the farmers 
assemble and based on the sanctioned area, he gives the time in 
days (a group of farmers with area of 4 to 5 acres) for each group 
to take the water and complete irrigation. The turns are fixed from 
tail to head, i.e., the farthest farmer from the oudet gets water first 
and the one located near the oudet gets water at the end of the 
rotation period. This turn system is called shejpali system. 
Thus, the steps that are followed in the working of the shejpali 
system could be summarised as follows (WALMI 1998a). 
(1) The preparation of the Preliminary Irrigation Programme 
before the start of the irrigation season and deciding the area 
and crops to be grown on the basis of water in storage 
(2) Inviting the water applications from farmers and sanctioning 
them 
(3) Preparation and publication of rotation programme, that is, 
days "on" and " o f f 
(4) Preparation of water release programme 
(5) Preparation of palipatrak by the Canal Inspector and 
communicating the day and time to irrigators by calling them at 
a predetermined place 
(6) Rotation of supplies among farmers on each oudet on the 
distributary, among different distributaries and in different 
sections of the canal 
(7) Checking of irrigation by the Canal Inspector and his 
colleagues 
(8) Field-to-field distribution of water from tail to head of field 
channel and the main system 
(9) Preparation of completed irrigation report at the end of each 
season 
Some changes have been made in the operation of the shejpali 
system. Though the Irrigation Department is expected to supply 
water to a cultivator on a certain date under shejpali, this is not 
guaranteed in practice since there are no restrictions on the length 
of time that a cultivator can take for irrigating his sanctioned area. 
Thus, farmers at the head reaches take more water, while the tail-
enders suffer. This has led to the introduction of the rigid shejpali 
system or the system of rotational water supply, where the time for 
taking water is also fixed. 
Thus, when the time allotted to each irrigator is rigidly 
prescribed, it is called rigid shejpali or rotational water supply 
(WALMI 1998a). The system of rotational water supply was 
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introduced in 1977 in the Girna canals and extended to other 
systems.27 The government policy now is to introduce the RWS 
system everywhere and to implement it in all the major and 
medium irrigation systems in the state (Lele and Patil 1994). 
The following assumptions are made in the implementation of 
the Rotational Water Supply system: 
(1) Water delivery at outiet head is standardised at 30 1/s (one 
cusec in the old systems). 
(2) Water is delivered from the tail to head. 
(3) Water is delivered to one farmer at a time. 
(4) Travel time is worked out and accounted for to the starting 
time of irrigation for the tail-most farmer. 
(5) The irrigators away from the outiet who are bound to get 
discharge less than one cusec due to inherent losses in the field 
channels are compensated by providing proportionately more 
time for irrigation. 
However, there are a number of conditions for RWS to work 
effectively (WALMI 1998a). 
(1) Outlets must discharge 1 cusec (30 1/s) even at low supply level 
in the minor, which requires the presence of cross-regulators 
on the minor or distributary. 
(2) A measuring device is needed on the oudets. 
(3) Field channels should be able to carry 1-cusec discharge, and 
they need to be maintained properly. 
(4) Rotational water schedules need to be prepared well in advance 
and communicated to the farmers in rotation so that the 
process o f water distribution proceeds smoothly. 
(5) Adjustment of levels in channels by operating cross-regulators 
and gate openings to ensure 1 cusec discharge from every 
outiet is needed. 
(6) A viable organisational structure is needed at the level of the 
irrigators to organise internal distribution of water and to 
maintain the chak and minor command. 
A number o f problems have been known to exist with the 
prevalence of the system of Rotational Water Supply (WALMI 
1998a). Firstiy, all demands are not known to the Irrigation 
Department in advance, before the start of the season. Demands 
tend to increase up to the 3rd rotation in rabi. Secondly, there is 
often an increase in demand due to clearance of dues by defaulters 
after 1 or 2 rotations are over. Thirdly, there is a tendency for 
irrigating area in excess of demand (that is, for carrying out 
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unauthorised irrigation). 
Operational implications 
An operational implication of the water distribution process arises 
from the characteristics of the gated pipe outlets from which water 
is released into the watercourses. HydrauHcally, these oudets are 
non-modular structures (Bolding, Mollinga and Straaten 1995; 
WALMI 1998a). This implies that the discharge depends both on 
the upstream and the downstream water levels. Discharge is driven 
by the working head, that is, the difference between the water level 
in the parent channel (in this case, the minor) and the watercourse. 
Thus, the discharge varies as the level in either changes. 
For instance, on the downstream side, when high fields are 
being irrigated, the watercourse heads up and the discharge is 
reduced (WALMI 1998a). When low fields are being irrigated, the 
water level goes down in the watercourse and the discharge is 
increased.28 I f the watercourse silts up, the working head is reduced 
and hence discharge is reduced. Upstream, this has to do with the 
absence in protective irrigation systems of cross-regulators: these 
are elevations or other structures on the canal bed that stabilise 
water levels with varying discharge (Bolding, Mollinga and Straaten 
1995). 
In Maharashtra at present only one type of irrigation outlet is 
used, that is 30 cm diameter pipe oudet, fixed at the bed of the 
distributary or minor having a gate for closing and opening of it 
(WALMI 1998a). The size of the outlet is standardised without 
consideration of available working head and the area to be served. 
All the oudets are not discharged simultaneously, but are clubbed, 
opened and closed in rotation, during the period that the canal is 
running. The canals do not run with a fixed discharge and the 
supply level in the canal varies in time depending upon the 
requirements of irrigation. This requires constant adjusting of gates 
and measurements to ensure that 1 cusec water flows through the 
pipe oudets. 
The other implications of this design of the outiet are as 
follows (WALMI 1998a). 
(1) When the outlet is closed after its irrigation is completed, it can 
be reopened during night time by breaking the lock. 
(2) A hole can be made in the skin plate of the gate and piping can 
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Comparison of shejpali with block system 
The block system described earlier in this chapter is still in practice 
in some parts of Maharashtra, especially in the older systems. It has 
essentially evolved into what is now a system for controlling the 
cropping pattern through six-year period sanctioning of particular 
crops in particular tracts of land (WALMI 1998b; Jurriens, 
Mollinga and Wester 1996). The block system is, thus, essentially a 
variation of shejpali, with a longer time frame of allocation. 
Sugarcane blocks are mainly sanctioned, and primarily in the head 
reaches of the system. Water distribution is the same as under 
shejpali and the blocks are treated as any other sanctioned crop 
area. 
Normally, under the shejpali system described above, every 
farmer has to apply for getting water to the area proposed to be 
irrigated under specific crops every season. This is a long and 
cumbersome procedure and there remains uncertainty in getting 
water for long duration crops like sugarcane, banana and other 
fruits. 
Hence to provide guarantee to the farmers for a long-term 
basis for high value or cash crops, blocks are introduced.29 A 
certain quantity of water with high dependability is allocated for 
supplying water on long-term basis, that is, 6 years for sugarcane 
and banana and 12 years for fruit crops. 3 0 For sugarcane blocks, 1 
part for sugarcane and 3 parts for other light crops are 
sanctioned.31 The sanctions given are for 6 to 12 years, thereby 
assuring the irrigators of a supply of water.3 2 
The difference between the block system and shejpali is that a 
block is allocation of water for certain area and period and shejpali 
is order or sequence in which water is to be taken by the farmers. 
Under ordinary shejpali, all farmers have to apply for getting water 
indicating the crops and area after the Executive Engineer invites 
be made below the oudet sill level by farmers for stealing 
water. 
(3) I f not constructed properly, leakages can take place. 
(4) The discharge can also be increased by increasing the opening 
of the oudet. 
(5) Tail oudets may suffer badly due to excess withdrawals in the 
head-reaches. 
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such applications before the season. This is called application for 
season on form No. 7. Blocks, on the other hand, are sanctioned 
for specific crops or area for a 6 to 12 years' fixed period (and not 
on form 7). Further, shejpali is order or sequence of getting water. 
Hence it would change from year to year, season to season, and 
also from rotation to rotation, depending on the crops and area to 
be irrigated in that rotation. The area under blocks as well as that 
sanctioned under form No. 7, however, both have the same rules 
for getting sequence turns in irrigation. Only in case of a shortage 
of water does the area sanctioned under blocks get a higher 
priority, and the seasonal area is reduced if water is not adequate. 
In the block system, as in shejpali, distribution is done by the Canal 
Inspector from the Irrigation Department. 
The organisational structure under shejpali 
The organisational structure under Shejpali is as follows (WALMI 
1998b): 
Under a Management Circle, there are 4 to 5 divisions of 
irrigation management. Each covers a hectarage of 40 to 60 
thousand hectares of mixed irrigation (perennials + seasonals). 
Each Division is headed by an Executive Engineer. Under every 
Division, there are 3 to 4 Management Sub-Divisions, each Sub-
Division dealing with 10 to 12 thousand hectares of mixed 
irrigation, and headed by a Sub-Divisional Officer. Under every 
sub-division, there are 3 to 4 sections, each section dealing with 
3000 to 4000 hectares of mixed irrigation. Each section is headed 
by a Sectional Officer. A Sectional Officer is assisted in his task by 
Canal Inspectors. 
There is a Revenue establishment in the office of the Executive 
Engineer, the Sub-Divisional Officer and the Sectional Officer to 
assist the office in irrigation matters. In the office of the Executive 
Engineer there is a branch known as "Irrigation Branch", 
consisting of 4 to 5 Dafter Karkoons (record keepers) - one Daftar 
Karkoon for each Management Sub-Division, working under the 
Head Clerk of the Division. Similarly, in the Sub-Divisional Office 
there is a small Irrigation Branch, consisting of 3 to 4 Daftar 
Karkoons, one for each section. In the Sectional Office, there is 
one sectional Daftar Karkoon who attends to the work of 
mamtaining the record of Irrigation Management in the section. 
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The following officers have duties in the operation of the 
system:3 3 
It is the duty of the Executive Engineer to prepare a seasonal 
forecast (Preliminary Irrigation Programme) for utilisation of water 
stored in the reservoir. He is required to conduct surprise 
inspections of water distribution at least once in a month. In his 
inspections, he is expected to note the conditions of the channels 
and any repair work that may be needed. 
The Sub Divisional Officer is required to control and be in 
direct touch with the field staff of the Irrigation Department and 
regulate the rotations and the discharges in the system under his 
control. He has to observe field irrigation at least once in a 
rotation and observe the general condition of the head-regulator, 
check irrigation passes, and whether unauthorised irrigations are 
brought to notice. 
The Sectional Officer is supposed to inspect field irrigation in 
his beat very frequently. He also keeps with him the schedule o f 
rotation and mnning of the distributaries in his beat, the shejpali 
record and list of Vanchanamas (statements of irrigation offence). 
A Sectional Inspector is an upgraded Canal Inspector, at times 
placed in charge of an irrigation section. His duties in respect o f 
irrigation management, control and supervision, are the same as 
those specified for Sectional Officers. 
The Canal Inspector is supposed to prepare a palipatrak and 
get it approved by the Sectional Officer for each channel before the 
irrigation season starts, and submit to the Sectional Officer at least 
4 days in advance, an indent for supply of water at the head of each 
distributing channel in his beat in the next rotation, update 
irrigators' passes, open the gates o f the oudet channels at scheduled 
hours to let down adequate discharge for water and close them at 
the channels at the scheduled hours, inspect irrigation to see if the 
areas for which passes were given for the previous day have been 
completed, and to keep the Sectional Officer constandy informed. 
The Muster Clerk helps the Canal Inspector in control o f 
maintenance work and prepares water bills. The Technical 
Assistant surveys maintenance work, helps the Section Officer in 
preparing estimates and supervises the maintenance work. 
The Paatkari (waterman) assists the Canal Inspectors in charge 
of larger beats. He opens and closes the oudets in the beat of the 
Canal Inspector, under the orders o f the Sectional Officers. His 
duty is also to report to the Canal Inspector any cases of the misuse 
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Design characteristics 
In order to understand the context of water scarcity, it is necessary 
to know the basic design characteristics of irrigation systems. This 
is necessary to know how scarce the water is by design, and what 
proportion of crop water requirements it is designed to meet. As 
noted earlier in this chapter, scarcity by design is an essential 
characteristic of protective irrigation systems. 
Design data on irrigation systems in the state, which is needed 
to assess their performance as well as to gauge the magnitude of 
"scarcity by design" is very scattered. The Second Irrigation 
Commission (GOI1972) cites the case of the Jayakwadi Dam. One 
of the post-independence, modern dams of the state, it is designed 
to cover a gross cropped area of 183, 565 ha and irrigable area of 
141, 640 ha. The designed intensity of irrigation is 77%. 3 4 Major 
crops to be irrigated are cotton and rabi crops, and rice on 5 % and 
sugarcane on 1.5%. 
On the Mula Dam, Lele and Patil (1994) cite the designed crop 
pattern as 5 % area under perennials (mainly sugarcane), 20% two-
seasonals (cotton), 30% monsoon seasonals (July to October), 4 2 % 
winter crops (November to February) and 3 % hot weather crops. 
The CCA, ICA and the cropped area as designed and the 
intensity of irrigation as per the design report of the Mula Project is 
presented in table 2.2. 3 5 
The irrigation intensities are lower than 100%. The assumption 
is that some soils like light/shallow soils are more suitable for 
kharif, where as deep soils are more suitable for rabi crops. Hence 
in some areas the area available for irrigation in kharif is more as 
per the soil conditions and in some areas the area available for 
irrigation would be more for rabi. 
of water or waste of water, if detected. 
The keyman works direcdy under the Section Officer. His 
duties are to open, regulate and close, in each rotation, the 
distributing channels in a Section, according to the orders o f the 
Section Officer. He also helps the Canal Inspector in carrying out 
the authorised rotation programme for the different channels in the 
section. 
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TABLE 2.2 Design features of Mula Project 
Canal CCA ICA Irrigation Cropped Cropping 
M (ha) intensity Area intensity 
ICA/ (ha) % 
CCA 
% 
MRBC 85167 59292 70 62257 105 
MLBC 15182 10121 66 10627 105 
Pathardi 17853 11397 64 14018 123 
Branch 
WALMI (1998b) presents the following assumed irrigation 
duties in the. upper Pravara Project. The duty figures are at the 
oudet level. 
TABLE 2.3 Duties for working out live storage necessary for irrigation in 
the upper Pravara Project, Maharashtra 
Serial 
Number 
Crop Kharif 
Duty 
Rabi duty Hot weather 
duty 
1 Sugarcane overlap 
Kharif 
Rabi 
Hot Weather 
65 
65 
70 
70 
50 
50 
2 Other perennials 100 105 75 
3 Long Staple Cotton 200 400 100 
4 Two seasonals 300 140 -
5 Green manure 400 - -
6 Kharif Groundnut 200 - -
7 Bajari (pearl-millet) - Unirrigated 
8 Mung and udud 
(pulses) - Unirrigated 
9 Rabijowar (sorghum) 
after mung, udud 
and early ground nut 
- 200 
10 Chickpea after bajari - 400 -
- . Hot weather maize -
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Kharif Rabi Hot Weather 
Sugarcane 60 50 40 
Sorghum 200 150 200 
Wheat — 100 -
Vegetable 200 200 7.5 
Pulses 200 200 100 
The figures o f 0.7 1/s.ha and 1 1/s.ha are actually not far from 
crop water requirements. When considered in addition to rainfall,36 
this would suggest that water is actually not scarce by design in 
Maharashtra. Box 2.1 presents some calculations, in a comparative 
perspective, of water scarcity in the water users associations that I 
studied. The calculations suggest that water is definitely scarcer by 
design in the case of the WUA in Haryana. This box helps us 
analyse scarcity by design in a relative context and interpret the 
preceding discussion. 
BOX 2.1: Water scarcity in the WUAs chosen for study 
Allocation in the case of the Lakshmi Narayan WUA (Maharashtra): 
These figures of allocation were arrived at through a process of 
negotiation between the Irrigation Department on the one hand and 
the WUA and an NGO on the other. The season-wise allocation of 
water was determined on the basis of design, cropping pattern and 
the water requirements of the crops considered in the cropping 
pattern as per the assumptions made at the time of preparing the 
Mula project report. The designed cropping pattern for Mula Project 
is sugarcane (4%), other perennials (1%), two seasonals (cotton and 
chillies) 19.5%, Kharif seasonals (paddy, bajri and groundnut) 30.5%, 
rabi seasonals (wheat, jowar, maize and gram) 43%, Hot weather 
seasonals 3%, total 105%. While fixing the quotas of water for this 
minor, only the design cropping pattern as considered in the project 
report was taken into account, assuming water required for each crop 
and losses in the canal network. 
In Maharashtra the canals are designed taking into account the 
cropping pattern and the area to be irrigated in peak period 
(personal communication, Mr. Sane, SOPPECOM). The canals are 
usually designed with 0.7 1/s.ha in case of non-paddy crop and 1.0 
1/s.ha for paddy crops. The duty of various crops considered for 
designing canals are as below. (These figures are at the oudet level.) 
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Kharif Allocation is 0.434 million m 3 to irrigate 94 hectares 
434000 m 3 to irrigate 94 x 104 m 2 
434 000 m 3 / 94 x 104 m 2 = 0.462 m = 462 mm 
Rabi: 1.058 miUion m3 for 120 hectares 
1058000 m 3 for 120 X 104 m 2 
1058000 m3 / 120 X 104 m 2 = 0.882 m = 882 mm 
Hot weather (summer) 
0.283 million m3 for 62 hectares 
283000 m 3 for 62 x 104 m 2 
283000 m 3 / 62 x 104 m 2 = 0.456 m or 456 mm 
Total Allocation= 462 + 882 + 456 = 1800 mm (for a piece of land 
that receives water in three seasons) 
Irrigation depth for the year in the command of the WUA is 1800 
mm. If we add to this the average annual rainfall of 594mm, this 
would come to about 2400 mm, which is enough for a crop such as 
sugarcane. 
Comparison with designed allocation on the Mula Right Bank Canal. 
The designed allocation on the Mula Right Bank Canal is as follows: 
Kharif 196. 31 million m 3 
Rabi 256.53 million m 3 
Hot weather 126.96 million m 3 
Total 579.8 million m3 
(These figures are obtained from the Operation Plan prepared for the 
MRBC in 1986 by CADA) 
Total ICA of the Mula Right Bank Canal is 59292 ha.37 
So, when this designed allocation is applied to the Lakshmi Narayan 
WUA, it would be as follows. 
For kharif, (94 / 59292) x 196.31 x 10 6 m3 = 0. 311 x 10 6 m 3 
The actual allocation is 0.434 X 106 m3 
The actual allocation is thus higher than the design allocation. 
For rabi, it would be (120 / 59292) x 256.53 x 10 6 m 3 
= 0.519 x 10 6 m3. 
The actual allocation is 1.058 x 106 m 3 
In rabi, the actual allocation is almost double the designed allocation. 
For hot weather, it is (62 / 59292) x 126.96 x 106 m 3 
= 0.133 x 106 m 3 
The actual allocation is 0.283 x 106 m 3 
This is again almost double the designed allocation. 
Thus, in all the seasons, the WUA has succeeded in securing the 
allocation more than the designed. Hence, it could be considered a 
favoured WUA. It is perhaps not surprising that the WUA has been 
able to expand the irrigated area, as will be seen in chapter 6. 
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Water allocation in the case of the Rampur WUA (Haryana): 
Capacity factor of the Distributary is 165 days (This was obtained as 
90 days in the monsoons + 75 days across four groups of the 
distributary each for the rest of the year) 
Designed discharge at FSL into the outlet is 1. 56 cusecs. (As 2.4 
cusecs per 1000 acres for 648 acres) 
Area of oudet is 648 acres or 260 hectares and the whole of it is 
designed to get water from the canal. This entire area is under the 
warabandi schedule. 
Total volume for 165 days = (1.56 x 0.0283) x 60 x 60 x 24 x 165 m 3 
= 629373. 88 m3 
or 629374 m3 
Irrigation Depth = Volume of water/ command area of outlet 
= 629374 m 3 / 260 hectares 
= 629374 m 3 / 260x 104 
= 0.242 m or 242 mm annually 
When an average annual rainfall figure of 500 mm is added38, we get 
an annual irrigation depth of 752 mm. Water is much scarcer by 
design in the Haryana case.39 
Evaluation of shejpali 
The system of shejpali is known to have two major shortcomings. 
First, as noted above, gated oudets are vulnerable to manipulation 
and second, the procedure for submission and sanctioning of 
applications is cumbersome (Tilak and Rajvanshi 1991; Lele and 
Paul 1994). Both these operations provide opportunities for illicit 
payments and corruption. 
The intended advantage of shejpali is that a farmer should be 
able to get the water that he wants for his particular crops. It makes 
it possible for the government to enforce certain practices about 
crops (such as crop restrictions); offenders and those who do not 
pay their bills can be denied water. A disadvantage to the farmer, 
however, is that he has to submit an application and can not 
change his crop afterwards. He may also resent crop restrictions. 
Further, it is cumbersome for the Irrigation Department to receive, 
process and sanction all the applications as well as to adjust the 
water supply throughout. The operation of this system requires 
precise engineering and managerial control, which can not always 
be provided by the Irrigation Department. For shejpali to be 
implemented properly, a large number of staff is required to adjust 
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Conclusion and Discussion 
The essential differences between the warabandi and shejpali 
systems are presented in table 2.4: 
TABLE 2 4 Comparison between warabandi and shejpali 
Warabandi Shejpali 
The available water is allocated in 
proportion to size of the land-
holding 
No control exists on the cropping 
pattern from the Irrigation 
Department 
Size of oudet and field channels is 
related to CCA and all oudets run 
simultaneously as long as the 
distributary is running 
Oudets are ungated 
Crop water requirements are not 
considered in the process of water 
allocation 
Fewer points of human operation 
exist along the system 
Water supply is from head to tail 
Water is supplied as per the demand 
of crops and the area sanctioned 
Control exists on perennial irrigation, 
but farmers can demand water for 
any seasonal crop; water is supplied 
according to the crops sanctioned 
Size of oudet and field channels is 
standardised to 301/s capacity; as the 
water is supplied as per the demand, 
oudets are required to be rotated 
Oudets are gated 
Crop water requirements are 
considered while sanctioning 
applications 
A larger number of points of human 
operation exist along the system 
Water supply is from tail to head 
Source: Based on WALMI (1998a) 
Even though irrigation practices under warabandi have 
received much more attention and documentation, both the 
warabandi and shejpali systems have been the subject of extensive 
debate and review. Since both these systems imply a system of 
rationing water that is scarce relative to demand, instead of 
the water supply throughout, as well as to receive, process and 
sanction water applications. Besides, crop zoning often proves very 
difficult to enforce. Farmers with good water supply are able to 
grow higher valued, more water-consumptive crops than allowed. 
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matching water supplies with crop water requirements, the 
management concerns relating to Indian canal irrigation, especially 
in terms of their productivity, need to be appreciated in this 
backdrop 0umens, Mollinga and Wester 1996; Reidinger 1974; 
Gustafson and Reidinger 1971). 
Another point o f discourse relates to the applicability o f the 
warabandi system of North India to the West, where shejpali is 
followed. In fact, the adaptability of the warabandi system was 
studied in the old Bombay state (Lele and Paul 1994). However, it 
was found unsuitable because of the variation in ground water 
availabiHty due to rocks underlying the soils, the changing soil 
conditions within the canal commands that necessitated different 
frequencies and doses of water supply, the resulting variation in 
crops and cropping systems followed by the farmers and the 
preference of farmers for high value, high water consuming crops 
like sugarcane and banana (Lele and Paul 1994). 
In fact, warabandi came to be treated as a magic buzzword, 
and efforts were made to implement it in many other states 
(Malhotra 1988). 4 0 States like Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, 
Maharashtra and Gujarat introduced this system on an 
experimental basis.4 1 
However, what was missed in these discourses and efforts was 
a consideration of the fit of the organisational system with the type 
and standard of the physical infrastructure- especially the 
distributary, its oudets and watercourses. Warabandi, as a system of 
water distribution, needs to be supported by a set of physical and 
institutional conditions which form the broader environment of 
warabandi, transcending the boundaries of the tertiary system in 
which it is applied (Bandaragoda and Rehman 1995). 
Another issue relates to the relevance of warabandi under 
present circumstances, especially after the introduction of the green 
revolution. The introduction and rapid spread of high yielding 
varieties after the mid-1960s generated a demand for assured 
irrigation. Under these circumstances, warabandi has been criticised 
for the total lack of control that irrigators are confronted with and 
the fact that it limits the participation of the farmers in the green 
revolution.42 
One fall-out of the limited flexibility in irrigation conferred by 
warabandi that constrained the farmers' ability to take part in the 
green revolution was the increase in tubewell structures. In the 
early 1970s, northwest India experienced a "tubewell explosion" in 
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response to the commercial gains that accrued to farmers from the 
introduction of the new technology in wheat production. In fact, in 
Punjab, the increase in area devoted to paddy cultivation and the 
development of groundwater occurred at the same time (Chopra 
and Bathla 1997). 
As regards shejpali, die criticisms relate to the large number of 
avenues for human control in the system, breeding grounds for 
illicit payments, the administrative burden that a system of 
receiving, processing and sanctioning applications imposes on the 
Irrigation Department, and the high requirement for engineering 
and management control that this system entails. 
Having said that, I examine the relevance of this discussion for 
my research. I have stated in chapter 1 that one of my research 
objectives was to study WUAs under two different design settings. 
Warabandi and shejpali as two different forms of protective 
irrigation entail a different physical layout: in warabandi, water is 
distributed through ungated proportional dividers: the adjustable 
proportionate module and the open flume. In shejpali, water is 
distributed through gated pipe oudets. Human operation of the 
canal irrigation system in warabandi is limited till the distributary 
level, where gated structures exist. Shejpali has gated structures 
throughout, from the main system down to the farmers' fields, 
requiring human operation. Further, the process of applications for 
irrigation, sanctioning those applications and collecting fees on the 
basis o f the areas irrigated under different crops necessitates a 
whole set o f operational and management requirements and 
farmer-bureaucracy interface in shejpali that are absent from 
warabandi. The operation of gated pipe oudets in shejpali also has 
certain organisational implications that I have explained above. 
Thus, the operational implications of the shejpali and warabandi 
systems are different, and they place correspondingly different 
demands on the organisational structure for water management. In 
the chapters that follow, I examine the implications of these 
differences for irrigation management transfer, the water 
distribution process and the farmer-engineer interface. 
Notes 
1 Irrigation intensity expresses the intensity of the use of the command 
area of an irrigation system. When irrigation intensity is 60%, 60% of the 
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land is cultivated with an irrigated crop once per year (or 30% is double 
cropped). When it is 200%, all land is cultivated twice with irrigated crops 
per year. Duty expresses the area that can be irrigated with a unit 
discharge of water. It is usually given in acres per cusec (cubic foot per 
second). It is the inverse of 'irrigation allowance', which is expressed in 
1/s. ha (litres per second per hectare) (Mollinga 1998a). 
2 The Deccan is a drought-prone region in peninsular India. 
3 Localisation is a water control strategy in the South Indian states of 
Andhra Pradesh, Tamil Nadu and Karnataka (Mollinga 1998a). It is a 
form of agricultural land use planning that aims to control water 
distribution in an irrigation system through the legal prescription of the 
cropping pattern. Juridical procedures exist to prosecute those farmers 
that violate the cropping pattern. For instance, in Karnataka, the main 
elements of this strategy are as follows: 
(i) irrigation is allowed in part of the irrigable command of an irrigation 
system, and excluded in another part 
tii) limitation of the irrigation of a localised piece of land to one season 
(with some limited allowance of two-seasonal and perennial crops) 
(iii) the prohibition or strong limitation of water-consumptive crops, 
particularly rice and sugarcane, in favour of light crops such as sorghum, 
millet, cotton and oilseeds. 
4 For accounts of warabandi in Pakistan, see Bandaragoda (1998), 
Bandaragoda and Rehman (1995), Bandaragoda and Firdousi (1992), 
Merrey (1986a, 1986b) and Wahaj (2001). See also van Halsema (2002). 
5 The theory of the warabandi arrangement is that each cultivator is 
assigned a turn, represented by the specific period of time—a time share— 
and the volume of water available during that slice of time is his to use 
(Coward 1986). This time share becomes a property right legitimised by 
the state through the creation of a formal and legal warabandi roster for 
the delivery channel in question. The warabandi share, as a property right, 
then serves to organise the social relations of irrigation among the 
cultivators and between them and the irrigation agency (Coward 1986). 
6 "Protective irrigation for many rather than intensive irrigation for few, 
has been the central theme, on which the warabandi system has been 
planned and designed. For social reasons, the protective approach by 
thinly spreading the available water over a greater area was considered to 
be much more effective against famines than the approach for more 
intensive irrigation over a smaller area. With limited supply and serious 
constraints about its certainty, nothing better than the protective approach 
could be thought of.. ... "(Malhotra 1988: 39). 
7 These performance indicators were irrigation intensity, irrigation 
capacity factor and water allowance. A definition and elaboration of these 
concepts is presented in the section that follows. 
8 Rivers in the Indo-Gangetic plains are known to carry vast amounts of 
silt and suffer from problems of silting and scouring (van Halsema 2002). 
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9 The hydraulic head is the difference between the upstream and the 
downstream water levels. 
1 0 There are two variants of warabandi. The first is kuchha warabandi, 
under which farmers take water on the basis of mutual consent. The 
second is pucka warabandi that is framed by the Irrigation Department. A 
day and night interchange is also effected every six months. Farmers who 
take water in the day-time during the first half of the year take water at 
night time during the second half. See also Merrey (1986b) and 
Bandaragoda and Rehman (1995). 
1 1 Nahar is the Hindi word for canal. 
1 2 Oudet discharges are based on duty. For instance, an outlet of 28 1/s (1 
cusec) would serve 120-160 ha. 
1 3 Personal communication, Mr. Satish Sharma, Irrigation Department, 
Rohtak, December 10, 2001. I observed that Engineers in the Irrigation 
Department are not very conversant with these design figures. One 
practice, however, is that at the end of the Irrigation seasons, in kharif and 
rabi, respectively, the Nahari Patwaaris, when they assess the dues to be 
paid for irrigation on the basis of the crop area rates, make an assessment 
of the area irrigated within the command of an oudet. Expressed as a 
percentage of the gross cultivated area, this figure is used as an indication 
of the intensity of irrigation achieved. It serves partly as a monitoring tool. 
But this is the total area irrigated in the command of the outlet, and also 
includes irrigation from groundwater. An irrigation intensity achieved 
that is less than 50% is considered a sign of poor performance. 
1 4 Personal communication, Mr. Mattoo, CADA, Rohtak, December 11, 
2001. 
1 5 I show through my own empirical observations in the following 
chapters that this means little in practice. Farmers do intervene both at 
the level of the outlets as well as above, to increase discharges by breaking 
outlets or by inserting siphons on the canal. Similarly, farmers bribe the 
officers of the Irrigation Department to allow them to do so. For a 
discussion of these strategies and their effects on discharges, see also 
Wahaj (2001). 
1 6 Even considering breakdowns, tubewell operators in Pakistan reported 
that pump or engine failures made groundwater unavailable for an average 
of 1-2 weeks per season, which was still better than the reported 
unavailability of canal water for an average of 4-5 weeks per season 
(Meinzen-Dick 2000a). 
1 7 My own empirical observations on time exchanges and sales of water 
turns are presented in chapter 6. 
1 8 These strategies are described further in chapter 6. 
19 " (The) Irrigation Engineer has to see that the total water available with 
the storage along with the river-gains is fully utilized up to June of every 
year and no drop of water remains unutilised; at the same time, his 
foremost duty is to see that all the committed irrigation is fully satisfied 
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according to the rules and practices of irrigation and no crops starve for 
want of water. This, therefore, leads to the Executive Engineer to the 
formulation of the programme for the utilization of the stored water, 
considering the duties of the various sanctioned crops, river-gains, 
evaporation losses, canals and distribution losses, in a planned manner. " 
(Gandhi 1979: 399-400). 
2 0 The Nira Left Bank Canal is located in the Deccan. The canal was 
constructed as a famine relief work in the period 1876-85. The area has 
an average rainfall of 450-500 mm a year. This falls mainly during the 
monsoon, which last from June until October. The rainfall is very erratic: 
in dry years, even traditional drought resistant food crops such as 
sorghum and millets would not survive. This would result in famines. 
2 1 A phad is a group of contiguous farmers where the same crop is grown 
under irrigated conditions (Lele and Paul 1994). The phad system refers to 
the management of irrigation by a group of farmers. For over 400 years 
such a system of irrigation management has been practiced on small 
irrigation works in North-western Maharashtra. Farmers have managed 
the allocation and distribution of water, rotation of crops, and the 
maintenance of the system through community effort. This system has 
been practiced in the Tapi basin on rivers Panjra, Mosam and Aram. On 
these rivers there is a series of bandharas (weirs). These systems receive 
their run-off from the monsoon flow which can sustain sizable irrigation 
in the winter and summer seasons. They are managed, operated and 
maintained by the irrigators themselves. Each system comprises a low 
diversion weir across the river, a small canal on the bank, and a 
distribution system for irrigation. The area under irrigation in each weir 
varies from 4 to 192 ha. The irrigators contribute funds for maintenance, 
manage these funds and organise community labour from the village. 
2 2 The disenchantment with the block system led to a long period of 
debate over the merits of the block system and the difficulties in its 
implementation. See Lele and Patil (1994) and GOI (1972). 
2 3 This made possible double cropping as well as increased production per 
unit of land in a season. 
2 4 I return to this point and a companson between the block and shejpali 
systems later in this chapter. 
2 5 This does not always happen in practice. Often the cropping pattern is 
announced after the crops have been sown. Further, the cropping pattern 
realised does not adhere to the pattern proposed. 
2 6 What is described here is the principle of shejpali, that is, how shejpali is 
supposed to work. The extent to which these practices are actually 
followed varies from location to location. 
2 7 RWS in Maharashtra can be considered as rigid shejpali when the 
discharge from the oudet is standardised at 28.3 1/s or one cusec. Based 
on the discharge and delta of irrigation, precise time allocation is done for 
preparing water distribution schedules below the oudets. This was 
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introduced first in Gima Command in 1977. Experiments were conducted 
to see how much discharge one farmer could handle for efficient 
irrigation like borders/furrows and accordingly one cusec or 28.3 1/s 
discharge was fixed. When the exact time was prescribed in advance, there 
was better understanding among the farmers which led to disciplined use 
of water and confidence in getting water by all, head as well as tail-end, 
farmers. The system was then applied to larger areas in other projects. 
The process involved observing filling/emptying time of each minor/field 
channel for preparing distribution schedules accurately and deterrrrining 
the irrigation delta as required for different soils/crops and season. The 
time allotted for irrigating one ha of land varied from 5 to 10 hrs. A 
discharge of one cusec provides, theoretically, without considering transit 
losses in field channel, 5 cm of water at field level per hour, and the time 
allocation was 5 hrs. Giving 5 cm of water at outlet level or 5 x 0.85 = 
4.25 cms of delta of crop level. Similarly 10 hrs. allocation/ha provides 
irrigation delta of 10 cm if calculated at outlet level, or 10 x 0.85 = 8.5 
cms at crop level (Personal communication, Mr. Sane, SOPPECOM, 
Pune). 
2 8 This applies when more than one outlet is drawing water at a time, as 
happens with oudet operation in this case. When a single one draws, it 
will head up till the outflow matches inflow or the canal overflows. 
2 9 The advantages of the block system, as in practice now, vis à vis 
ordinary shejpali are as follows (Lele and Paul 1994): 
(i) Irrigators get a guarantee for long term water supply (i.e. 6 to 12 years) 
for an agreed or fixed area, and they can, therefore, incur capital 
expenditure for land development and higher inputs. 
(ii) Perennial /sugarcane blocks involve rotation of crops within the block 
area, thus improving fertility of soils. 
(iii) The high water consuming crop area is restricted and farmers have an 
obligation to grow seasonal crops. 
(iv) Farmers are free from the hassle of applying and getting sanctions 
every year/season. The Irrigation Department's effort to scrutinise and 
sanction crops every season and measure the irrigated area is reduced. The 
Irrigation Demand is stabilised, which simplifies the preparation of 
Preliminary Irrigation Programme. 
3 0 Personal communication, Mr. Sane, SOPPECOM. 
3 1 0.2 ha. sugarcane + 0.6 ha. other crops - i.e., 0.8 ha- is called a block 
area. The bearer of a block is a person who has a share in a block. 
3 2 The blocks are sanctioned for sugarcane-banana crops with one-third 
area (later reduced to one-fourth) and the remaining area for other 
seasonal crops in kharif and rabi. Similar blocks are sanctioned for two 
seasonals, i.e. either two seasonal crops like cotton, or half area in kharif 
and the balance in rabi. Fruit blocks are sanctioned for 12 years without 
any obligation of seasonal crops (Personal communication, Mr. Sane, 
SOPPECOM). 
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3 3 This section draws upon IIM(A) -IWMI (1999). 
3 4 This intensity is split up as 60% for rabi, 10% for hot weather and 7% 
for Kharif (personal communication, Dr. S A Kulkarni, INCID, New 
Delhi). 
3 5 Personal communication, Dr. S.N. Lele, SOPPECOM, Pune. 
3 6 In the command of the Mula Project, for instance, where my research 
site is located, the average annual rainfall is 594 mm (Lele and Paul 1994). 
3 7 This calculation is on the assumption that the water is spread over the 
entire 59292 ha. When the NGO was negotiating the water allocation for 
distributary 4 of branch 1 of the Mula project, the question of equitable 
distribution to all the minors came up. The Government of Maharashtra 
had issued a circular (in 1992) for allocating water equitably across the 
minors. The quotas for all minors of the Dy. 4 were worked out on this 
basis as 3520 m 3 per hectare. However, this circular is not followed 
scrupulously (Personal communication, SOPPECOM team, Pune). 
3 8 This figure of 500 mm is an estimate of average rainfall in Rohtak 
district based on data obtained from the Agriculture Department, District 
Rohtak, Haryana. 
3 9 However, one factor that has not been taken into account to arrive at 
these calculations is the possibility of lateral inflow through canal seepage. 
In both the cases, there is some recharge from canal waters. In fact, in the 
Lakshmi Narayan case, recharge from canals led to the digging of a large 
number of tubewells in the canal command. In the Rampur case, too, 
some percolation from the canal waters benefits the saline ground water. 
Since the hydrogeologies of the two regions are different - Haryana has 
deep alluvial while Maharashtra has shallow black cotton soil with hard 
rock — I have been unable to make a substantive claim regarding the 
differences in water availability through seepage. 
4 0 This discourse became very popular particularly in the 1970s and 1980s. 
4 1 The introduction of warabandi became one of the tasks entrusted to 
the CAD agencies constituted under the Command Area Development 
Programme. For a review of the experience with introducing this system 
in Karnataka, see Mollinga (1998a). 
4 2 In chapter 6,1 describe how farmers seek to deal with this situation. 
3 
Policy Support and Resistance 
The process of WUA establishment in 
Haryana and Maharashtra 
This chapter describes the reform processes o f WUA establishment 
in Haryana and Maharashtra. In both these states, very litde effort 
has been made to garner support for the reform process, or to 
ensure that the necessary resources are available. A principal 
weakness of the process in Haryana is that water users associations 
have been formed below the oudet, while the main management 
challenges are located above it. Besides, there has so far been no 
place for the Irrigation Department in the reform process. In 
Maharashtra, while the policy for WUA formation is more 
ambitious as a reform strategy, it is opposed by vested interests that 
benefit from the status quo. 
An overview of the policy environment for WUA formation in the 
state of Haryana is first presented. This is followed by a discussion 
of the implementation process, where I describe how this policy 
translates into practice. The perceptions of different actors 
involved are described, and the bottlenecks to policy 
implementation are discussed. I then repeat this exercise for the 
state of Maharashtra. Later in the chapter, the experience o f both 
these states is compared with that of other Indian states where 
policies for establishing WUAs are at different levels of 
formulation or implementation. 
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WUA Formation in Haryana 
As noted earlier, Haryana is one of India's leading agricultural 
states. Along with the Punjab, it was the cradle of India' s green 
revolution in the 1960s and 1970s and remains a major contributor 
to her food basket. The state has predominandy an arid and semi-
arid type of agro-ecology and irrigation has had a significant role to 
play in raising agricultural productivity. The spurt in tubewell 
BOX 3.1 The organisational and Institutional Framework for Irrigation 
Management in Haryana 
In Haryana, the Haryana Irrigation Department (HID) has the 
primary responsibility for managing the state's water resources and 
provides the essential services in this sector (GOH 1998). Two other 
agencies of the Government of Haryana are involved. The first one is 
the Haryana State Minor Irrigation and Tubewells Development 
Corporation (HSMITC). This organisation takes up groundwater 
development through deep tubewells. It also does the lining of 
watercourses in canal irrigated command areas. The Command Area 
Development Authority (CADA) is the second organisation. It was 
established in 1975. It does lining of watercourses where irrigation is 
lagging, also under lift irrigation schemes. 
The HID has the responsibility for the operation and maintenance of 
canals, distributaries, minors and oudets up to the head of 
watercourses which are the lowest common channel serving an area of 
100-300 hectares. According to the Haryana Canal and Drainage Act 
(1974), the maintenance and repair of watercourses is the 
responsibility of farmers; alternatively, the Act provides for the 
Irrigation Department to operate and maintain the system and charge 
farmers to cover the cost. 
Watercourse lining is carried out both by CADA and the MITC. Most 
MITC work is in the command of the Bhakra system while most CADA 
work is in the WYC (Western Yamuna Canal ) and other systems in the 
state. 
The Haryana Irrigation Research and Management Institute, HIRMI, 
based at Kurukshetra, carries out research and ttaining in the 
irrigation sector. In the context of WUA establishment, it has been 
training farmers and WUA leaders. 
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structures in the state facilitated the participation of the farmers in 
the green revolution. In recent years, however, doubts have been 
cast over the sustainability of the green revolution on account of 
falling water tables and rising salinity. The role of the government 
in irrigation has been in the development and spread of canal 
irrigation and the development of state tubewells (See Box 3.1). 
Factors driving WUA formation in Haryana 
In 1995, it was decided by a resolution passed by the Government 
of Haryana, that begmning 1995, new watercourse lining on canals 
would be carried out only for farmers who had organised 
themselves into a water users association.1 This act of forming 
water users associations has acquired the label o f Participatory 
Irrigation Management in the state. 
The most important factor driving WUA formation in the state is 
the agreement made by the Government of Haryana with the World 
Bank for the Water Resources Consolidation Project (WRCP).2 The 
components of this project in Haryana are rehabilitation of existing 
irrigation facilities, research and training, canal lining, watercourse 
lining, building a main canal link, a drainage programme and the 
erection of the Hathni Kund barrage (World Bank 1993).3 This 
project, signed in 1994, mandates improving farmer contribution to 
O & M in large systems by raising fees and by promoting WUAs 
below the oudets to take over maintenance of lined watercourses. 
The HSMTTC has been entrusted with the task of forming 
WUAs under this programme. The emphasis on WUA formation 
under the WRCP supports the general thrust on devolution of 
functions in the World Bank's programmes. The World Bank's 
Water Resources Management Policy (1993), stressing the need for 
decentralisation asserts thus... 
the principle is that nothing should be done at a higher level that 
can be done satisfactorily at a lower level. Thus where local or 
private capabilities exist and where an appropriate regulatory 
support can be established, the Bank will support central 
government efforts to decentralise responsibility to local 
governments and to transfer service delivery functions to the 
private sector to financially autonomous public corporations and 
to community organisations such as water user associations. 
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Further, 
when properly designed, community-based programmes can be 
highly effective in managing natural resources, providing basic 
infrastructure or ensuring primary social services Successful 
design requires tapping into local needs, understanding and 
building on the strengths of existing institutions and defining the 
changes needed in intermediary implementing agencies to 
support community action. (World Bank 1996: 247) 
A justification for WUA formation that is presented by the 
Irrigation Department is that farmers need to show an involvement 
in the maintenance of lined watercourses. Two senior officials from 
the Haryana Irrigation Department put it as follows. 
as far as the history goes, farmers had been mamtaining the 
watercourses themselves till these were lined and are still doing 
so in case of unlined watercourses. The question is what goes 
wrong when a watercourse is lined? The reason is quite simple 
that the investment on lining of watercourses is entirely made by 
the state. As a result, the shareholders lose the sense of 
ownership of the watercourse and start looking upon the state 
for every aspect of watercourses, and importantly maintenance. 
It is the intervention of the state in creating the infrastructure 
without any share of the stakeholders in investment that the 
shareholders change their perspective to see the lined 
watercourse as a state property. .. the essential requirement of 
success of PIM at primary level is to imbibe a sense of 
ownership of watercourse in its stakeholders. No intere^ can be 
created for responsibility for O & M alone unless there i i • sense 
of ownership. Since in the present arrangement stakeholders do 
not have any share in investment for lining of watercourses, this 
lack of involvement prevents from getting a sense of the 
ownership (Ailawadhi and Bansal 2001:17). 
Apart from the HSMITC, the other organisation engaged in 
forming WUAs in the state is CADA, the Command Area 
Development Authority. The CADP (Command Area Development 
Programme) was launched in India in 1974. CAD agencies were set 
up to overcome the monodisciplinary outlook of irrigation agencies 
and to bring in water/land management and agricultural services at 
the farm level and to bridge the gap between irrigation potential 
created and utilised (Maloney 2000; Sivamohan and Scott 1992). 4 One 
of the reasons for the large gap between potential created and utilised 
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in Indian irrigation was taken to be the underdevelopment of 
irrigation infrastructure between the main system and farmers' fields 
(Sfvamohan and Scott 1992).5 It was recognised that this gap had to 
be tackled directly by concentrating on the construction of field 
channels and supplying water as close to the farmers' fields as 
possible. Thus, emphasis shifted to On-Farm Development in 
particular, to construction of watercourses to bring water to the fields 
of farmers. In 1983, attention turned specifically to field channel 
construction. This shift was also reflected in the patterns of financial 
assistance given by the central government During the sixth and 
seventh plans, the construction of field channels was accorded a high 
priority to make irrigation accessible to farmers. 
The emphasis on watercourse lining is seen as a way of reducing 
seepage losses, which in turn, is seen as a way of reducing the gap 
between irrigation potential created and utilised.6 A senior CADA 
officer in Haryana explained that there was a realisation among the 
senior management at CADA that these activities would not bear 
fruit in the absence of participation from farmers.7 
Though CADA had already been engaged in the task of forming 
WUAs in Haryana, it was only in 1995 that the effort received a 
strong push under the ongoing HWRCP (Ailawadhi and Bansal 
2001). The Government of Haryana took a policy decision to pass on 
the responsibility of operation and maintenance of the irrigation 
system under watercourses to farmers, organised into water users 
associations. The Institute of Resource Development and Social 
Management (TRDAS), an N G O with some experience in WUA 
establishment, was entrusted with the task of evolving a strategy for 
establishing WUAs and assisting the HTD in establishing 10 WUAs 
on a pilot basis. The work was initiated in June 1996 and TRDAS 
organised a total of 70 WUAs (GOH 1998). 
In the year 1998, the state government approved model bye-laws 
to be adopted by the WUAs at the time of forming the WUAs and a 
draft MOU to be signed at the time of turning over management to 
WUAs on completion of modernisation or rehabilitation of a 
watercourse. Essentially, this MOU entrusts responsibilities for 
repair and maintenance of the watercourses to the WUA. It also 
requires the WUAs to carry out the water distribution process on 
the lines of the warabandi schedule.8 
In order to step up and coordinate the programme, a core group 
on PIM was formed in the Haryana Irrigation Department, with 
representation from the implementing agencies such as HSMTTC, 
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Hissar Kaithal Bhiwani Hand over of 
watercourses completed 
Modernisation 
of WCs 1 0 
601 47 97 141 
Rehabilitation 73 19 5 6 
O&M 28 18 - 2 
Total 702 84 102 149 
Source: Haryana Irrigation Research and Management Institute, Kurukshetra 
There was some progress in the following year. Out of 1550 
WUAs registered by March 2001, hand-over of watercourses had 
been completed in 389 cases.11 
By July 31, 2001, under the HWRCP, 1957 WUAs had been 
formed and 728 WUAs had been turned over to WUAs for 
management. These WUAs have been formed in Kaithal, Bhiwani 
and Hissar districts of the state (Map 3.1). Most of these WUAs are 
quite recent, having been formed only after 1997-98. My discussions 
HAD (the Haryana Agriculture Department) and HIRMI (Ailawadhi 
and Bansal 2001). The core group prepared a strategy to implement 
the programme, which includes a mass awareness and training 
programme for WUAs and agency officials. 
Water users associations organised by the HSMITC 
The WUAs formed by the HSMTTC are registered under the 
Societies Registration Act (1860) with the state's Registrar of 
Cooperatives. The principle is that at the time of the formation of the 
WUA, the state government contributes Rs 100/ha and each farmer 
contributes Rs.lOO/ha. This is deposited in a Fixed Deposit Account 
in a commercial bank. The interest accruing on the Deposit is to be 
the source of future funds for maintaining watercourses. For these 
WUAs to be formed at least 50% of the members in a watercourse 
have to agree to become members; they then work with an Executive 
Committee under a Chairman. Table 3.1 gives details of the status 
and number of water users associations thus formed in the state. 
TABLE 3.1 Water Users Associations formed by the HSMITC, Haryana 
(December 1999) 
Political Map of Haryana 
M A P 3.1 
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been completed 
Faridabad 248 53 
Jind 229 122 
Rohtak 515 52 
Total 991 227 
Source: Haryana Irrigation Research and Management Institute, Kurukshetra 
As of December 1999, 991 WUAs had been registered. This 
number rose marginally over the following year. As of December 
2000, 1036 WUAs had been registered and of them, hand-over of 
watercourses had been completed in 333 cases. Most of these 
associations were formed in or after 1998, when the bye-laws were 
approved. They have been formed in Faridabad, Jind and Rohtak 
districts of the state. 
There is some tlrinking within policy circles for extending the 
level at which WUAs are formed. An undated CADA document 
entitled 'Sahabhagi sinchai prabandh' (Participatory Irrigation 
Management), states that WUAs should be formed at the level of the 
at the senior management level of the HSMITC revealed that 
eventually a number of functions, including collection of water 
charges, are proposed to be transferred to the WUAs. The 
justification presented is that this would relieve the burden on the 
state Irrigation Department. 
WUAs under CADA 
The WUAs formed by CADA are also registered under the 
Societies Registration Act (1860). The state government contributes 
Rs 225/ha and the centre provides Rs 225 / ha while the farmers 
contribute Rs 50/ha at the stage of formation. CADA provides for a 
subsidy to water users associations. This takes the form of a 
maintenance grant of Rs 100/ha, in each of the first two years, and Rs 
75/ha in the following year, respectively. Table 3.2 gives details of 
WUAs thus formed by CADA in the state. 
TABLE 3.2 Water Users Associations formed by CADA in Haryana 
(December, 1999) 
Distria Number of WUAs formed Number in which hand-over has 
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outlet first and then at the level of the minor and the distributary. 
The process o f implementation of reforms 
The major weakness of the process o f WUA establishment in 
Haryana is that WUA formation has been carried out below the 
oudet, while the more important management challenges are 
located above the outiet. There is little reflection of what WUA 
formation seeks to achieve. There is no reorientation of the 
Irrigation Department, and very litde control has been devolved to 
users. 
Limited range of functions transferred; no change in control 
relations between farmers and the bureaucracy 
Perhaps the strongest critique of the PIM process in the state is 
at the level of the content of the policy itself, in terms of the 
limited range of functions transferred to users. The only function 
transferred to the WUAs is the maintenance o f lined watercourses. 
The task of the WUAs is to supervise the repairs and construction 
of watercourses and to keep a check on the quality of material used 
by contractors who are assigned (by the government agencies) to 
do so. 1 2 Thus, during my first interface with the members of the 
Sitapur WUA, they righdy said . . . "they have left us as Chowkidaars 
(watchmen)". The Chairman of the WUA said, "They have made 
me chief, but have not given me any powers". A point that cropped 
up in further discussions was., "we only have problems and 
problems, no real powers." Unlike the case of WUAs in 
Maharashtra, which is discussed later in this chapter, where, in 
principle, the formation of water users associations seeks to 
transfer control over system operation to farmers, the process of 
"PIM" in Haryana does not devolve any real control to users. 
As noted earlier, there is some thinking within policy circles 
about involving WUAs in other functions such as assessment, 
collection and sharing of irrigation revenues (Ailawadhi and Bansal 
2001:15; Brewer et al .1999). There are also proposals for forming 
WUAs at the distributary level (GOH, n.d.; Ailawadhi and Bansal 
2001: 19, 20). A common perspective among many field level 
CADA and MITC officers that I interviewed, however, was.." We 
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will first see if farmers are capable of performing the functions that 
are transferred to them... only then will we think of giving them 
more powers." A member of the senior management at CADA 
also felt that the demand for the transfer of more functions should 
come from the farmers. What is amazing, however, is that there is 
no direct feedback loop between the farmers and the senior 
management at CADA; so there is a question mark over how such 
a demand would be communicated. 
The only reporting on WUAs in the offices of both CADA 
and MITC is quantitative; "numbers formed, share money 
deposited, hand over completed". Beyond quantitative targets and 
meeting them, there is litde effort to understand at what level of 
working these WUAs are. Senior management at the organisations 
engaged in forming WUAs openly admits that they have no 
information about their working and no feedback or evaluation has 
been carried out. 1 3 This speaks of the litde real commitment to the 
act o f establishing WUAs. 
An instrumental perspective 
There is a strong instrumental perspective to WUA formation in the 
state. WUAs in the command of CADA and MITC remain 
essentially arms of the bureaucracy, performing functions delegated 
to them. They are liable for their actions to CADA and the MITC. 
A field level official at HSMTTC said, " they (the farmers) now 
maintain watercourses and do not come to us., what else do we 
want." Another one, in a similar vein, said, " they are quite useful 
to us, and serve our objectives effectively". The justification that 
the farmers are presented for forming water users associations is 
thus... "The government manages the entire irrigation system: 
can't you manage even the watercourses?"14 
Further, these WUAs continue to be strangled within the 
clutches of the bureaucracy. When a watercourse is repaired, WUA 
members have to approach CADA with a request and go again 
through a number of procedures and formalities. A field level 
HSMTTC official with whom I had a long interview felt that the 
process of formation of water users associations was long and 
cumbersome. 
During my meeting with the Chairman of a WUA, he said, "we 
have to keep very careful accounts., you never know when there 
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will be an audit". Even while members deposit share capital, its 
withdrawal has to be approved by the CADA. Even then, field 
level officials at CADA express their dissatisfaction at being unable 
to "keep checks on them". Some go to the extent of saying that 
WUAs are ineffective because there is no permanent agency to 
"monitor" them. This sentiment runs counter to the spirit o f 
devolution.15 
The role of the Irrigation Department and CADA: absence of an 
enabling environment 
There are different views circulating within the government 
machinery on the policy for WUA establishment, revealing little real 
interest, or commitment to implementing the policy initiative. There 
is littie ownership of the reform process. An enabling environment 
for sustained support to WUAs has failed to emerge. 
Many field level officers of the Irrigation Department admitted 
that they had "nothing to do" with water users associations. Lining 
of watercourses has been the domain of the lining wing of the 
Command Area Development Authority and the Haryana State 
Minor Irrigation and Tubewells Development Corporation. It is 
effectively these organisations that are involved with WUA 
establishment. It is their functions that are transferred to water 
users. 
On the other hand, some field level CADA officers felt that 
these WUAs are not sustainable because there is limited sustained 
involvement of other organisations at the village level: in particular, 
the Irrigation Department and the Gram Panchayat (unit of local 
government at the village level). Proponents o f this view hold that 
unless other village level institutions are involved, the WUAs will 
not 'deliver results'.16 Several CADA officials feel that the Irrigation 
Department, the canal Patwaari and the B D O (Block Development 
Officer) should take a greater interest in the working of these 
WUAs. The rationale behind this position is that CADA withdraws 
soon after the task of lining the watercourse has been completed 
and turnover of the watercourses has been effected.1 7 For 
continued "monitoring" o f the WUAs, to use the bureaucracy's 
own jargon, it is argued that there is a need for involvement from 
an agency that interacts with farmers on a regular basis. 
One reason for the limited success of CADA programmes at the 
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state level is that CADA schemes are essentially a central government 
programme being implemented by the state government, on a subject 
that is a state subject (water). A CADA officer with whom I had 
regular meetings during my fieldwork summed up this attitude 
thus..." we do not involve ourselves much in this 
programme.. .because it is basically a central government scheme". 
No effect on water distribution practices 
Further, with WUA formation, there is no change in the status quo 
with regard to other activities and practices in water management 
and distribution.18 This is similar to what Byrnes (1992) established 
with regard to his study of water users associations in Pakistan's 
World Bank Assisted On-Farm Water Management Programme. 
"Generally, the establishment of legally-authorized WUAs on the 
W/Cs (watercourses) has not resulted in farmers drastically 
changing or going beyond what they traditionally accomplished 
through their informal khal (watercourse) committees" (Byrnes 
1992: idv). Further, " the underlying reason for this problem lies in 
the failure of the design of World Bank-assisted irrigation projects 
to include an effective strategy, and to provide the necessary 
resources to implement that strategy, for WUAs to function as the 
farmers' own vehicle for investing and sharing in the benefits of 
development. Much work remains if WUAs are to evolve from 
short-lived paper organizations for improving watercourses to self-
sustaining organizations active in promoting agricultural and rural 
development (Byrnes 1992: xv)." 
The experience in Haryana supports the point that is raised by 
Byrnes, namely, that changes are necessary for WUAs to become 
sustainable catalysts for agricultural and rural development, rather 
than being seen as a means of accompHshing agency objectives of 
securing watercourse lining. Byrnes argues that viable WUAs 
should be built as the programme's primary objective, not simply as 
a formality that needs to be completed to proceed with watercourse 
improvement.1 9 It is interesting that the World Bank did not learn 
from its experience in Pakistan about a decade ago. 
Reform needed above the outlets 
The more important management challenges, as will become 
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evident from my association with two WUAs in the state that is 
presented in the following chapters, are located above the 
watercourses: tampering with oudets, inserting soondiyas (siphons) 
to extract more than the protective entitlement of water and 
bribing the employees o f the Irrigation Department for being 
allowed to do so. Real water management issues are, therefore, 
located at a different level than where reform is concentrated at 
present. 
Some farmers that I interviewed felt that lining watercourses did 
reduce seepage losses and supervision of construction improved the 
quality of materials used. However, they also complained that when 
they did not get their share of water from the main system, it did not 
matter whether the watercourse was lined or unlined. Many farmers 
even complained that when they deposited money for lining the 
watercourse and did not get their share of water, they felt cheated. 
Institutional and technical reform below the outlet is meaningless in 
the absence of effective management of the main system or control 
over water supplies (Hunt 1989; Wade and Chambers 1980). 2 0 
There is some complacency within the Irrigation Department 
on grounds that there is no need for PIM in the state since the 
warabandi system itself is a form of farmer participation. The point 
that needs appreciation is that warabandi is only a system of water 
distribution.21 There is a need for reform but for reform to be 
meaningful, it needs to be introduced above the watercourses and 
oudets. The limited appeal of "management turnover" in the state 
as is being carried out now is not that there is a warabandi system 
per se, but that the points where intervention is required are 
different from where action is concentrated at present. 
The politics of reform 
High-level political support is now widely acknowledged as a 
necessary ingredient for success o f irrigation reforms. 2 2 Haryana 
policy circles recognise this. 
"Political patronage for ownership of the programme and 
spreading the message across will provide necessary impetus to 
the programme. PIM will have a better mass appeal, when 
elected representatives promote it. Once ministers and 
legislatures are committed to PIM and strongly advocate the 
cause of PIM, it will be far easier for the stakeholders to get 
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convinced to own the programme. The message from this forum 
will spread faster and have far better results than by the irrigation 
agency" (Ailawadhi and Bansal 2001:18). 
However, officers at CADA and the HSMTTC are quick to 
point out that the required "'political will" for WUA formation is 
absent in the state. The policy approach to establishing WUAs was 
given concrete shape during the reign of the state's former Chief 
Minister, Bansi Lai. In the year 2000, there was a change of 
government and a new state government headed by Om Prakash 
Chautala came into power. Chautala contested the elections to the 
State Legislative Assembly by promising free water and electricity 
to farmers. In March 2000, he announced that his government was 
committed to raising agricultural production by repairing 
watercourses and carrying out free lining of watercourses. 
Populist announcements such as the one described above 
contradict the policy approach of CADA and MITC of engaging 
farmers and making them contribute financially. According to 
many of the field level officers that I interviewed, this weakens 
their efforts and dampens farmer enthusiasm as weE. They said that 
it takes a lot of effort to persuade farmers to contribute. Once this 
is done, and the corresponding share money of the state 
government does not come forth, it weakens CADA's credibiEty 
with the farmers. The non-availabiEty of share capital from the 
state government also plagues WUAs formed by the MITC under 
the World Bank's WRCP. Farmers are often reluctant to contribute 
because they expect that they vote for a government and it is the 
latter's duty to provide water. PopuEst poEtics reinforce this attitude: 
the elected representatives actuaEy promise free water and electricity. 
Demand for PIM 
As noted earEer, the formation of WUAs is seen largely as a 
response to the on-going HWRCP initiated by the World Bank, 
with Etde ownership of the agenda among the bureaucracy. A 
number of field level HSMTTC officials expressed the view that the 
chief reason that the WUAs are being formed is that the World 
Bank insists so under its WRCP and that barring that there is Etde 
demand for PIM. 2 3 Some CADA officials also feel that the only 
reason they are being formed is that there is financial support for 
them from the central government.24 Lately, however, there have 
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been some initiatives for WUA formation. At Bhiwani, for 
instance, members of the Gowshala trust, a charitable organisation, 
approached CADA for support in forming a water users 
association.25 
There is litde self-reflection - within the Irrigation Department 
or the State Government -of what ' T I M " should really accomplish. 
There is also no effort to mainstream the initiatives into overall 
water development efforts. At the moment, Haryana is in the midst 
o f an overall programme for social and economic development, led 
by the Chief Minister Om Prakash Chautala, targeting agricultural 
transformation and industrial modernisation. Litde thought has 
gone into how an irrigation reform programme can be integrated 
with overall development and agrarian transformation. 
Limited involvement of civil society 
It is rare that all members of WUAs participate in meetings of the 
WUA, or take decisions. Usually, it is a managing committee 
(comprising anywhere between three to eight members) that takes 
most of these decisions. This managing committee is often a body 
distanced from other farmers.2 6 Thus, the concept of vibrant, self-
governing robust institutions o f mass participation from civil 
society is missing in practice. 
Another critique, related to the previous point, from my 
association with both the Sitapur Water Users Association as well 
as the Rampur Water Users Association is the absence o f any 
mechanism to ensure the accountability of the management of the 
Water Users Association to the other WUA members. That there is 
a local level mechanism for the management of water does not 
necessarily mean that this structure is egalitarian, transparent and 
accountable. Or that sharing leads to greater empowerment.27 
Empowerment has been one of the major goals of the 
processes o f decentralisation. But the critical question is 
empowerment of whom? Power has been concentrated with and 
shared among those who were already powerful in other ways. The 
other members have not been involved. They do not have access 
to information and there is litde transparency between them and 
their management body. Most members do not have a sense of 
identification with the water users association. They do not know 
what happened to the money that they contributed, where it was 
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used, if ever a meeting was held, or what their rights are. 
Conclusion 
The major, if any, benefit of forming the WUAs is that the 
organisation of farmers gets a legal identity, by being registered as a 
water users association. However, the implementation of the policy 
intervention is left wanting on many fronts. 
First, there seems to be litde commitment to the imperatives 
for reform among the implementers, barring the external pressure 
from the World Bank. Those responsible for carrying out the 
reform do not identify with it and are not convinced about it. The 
second limiting factor is the scale of reform and management 
transfer. There has been some talk in the past of devolution of 
more powers to the water users associations, but it has not 
materialised. At CADA, a perspective is that more functions have 
not been given to WUAs because the demand for this has to come 
from among the farmers, but there has been no representation 
from the farmers. What is amazing is how the senior management 
expects this demand to be communicated in the absence of a direct 
feedback mechanism between the farmers and the bureaucracy. 
Another limitation in terms of scale is in terms of federating. 
One reason why scaling up of the WUAs may not be possible at 
the moment is that there is no direct involvement of the Irrigation 
Department, which means that reform does not proceed above the 
oudet. The process of federating or upscaling is relevant only after 
reforms have been introduced above the oudets. 
Third, a feedback mechanism should be an essential ingredient 
o f a policy reform process, where proposals for reform are 
articulated and debated. The head-offices of CADA and MITC are 
limited in their ability to obtain such feedback. Fourth, a common 
observation among the officers of both CADA as weE as the 
HSMITC is that the infamous "poEtical wiE" has been absent. 
When the Chief Minister promises free Ening of watercourses, it 
dampens the enthusiasm and the move to reform. FinaEy, the poor 
avaEabiEty of financial resources from the state government serves 
as the coup degrace in retarding progress. 
In many ways, these WUAs have become Etde more than 
products of government programmes, enmeshed in a number of 
problems, reliance on government funds, confusing and 
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contradictory policies and a half-hearted commitment of the state 
government. While the idea behind PIM should be to build new 
partnerships and empower, this is not happening. Real power 
continues to vest outside the WUA, technically in the main system 
and institutionally with the Irrigation Department, while WUAs 
simply perform functions handed over to them by CADA or 
MITC. They continue to be dependent on and accountable to the 
bureaucracy and perform the functions assigned to them with litde 
or no matching powers and rewards. 
WUA Establishment in Maharashtra 
Maharashtra is India's fourth largest state, and known for its 
powerful sugarcane economy. In Maharashtra, the state has had to 
play a much more active, interventionist role in development, than 
in Haryana. In particular, it has had to play a role in famine 
prevention. The ingredients of such an intervention have been the 
generation of employment for cash on a large scale and provision 
of relief for those unable to work. 2 8 Box 3.2 lists the roles o f 
different organisations engaged in irrigation development and in 
WUA formation. 
Maharashtra is considered a cradle of co-operation, with co-
operatives pervading virtually every sphere of agrarian activity. The 
state has several conditions conducive to the spread of co-
operation, including a vast pool of local leadership, and a tradition 
of NGOs. It has a tradition of co-operative management in the 
management of water and other natural resources. What is 
interesting, however, is that efforts at forming WUAs in canal 
irrigation have been very limited in their scale and spread. In this 
section of the chapter, I describe this phenomenon. 
BOX 3.2 The organisational and institutional set-up for irrigation 
management in Maharashtra 
Apart from the Irrigation Department of Maharashtra, a number of other 
organisations are involved in the irrigation sector and in the formation of 
WUAs. They are described as follows: 2 9 
The Directorate for Irrigation Research and Development (DIRD) 
The DIRD, an arm of the Irrigation Department, monitors the water users 
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associations in the state. It keeps a record of water users associations formed. Its 
role is purely advisory in nature (to the Irrigation Department). The DIRD 
functions through its section offices in Pune, Aurangabad, Akola, Nasik and 
Thane. 
Water and Land Management Institute, (WALMI), Aurangabad 
WALMI is engaged mainly in training programmes. It trains several actors, 
including members of the Agricultural Department, farmers, women, and 
appointees and position holders of WUAs. The Irrigation Department funds it It 
also carries out some action research, but does not have an implementing role. 
Cooperatives Department 
The Cooperatives Department provides a facility for the registration of WUAs. 
The Cooperative Water User Guidelines (GOM, 1992) provide the broad set of 
modalities. The department monitors the working of water users associations. 
NGOs 
Two NGOs have been engaged in fostering water users associations; the Society 
for People's Participation in Ecosystem Management (SOPPECOM), Pune and 
the Samaj Parivartan Kendra (SPK), Nashik. SOPPECOM, an outgrowth of 
CASAD, the Centre for Applied Systems Analysis in Development, was 
instrumental in forming a WUA on the Mula Project, that later became the basis 
for evolving a set of guidelines for WUA formation in the state. The SPK has 
been working with three water users associations on the Waghad Project at 
Ozhar village near Nashik. 
Donors and funders 
The state has had a presence of funders such as the USAID (United States 
Agency for International Development) and the World Bank that have 
insisted on the formation of water users associations in their projects as a 
condition for financial support in their lending projects (Brewer et al. 1999).1 
Also prominent in its influence was the Ford Foundation that provided 
financial support for Action Research on effecting management turnover and 
was keen on replicating the Philippines model of management turnover. 
Command Area Development Authority 
CADA set up outlet committees in a number of CAD projects in 1982-84. It 
undertook experiments in involving farmers for distributing water and solving 
disputes in Girna and Mula Projects through Pani Panchayats (water 
management committees) at the level of the Minor (Lele 2000). CADA 
initiated pilot projects in Khadakvasla and Jayakwadi Irrigation Projects in 
response to the guidelines issued by the Ministry of Water Resources in 1985 
and 1986. 
Factors driving PIM in Maharashtra 
The PIM process in Maharashtra started much before that in 
Haryana.30 Maharashtra has a policy called Participatory Irrigation 
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Management as expressed in the PIM guidelines formulated by the 
Government of Maharashtra through its policy resolutions o f 1992 
and 1994. A listing of these provisions is provided in Box 3.3. 
BOX 3.3 Guidelines for formation of WUAs 
In March 1994, the Cooperatives Department issued a set of guidelines 
for the registration of canal WUAs. The main ingredients of the policy for 
forming WUAs in the state are as follows (Pant 1999): 
1) Unit of IMT. The primary unit of IMT is a minor comprising about 
200 to 300 farmers covering about 300 to 800 hectares. The Water 
Users Association at the minor level is a formal organisation 
registered as a water users' society under the Cooperative Societies 
Act, 1960. 
2) Eligibility Criterion. At least 51% of beneficiaries or 51% of the 
Culturable Command Area of the minor is the eligibility criterion for 
the registration of the WUA. 
3) Memorandum of understanding (MOU). MOU is an agreement between 
the WUA and the Irrigation Department, which specifies rights, 
responsibilities and functions on either side. 
4) Volumetric Supply. The Irrigation Department supplies water to the 
farmers on a volumetric basis. Water quota for each cropping season 
is fixed, based on a normal water supply, and is entered into the 
MOU. 
5) Freedom of crop choice. The WUA has the freedom of growing any crops 
within the sanctioned quota. 
6) Use of surface and groundwater. According to the Provisions of the 
Maharashtra Irrigation Act, 1976 the canal and well water can not be 
used on the same area. The Act envisages a distance of at least 3 
meters between channels conveying water from wells. Since WUAs 
are charged on a volumetric basis, the government does not levy any 
additional fees on the groundwater exploitation by the farmers. 
7) Maintenance Grant. The Irrigation Department gives a grant of Rs 20 
per hectare to the WUA; in addition, WUAs can charge additional 
fees or service charges from the water users. 
8) Payment Rebate. An incentive of 5% rebate is given by the Irrigation 
Department to the water users association on timely payment of the 
bills. 
9) Rules for distribution of surplus or deficit water. They are framed in 
the MOU. 
9) Multi-Purpose Cooperative Societies. The WUAs are designed to be 
multi-purpose cooperative societies and can undertake other allied 
activities that may promote agricultural production and increase 
incomes of the members. 
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Other Irrigation-related laws and Acts in the state 
The current irrigation policy for Maharashtra is the result of numerous 
legislative acts. Among these acts are the 1934 Bombay Canal Rules, the 
1967 Maharashtra Irrigation Act, and the 1867 Bombay Irrigation Act. 
The implications of the provisions of these acts are as follows: 
1) In command areas, irrigated land is designated as either 
groundwater-irrigated or canal-irrigated. Areas irrigated with 
canal water may also receive ground water if canal supplies 
become short. The farmer must report this use to the Executive 
Engineer within 8 days. The water charge in this case is 50% of 
the regular canal charge (Rule 18, Bombay Canal Rules, 1934). In 
contrast, ground water-irrigated areas may at no time be irrigated 
using canal water. 
2) Well water transported via surface channels constructed for canal 
water is charged at the full canal rate (Rule 19, Bombay Canal 
Rules, 1934). 
3) With the permission of canal authorities, a farmer may divert or 
pump water from natural surface drainage that originates from 
percolation or leakage of canal water (return flow). The water 
charges for such use are at par with the direct canal water supply 
(Rule 55a, Maharashtra Irrigation Act, 1976). 
4) Irrigation water from wells located within the irrigable command 
of canal or within 35 m on either side is charged at 50% of the 
normal canal water charge (Rule 55 b, Maharashtra Irrigation 
Act). 
5) Any person planning to construct a well in an irrigation 
command is required to inform the canal authorities of his 
intentions, or he may be penalised (Rule 105, Maharashtra 
Irrigation Act, 1976). 
6) The irrigation of perennial crops with canal water is restricted as 
follows: 
7) In major irrigation systems, the area planted in sugarcane, a 
heavy-water consuming crop is limited to 1/4 to 1/3 of the total 
command area. This restriction, popularly known as the X limit, 
does not apply to sugarcane grown exclusively with well irrigation 
(Form II, Condition 1, Bombay Canal Rules, 1934); 
8) In minor irrigation projects it is not feasible to irrigate perennial 
crops with canal water since water can not be assured on a year-
round basis. 
In practice, adherence to the rule requiring a farmer to inform the 
irrigation authorities of his plans to construct a well in the command area 
depends on other financial factors. If a farmer is using his own money to 
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construct a well, he often does so without seeking permission. However, 
if the farmer approaches the Maharashtra Cooperative Land 
Development Bank (LDB) for a loan to construct the well, the bank 
must first do a hydrologie feasibility study of the well site. Depending on 
the results of the study, the well may or may not be financed. LDB loans 
are special long-tem, low-interest loans. A farmer has the choice of 
obtaining a higher cost loan from another bank in which case the well 
may not need to meet any hydrological conditions. 
The PPM guidelines mentioned above have been developed 
from many sources and have many different influences (Brewer et 
al. 1999; Pendse and Bhogle 1994). These include actions from a 
number of actors -funders as the World Bank and the USAID, the 
experience and lobbying by NGOs, and a traditional heritage o f 
cooperation in the state, exemplified by the Phad system and lift 
irrigation. Some benefits of WUA formation have also been 
demonstrated to the farmers and the Irrigation Department. 
A history of policy developments 
The introduction of WUAs in the Maharashtra irrigation debate 
stems from the 1930s. Among the many suggestions made by the 
1938 Irrigation Inquiry Committee, chaired by Sir M Visvesvaraya, 
was the establishment of co-operative societies or water 
Panchayats, one for every ten mile section of a canal, for efficient 
and equitable distribution of water (SOPPECOM 1997). The 
irrigators of all the villages that constitute a canal section would 
choose these Panchayats. The water Panchayats would decide the 
water cess once a year. The committee also recommended sale o f 
water on a volumetric basis to the user groups at the distributary 
level once in a year. 
About 25 years later, the First Maharashtra Irrigation 
Commission endorsed the 1938 Committee's recommendations. 
The Commission built on the Committee's recommendations, 
emphasising that it would be obligatory for all farmers to become 
members of the organisation. It also recommended that the co-
operative structure should be built up from the distributary level to 
the divisional level.31 
In 1982, the High Power Committee, under the Chairmanship 
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of Shri Suresh Jain again stressed the need for turning over O & M 
to the farmers' organisations (Lele 2000; SOPPECOM 1997). It 
reiterated the need for farmers' participation and suggested 
establishment of farmers' societies. In 1985, the Ministry of Water 
Resources, Government of India, issued a circular to state 
governments emphasising the need for collective efforts by farmers 
for water management in a distributary or minor on irrigation 
projects commanding an area o f 500-1000 ha. It further suggested 
that Non-Government Organisations should be persuaded to take 
up the work of organising farmers for this purpose. The Ministry 
agreed to finance the expenses, on a 50:50 basis, in collaboration 
with the concerned states. In this backdrop, in 1987, an N G O 
called CASAD, the Centre for Applied Systems Analysis in 
Development, decided to take advantage of the Ministry's offer to 
launch an Action Research Programme on the Mula Irrigation 
Project. This was done in collaboration with the Irrigation 
Department, Government of Maharashtra (Lele and Patil 1994). 3 2 
In 1996, the study group appointed by the G O M for 
recommending the 9 t h Plan proposals in the irrigation sector 
estimated that, at the rninimum, 2000 societies should be initiated 
and complete turnover of water management effected to these 
societies by the year 2002. It also suggested that action should be 
taken to establish federal and apex bodies, so that water 
management at the project level as well as lower levels is handed 
over to the cultivators. 
Tradition of co-operation in other sectors 
The state has an active history of co-operation in several other 
sectors such as lift irrigation, sugarcane, dairying, forestry, and 
watersheds. With a successful history of the co-operative 
movement, there is a well-developed pool of leadership at the 
village level.3 3 The state has seen rapid institutional innovation and 
variety, as well as experimentation (Apte 1995; Chopra 1995). Even 
among cooperatives of the same general type, there is a great 
variety of organisational patterns (Attwood and Baviskar 1995a, b). 
The state has had a tradition of cooperation in the lift irrigation 
sector since the 1950s (Brewer et al. 1999; Palakudiyil 1996). Lift 
Irrigation Co-operatives (LICs) have been established with the 
support of the cooperative sugar factories. They have worked in 
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close co-operation with the Irrigation Department over a 
considerably long period of time, providing an example of such 
cooperation. 
In lift irrigation co-operatives, the Irrigation Department 
sanctions the withdrawal of water from a river, or, in some cases, 
from a tank. It charges the LICs for water used and collects the 
same from members. The management of these systems requires 
financial skills to repay construction loans, to pay water fees, and 
maintain the systems. Though no Irrigation Management Transfer 
is involved, the existence of Lift Irrigation Co-operative societies 
served as an example of farmers' ability to manage their own 
systems, as well as an example of a partnership between the 
farmers and the Irrigation Department (Brewer et al. 1999). The 
Lift Irrigation Cooperatives provided the justification and an initial 
model for the registration of other types of WUAs by the 
Cooperatives Department. 
Similarly, the phad system is a form of farmer managed 
irrigation prevalent for about 400 years in the Southwest parts of 
the state. 3 4 The existence of the system is often used as a 
justification to promote the introduction of PIM initiatives. " These 
systems have been a part o f the livelihood of farmers; thus the 
management discipline for system operation and other activities 
have merged with the local way of life. Equitable distribution of 
water shortage and conflict resolution are internally managed. Such 
aspects of phad irrigation are, therefore, worth considering for 
adoption in other irrigation projects (Pendse and Bhogle 1996: 40). 
" The existence of small-scale farmer managed irrigation systems 
over centuries has prompted a consideration of the potential o f 
farmer management in large scale canal irrigation systems. 
Role ofNGOs 
There is a rich tradition of NGOs active in a number of natural 
resource management activities, mobilising local level action for 
resource conservation (Pendse and Bhogle 1994). There is a wide 
presence of NGOs scattered through the state, such as 
Marathwada Sheti Sahaya Mandal in Aurangabad, Vanrai in Pune, 
Manav Lok in Ambejogai, Beed district and Samaj Prabodhan 
Sanstha in Pune. They are actively engaged in a wide range of rural 
development programmes, including watershed development. 
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Donor pressure 
Another important factor has been donor interest and pressure. In 
certain aided projects undertaken by the Government o f 
Maharashtra such as the Maharashtra Water Utilisation Project 
aided by the World Bank and the Maharashtra Minor Irrigation 
Project aided by the USAID, the formulation of guidelines for the 
formation of WUAs has been incorporated (Kulkarni and Kulkarni 
1994). 3 5 "Thus in a way, the draft agreement . . . as well as certain 
procedures to enhance farmers' participation in managing minor 
irrigation schemes are the outcomes of these projects (Kulkarni 
and Kulkarni 1994: 60)." There was also an influence of the 
Philippine model of management transfer, popularised by the Ford 
Foundation.3 6 The foundation supported visits of government 
officials to the country and gave financial support to the N G O s in 
this sector for organising farmers for management turnover. 
Benefits to the Irrigation Department 
The formation of the WUAs results in some benefits to the 
Irrigation Department. Many field level officers of the Irrigation 
Department admitted that it lowers the administrative burden. It 
Social workers like Vijay Borade of Adgaon village and Anna 
Hazare of Ralegaon Siddhi village have been known for their 
efforts in organising farmers in the activities of water and soil 
conservation, social forestry and watershed management. 
In the canal irrigation sector, the pilot experiments by two 
NGOs, SOPPECOM and the Samaj Parivartan Kendra, have made 
a significant contribution. As noted earlier, the efforts made by 
SOPPECOM in transferring management to farmers on one of the 
minors of the Mula Project became the basis for a set of guidelines 
later issued by the Co-operatives Department for transferring 
management to water users associations. What is interesting, 
however, is that only two NGOs have been involved in the canal 
irrigation sector, while several NGOs have been involved in many 
other sectors. This issue is discussed further below. 
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has the potential of improving the collection rate of irrigation 
charges. They presented this as an argument in favour of 
management turnover. In fact, for the Irrigation Department, 
ending shejpali does reduce the paper work and field enforcement 
needs (Brewer et al. 1999). Under shejpali, only about 65% of the 
water rates are collected. The reason is that the shejpali system 
applications process through which the water rates are collected is 
extremely difficult to enforce. 3 7 Volumetric rates for WUAs, on 
the other hand, are easier to enforce and cheaper to collect. Since 
farmers take over the operation and maintenance of lower level 
field channels, it reduces the involvement of the Irrigation 
Department in aclrninistrative aspects of the operation of shejpali. 
Another indirect benefit has been the greater political 
acceptability of water rates for irrigation (Brewer et al. 1999). Till 
1990, the water rates that prevailed were those of 1974. In the early 
1980s there were some efforts to raise the rates. Farmers 
complained to politicians and these efforts failed. In a more recent 
move, the 1991 rates were doubled by progressive increases from 
1990 to 1994. No outcry from farmers took place.3 8 I f recovery 
improves gradually and subsidies are cut, it could reduce the 
financial burden on the Irrigation Department (Brewer etal. 1999). 
Benefits to farmers 
There are several benefits of WUA formation to the farmers that 
provide a justification for turnover. These benefits stem from the 
provisions of the Memorandum of Understanding that is signed 
between the water users association and the Irrigation Department 
(See Box 3.2). First, the farmers, as a group, have a guarantee of a 
particular amount of water for the period of the MOU, and control 
over the scheduling of the delivery of water. Water that is saved in 
the rabi season can be shifted over to the hot weather season. 
Second, restrictions on crops, such as sugarcane, vanish, except 
where waterlogging threats exist. Restrictions on ground water use 
disappear. Farmers apply for water to the WUA instead of to the 
Irrigation Department, which reduces the hassle of ttavelling to the 
Irrigation Department for filing their applications. Further, 
volumetric charges are lower than average crop area charges and 
much lower than crop area charges for sugarcane. Farmers get a 
5 % rebate on timely payment. 
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The other benefit that accrues, both to the farmers and to the 
Irrigation Department, is in terms of improved maintenance 
(Brewer and Sakthivadivel 2000). WUA establishment is shown to 
have improved the maintenance o f irrigation infrastructure and to 
lower the costs to the Irrigation Department by putting resources 
in the hands of the farmers and giving them flexibility in using 
them. It is argued that WUAs have better information and more 
flexibility in maintenance planning. A WUA can put in more 
maintenance effort per season, and is not bound by slow 
government funding and approval processes.3 9 
An assessment of IMT in Maharashtra (Pant 1999), based on a 
study of 23 WUAs spread through the state, concluded that water 
user associations have done well on three fronts. First, they have 
increased the irrigated areas in their commands using less water. 
Even in such WUAs where more water has been used after the 
IMT, the per unit water use efficiency is found to be higher. The 
second front on which WUAs have done well is the revenue from 
water charges. Recovery has improved after the IMT. At the same 
time, the WUAs have been charging a much higher amount from 
their water users. This is considered a good sign since it would 
enable the WUAs to accumulate funds for the maintenance o f 
microstructures relating to conveyance of water at the WUA level. 
The third redeeming feature is that the WUAs are running on 
profit. The shift to volumetric pricing of water is causing farmers 
to think more about saving water (Brewer et al. 1999). 
However, even though benefits to farmers as well as the 
Irrigation Department have been well demonstrated, they have not 
had a significant effect on expansion of the number and coverage of 
WUAs. I return to the analysis of the underlying factors later in this 
chapter, when I describe where the breaks are located. 
Progress in establishing WUAs 
Two WUAs had been registered in Ahmednagar and Sholapur 
districts but they remained islands in the larger irrigation scene and 
were not replicated (SOPPECOM 1997). 4 0 In 1987, CASAD, the 
Centre for Applied Systems Analysis in Development, decided to 
organise a WUA in the Mula Project with funding from the Ford 
Foundation and support of the Irrigation Department In 1991, the 
SPK, the Samaj Parivartan Kendra, took the lead in initiating 3 WUAs 
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in Nashik and some officials from the Irrigation Department of the 
rank of Deputy Engineer established a couple of societies in the 
Marathwada region.41 WUAs have been formed by some other 
scattered efforts of the Irrigation Department officers in Aurangabad, 
Jalna and Parbhani districts (Map 3.2). 
By March 1997,124 societies had taken over the management of 
irrigation functions and 410 were at various stages of registration, 
signing of MOUs and takeover. As per the records of the DIRD, 
Pune, as of September 1, 1999, in all, there were 693 water users 
associations, spread over 252, 566 ha, covering about 6% of the 
command area, at different stages of operation, registration or 
functioning. O f these, 236 WUAs had taken over the management of 
irrigation systems, covering about 89,245 hectares. 55 WUAs, 
covering 19,322 ha, had made the agreement but did not have the 
systems turned over yet. 222 WUAs, covering 78, 969 ha, were only 
registered. 180 WUAs covering about 65,030 ha were in the 
'proposed' stage. 
This number rose marginally in the following year. As of 
September 1, 2000, in all, 721 WUAs were at various stages of 
formation, or working, covering a Culturable Command Area of 
about 258,318 hectares. O f these, hand over had been completed 
on 247 water users associations, covering a Culturable Command 
Area of 91,619 hectares. The MOU was signed on 66 WUAs (but 
hand over had not yet been effected), covering a Culturable 
Command Area of about 23, 546 hectares. 241 WUAs had been 
registered covering about 84527 hectares and 167 Water Users 
Associations were in the proposal stage, covering about 58, 626 
hectares. 
SOPPECOM tried replication of WUAs and the eventual scaling 
up into a federal society at the Distributary 4 located at the tail of 
Branch 1 of the Mula Right Bank Canal. However, the effort did not 
take off. SOPPECOM attributes it to the lack of support from the 
Government. (I discuss this further below). At Ozhar, there have 
been some efforts at,federating WUAs, but these have been to form a 
federation where there is a forum to negotiate over common issues. 
This is a federation of 75 water users associations on the Upper 
Godavari Project. This is essentially to form a pressure group. The 
federation was formed in 1996. 4 2 
92 Institutions, Technology and Water Control 
The process of implementation of PIM reforms in the state 
The analysis in the preceding sections seems to suggest that there 
should have been rapid efforts at replicating WUAs in canal 
irrigation, and there are many factors that seem to make the 
environment conducive to this development: a tradition of co-
operation in many agrarian sectors, a history of policy 
developments favouring the establishment of WUAs, a vast 
resource o f astute leadership and demonstrated benefits to both 
farmers as well as the Irrigation Department. In the section o f the 
chapter that follows, I examine why progress in WUA 
establishment in the state has been limited, in spite of these factors. 
Fragmentation of roles of different actors 
A number of Departments are involved in the formation of Water 
Users Associations in the state; the Irrigation Department of the 
Government of Maharashtra, the D I R D and the Cooperatives 
Department (see Box 3.2). The involvement of a large number of 
actors and the fragmentation of roles among them not only 
breeds room for ambiguity, but some times also make it difficult to 
fix responsibility. A tendency among many of the officers is to 
shift responsibility for poor implementation on each other, 
without accepting any real responsibility on their own. Similarly, a 
common tendency at different levels within the bureaucracy is to 
hold another level responsible, as i f it were helpless on its own. 
Field level irrigation officers feel that the D I R D needs to play a 
more active role beyond its present monitoring and recording role. 
The perspective of the management at the DIRD, on the other 
hand, is that the motivation for forming water users associations 
should come from the farmers or from the Irrigation Department, 
especially the lower level bureaucracy. At the lower levels of the 
bureaucracy, it is felt that the drive for PIM should come from the 
higher levels so that there is a reflection of a commitment to the 
process. This is a call on hierarchy. 
A tug of war 
My own observation of the PIM process in the state has been that 
Policy Support and Resistance 93 
there is a constant tug of war between the state government and 
two NGOs, SOPPECOM and the SPK, that have been engaged in 
forming WUAs. The NGOs insist that there is preparedness 
among farmers for PIM to take off. Officials of the State Irrigation 
Department and the Directorate for Irrigation Research and 
Development (DIRD), on the other hand, while in principle accept 
the need for PIM, show resistance to its implementation.43 The 
justification presented by the Irrigation Department and the D I R D 
is that funds are inadequate for repairs and maintenance that has to 
be carried out prior to the hand over of systems to farmers. They 
also feel that there is insufficient demand for PIM. 
A senior member of the academic community that I 
interviewed felt that a trump card in the hands of the bureaucracy 
is that if there were enough demand for PIM, it would have taken 
off by now. That it hasn't shows that the level o f dissatisfaction 
with the bureaucracy is not that high. NGOs that are pushing for 
Irrigation Management Turnover, on the other hand, feel that the 
bureaucracy has clearly failed in its task of providing adequate, 
reliable and timely supply of water (SOPPECOM 1997). 4 4 
In fact, there are many reflections of the half-hearted approach 
of the Government of Maharashtra to the process of PIM. Firsdy, 
there is no clear-cut legal backing for PIM, barring a set of policy 
guidelines. In the state of Andhra Pradesh, on the other hand, the 
FMIS Act (1997) makes it legally mandatory to form water users 
associations.45 In Maharashtra, however, the formation of WUAs is 
backed only by the guidelines issued by the Cooperatives 
Department. This does reflect a lack of seriousness on part of the 
state government in terms of how keen it is to go ahead with a 
reform agenda. 
Though the state government has adopted the PIM concept, as 
also emphasised in the National Water Policy (1987), critics feel that 
the Irrigation Department officers still view it as little more than a 
pilot activity. This was also my own assessment of the process. 
As also noted by Mollinga (2001b), policy development on this 
front has come to a virtual stand-still in Maharashtra since the mid-
1990s. In the neighbouring state of Gujarat, on the other hand, the 
Government of Gujarat has passed several resolutions to the effect 
of legitimising PIM. Gujarat is now on the verge of drafting its own 
Act for PIM, on the lines of Andhra Pradesh. 
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Resistance among the bureaucracy: delays in implementation and 
lack of funds 
In Maharashtra, the IMT model aims at changing control relations 
between the users and the bureaucracy, by handing over control 
over oudets and operating devices at the level of the minor. This 
amounts to a significant change in control relations and an altering 
of the balance o f power between the two actors. 4 6 
As a reform strategy, the bureaucracy implements PIM. The 
bureaucracy is involved in implementing a policy that results in a 
diminution of its own status, role and importance. This, in itself, 
tends to slow down the pace o f reform. Though in principle, the 
bureaucracy admits to the need for PIM, it also reveals some 
resistance to change. This resistance is stronger at the lower levels 
o f the bureaucracy that fears a loss of control, power or of jobs. At 
the higher levels of the bureaucracy, this finds expression in the 
inconsistent behaviour of the Irrigation Department, delays in 
rehabilitation of projects and intermittent withdrawal of support to 
effecting management turnover.4 7 
As noted above, in some parts of Maharashtra, WUAs have been 
formed through the efforts of the Irrigation Department officers; this 
has happened in Aurangabad, Jalna, Parbhani and Nanded districts.48 
Here, too, the rehabilitation of projects took a very long time, about 1 
to 2 years after registration. This delayed the signing of Memoranda 
of Understanding. The reason cited by the Irrigation Department has 
been the non-availability of funds. Similady, along Distributary 4 of 
the Mula Right Bank Canal (MRBC), a proposal to form six WUAs 
found ready acceptance by the farmers (SOPPECOM 1997). 
However, because of the paucity of funds, rehabilitation could not be 
completed even after registration and signing of the MOUs. Five out 
of six NJCTJAs decided to take over the management even without 
rehabilitation after the drought of 1994-95. One resolved to take over 
the following year. Finally, the MOU was executed in 1997. 
Monitoring and accountability issues 
A consequence of the somewhat erratic behaviour from the side of 
the state government has been that a demand for greater 
accountability of the government has been building up from the 
N G O sector. It is felt by the NGOs that appropriate techniques o f 
monitoring have to be devised to cover the relevant issues in PIM 
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What role for NGOs? 
While NGOs have potentially a powerful role to play in organising 
management turnover, and in Maharashtra, while they have played 
such a role, they are constrained in their ability to produce reform 
on a larger scale than a local level. Further, in the absence o f a 
consistent policy and support for N G O led research and action, 
the scale of even this activity in the state has been limited.4 9 
Another critique of the role of NGOs is that they have made little 
effort to strategically influence policy reform (Mollinga 2001b). 
They focus fully on farmer organisation for water management. 
There is little effort to involve the users in advocacy or policy 
formulation; users remain mere recipients of the policy initiatives, 
but are not involved in their formulation.50 
One reason cited for the limited presence of NGOs in the 
sector is the perception among the NGOs that irrigation is the 
domain of the rural elite- a small section of large, powerful farmers, 
who have pre-empted the benefits. NGOs are reluctant to support 
such a section.51 The other important reason cited for the limited 
presence of NGOs is that relatively little financial support is 
available for research and catalysing action in the canal irrigation 
sector. While there are many NGOs involved in other natural 
resource management activities, they all look up to external sources 
(SOPPECOM 1997). This task of monitoring, farther, it is felt among 
the NGOs, should be handed over to an external agency, such as the 
Planning Board or Planning Department. 
SOPPECOM had suggested that steering committees should be 
formed comprising NGOs and government officers to monitor the 
progress of water users associations. However, till the period of my 
fieldwork, there had been no progress on this front. Even after the 
experience of forming the water users association on a minor of the 
Mula Canal, SOPPECOM alleges that the procedure for registering 
the WUAs has not been simplified. SOPPECOM also furnished the 
necessary details on benefits of forming a federal society, but an 
agreed meeting between the SOPPECOM and the Government of 
Maharashtra (GOM) did not take place. A valid criticism of the 
process of PEVl in the state is that in the absence of a consistent 
policy on this front, much is left to the whims and fancies of 
concerned officers. 
96 Institutions, Technology and Water Control 
of funding, including the central government; such resources are 
scarcely available for canal irrigation. Another weakness in the 
policy environment that was cited by a member of the academic 
community is that there is no clear-cut policy on the role of NGOs 
in the PIM process. This has resulted in only two NGOs being 
involved. 
Factionalism among farmers 
Another impediment is that WUAs have become heavily 
politicised. This point emerged during several discussions with 
government officers, the Irrigation Department and other 
observers o f the PIM process. The fact that farmers owe their 
allegiance to different political parties acts as a deterrent to their 
coming together. Another aspect of the factionalism is non-
political: there is a vested interest among a lobby of the farmers 
that resists the reform effort. This resistance comes from the larger, 
influential farmers who are in a strategic position to manipulate 
water supplies in their favour. They resist the effort because it 
threatens the status quo. 
This observation was made twice in the course of my 
fieldwork. It was once made in my own experience with the Mula 
Minor No.Y. One of the reasons why efforts at WUA formation 
did not take off was that the efforts were resisted by the large and 
powerful farmers who could bribe the Paatkari to get water when 
they needed it. Since both tended to gain from the status quo, it 
dampened the effort at WUA formation. Second, I learnt from my 
interactions with SOPPECOM that it had once received a 
threatening letter from an MLA, a large sugarcane grower, to "stop 
all this PIM business", since he had always got water without 
paying for it. The formation of a WUA creates a relationship of 
mutual accountability among farmers as well as the bureaucracy. 
This tends to be evaded by those who benefit from the status quo. 
An obstacle cited by the Irrigation Department is the 
reluctance on the part of farmers to contribute financially. Farmers 
have to deposit a share capital, but they do not do so. Essentially, 
the formation of WUAs creates a relationship of mutual 
accountability, which farmers seek to evade " . . .by forming a 
society, the member farmers will be required to pay irrigation 
charges regularly, something which they can avoid by not forming a 
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society (Pendse and Bhogle 1994:48). " For the reasons described 
above, the formation of water user associations is evaded by both 
sides, as to what could otherwise be a forum for dual 
accountability. 
Conclusion 
Thus, in Maharashtra, on the one hand, NGOs, multilateral 
organisations and donors have been pushing for management 
turnover. On the other hand, there has been some resistance 
among the farmers as well as the bureaucracy that gain from the 
status quo. While NGOs have been successful in their efforts, they 
are constrained in their ability to produce reform beyond a local 
scale. It is because of the resistance among these actors, and the 
half-hearted interest in the state government that the progress in 
WUA establishment has been limited. 
A Comparison with Other States 
In this section, I compare the experiences of Haryana and 
Maharashtra with that of other Indian states where PIM initiatives 
have been made and policies for establishing WUAs are at varying 
levels of formulation and implementation. The comparison is 
written from a perspective of what these two states could learn 
from the experiences elsewhere in the country, as well as where 
their experiences depart from, or align with experiences elsewhere. 
As noted in chapter 1 ,13 states in India have adopted policies 
or laws that seek to establish WUAs (Ballabh 2002). There is 
significant variation in the extent, processes adopted and the 
outcomes of Irrigation Management Transfer in the country.5 2 
However, broadly two models can be distinguished (Parthasarathy 
1998). The first is the top down approach of Andhra Pradesh 
where 10, 292 WUAs were sought to be created at one go over the 
entire command area of the state with legal backing and political 
support. The second one is the bottom up approach in states like 
Gujarat and Maharashtra where the process has been slow and 
gradual, with NGOs piloting and making efforts to replicate. 
The exact mix of circumstances and compulsions that have 
promoted PIM initiatives or urged state governments to introduce 
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PIM reforms have varied from state to state. However, broadly, 
they have been driven by pressure from funders and donors as the 
World Bank and the USAID, an urge to reduce the financial 
burden on state governments and through some interest and 
lobbying on part of non-government organisations. A strong 
influence of PIM 'models' is also evident (Mollinga 2001b). In the 
1980s, this was the 'Philippines model", popularised by the Ford 
Foundation, that funded visits to that country. More recendy, this 
has been the "Mexico Model", popularised by the World Bank, that 
is keen on its replication elsewhere.53 
An emphasis on "farmer participation" has also been part of a 
philosophy of development where "decentralisation" and 
"empowerment" have been powerful buzzwords. These 
dimensions of water management have received emphasis in 
national level policy statements such as the National Water Policy 
o f 1987. 
While the cases described in this section do tell us about the 
experience in the individual states, they are reflective o f the general 
approach to WUA formation in India. The process o f WUA 
formation has been a slow and haphazard one, driven largely by the 
availability of external financial resources for state restmcturing 
programmes (Ballabh 2002). Powerful groups and sections of the 
irrigation bureaucracy have tended to maintain the status quo. What 
seems lacking largely, and has been somewhat missed, is a stronger 
reflection of what the formation of water users associations itself 
should achieve. Further, the modus operandi o f irrigation reform itself 
has come to be seen as the formation of water users associations, 
with little clarity on how WUA formation would bring about 
irrigation reform. 5 4 
While in some other countries such as Mexico, the 
establishment of WUAs was part of a broader agenda of neo-liberal 
reforms in the wake of the past dissatisfaction with the 
overengagement of the state in several sectors, in India, that 
integration of the irrigation reform process with overall efforts at 
structural transformation has not happened. WUA establishment 
has been an ad hoc, haphazard activity, isolated from mainstream 
efforts at agrarian change, social transformation and development. 
Andhra Pradesh 
In 1997, Andhra Pradesh became the first state in India to legislate 
Pokey Support and Resistance 99 
on farmers' participation in the management of irrigation systems 
(World Bank 1999b). 10, 292 WUAs were created covering the 
entire command area o f the state with political backing and legal 
support. This "model" has come to dominate the international 
limelight, right next to the experiences of Turkey and Mexico. 
A three-fold rise in the price of water, physical rehabilitation of 
systems and the creation of accountability relationships by making 
the irrigation bureaucracy accountable to the WUAs have been 
ingredients o f an overall reform strategy in the state. This is clearly 
a strong contrast with the Haryana case described above. The 
Andhra "model" is significant in that it aims at reform of both 
irrigation management at system level and at the agency level 
(Mollinga 2001b). Its strengths are that it devolves real powers to 
users, links availability of management funds with water rates 
collection and raises water rates to make the sector financially viable. 
WUAs have also been federated at the distributary level. 
While there has been much euphoria on the process of PIM in 
Andhra Pradesh, driven and reinforced by the international 
limelight that it has received, one critique has been that its benefits 
have not extended beyond the head-reaches (Jairath 1999). To 
realise its full potential, Jairath argues that much more attention 
needs to be paid to the redistributive implications of reform. The 
emphasis has been purely on 'supply side' improvements aimed at 
physical rehabilitation to improve the availability of water. These 
efforts need to be supported by demand side management that 
could have redistributive effects by releasing water for use at the 
tail-reaches. This would require, among other things, a switch to 
low water consuming crops through a mix of new technologies and 
market and non-market instruments directed at inducing water 
savings. 
We also still know little about the organisational dynamics of 
water users associations in the state and how other small and 
marginal groups take part in them or are affected by them (World 
Bank 1999b; Mollinga 1998a). Further, as in other states, farmers 
have been recipients of the reform policy, and have not been 
involved in the policy formulation process itself (Mollinga 2001b). 
A welcome development, however, is that as part o f addressing 
'second generation' problems, policy implementation managers are 
talking more of consultation and negotiation with farmers to drive 
the reform process further. This could be seen as a sign that the 
policy formulation process itself is maturing and going through a 
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Gujarat 
Several factors have given a thrust to PIM initiatives in Gujarat 
(Brewer et al. 1999). Among them are a consideration of reduction 
of costs to the state government, elimination of the administrative 
burden of the shejpali system, and the demonstration effect of the 
success o f PIM efforts in other countries. Notable particularly has 
been the influence of the Philippines model, popularised by the 
Ford Foundation that sponsored several trips of the State Irrigation 
Department and other officials to the Philippines and extended 
support to NGOs in estabhshing WUAs. Also in the league of 
those promoting and supporting reform have been the USAID and 
the World Bank. 
As in other states, here, too, the influence of national level 
policies such as the National Water Policy of 1987 has been 
important. The activities o f NGOs in organising user groups for 
management of natural resources in other sectors-lift irrigation, 
ground water and forests- have demonstrated the capability of 
farmers to manage resources effectively. More lately, NGOs have 
succeeded in lobbying for change and urging the Government of 
Gujarat to pass a series of resolutions, starting in 1992, to effect 
management turnover. 
A distinguishing feature of the PIM process in Gujarat has 
been the reliance on Process Documentation Research (PDR) 
(Shashidharan 2000; Parthasarathy 2000). P D R was carried out in 6 
of the 13 pilot projects in the state (Parthasarathy 2000). Two 
research and academic institutes - the Institute of Rural 
Management, Anand (IRMA) and the Gujarat Institute o f 
Development Research, Ganclhinagar (GIDR) -undertook field 
research on the pilot projects undertaken by NGOs. 
Commissioned by a ITigh Level Working Group, this process gave 
feedback that fed into mid-course corrections. 
P D R reports served as a major source of identifying 
administrative and policy botdenecks in the PIM process 
(Shashidharan 2000). This process provided a strong basis for 
further improvements in policies and procedures to create an 
enabling policy environment. This has relevance both for Haryana 
as well as Maharashtra, and should be seen as a welcome move 
process of evolution. 
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from the usual obsession with quantitative targets that are typically 
resorted to by bureaucratic agencies to show their progress in 
promoting participation of farmers in their programmes. Further, 
this exercise presents a good example of a collaborative effort 
between NGOs and the academic and research community. 
The approach in the state, as in Maharashtra and unlike that in 
Andhra Pradesh, has been a pilot approach. NGOs hire 
community organisers, who organise farmers, mobilise local 
support and negotiate with the Irrigation Department for reform. 
Here, too, farmers have been the recipients o f reform, rather than 
those asking for it. This is an interesting contradiction. Much like 
Maharashtra, this state has been known for its history of 
institutional innovation. Different institutional forms have come up 
on their own, ranging from water markets to tubewell companies 
and lift irrigation co-operatives, well before their significance and 
potential was acknowledged outside the state, and by the 
international community (Shah 1997; Shah and Bhattacharya 1996). 
In a state known for a tradition of self-emerging water institutions 
that replicate steadily, that they have not come up in the canal 
irrigation sector throws up an interesting question mark. 
In Gujarat, as in Maharashtra, NGOs have demonstrated the 
feasibility of a farmer-centred management system. However, this 
is not sufficient to ensure a scaling up of PIM (Shashidharan 2000). 
N G O s have proved their ability to experiment and come up with 
good results, but there is no evidence yet to demonstrate their 
ability to operate on a sufficientiy larger scale. In both these states, 
the slow and gradual approach of NGOs has meant that it would 
still take a long time to accomplish a significant coverage of the 
command areas of the respective states under PIM initiatives. 
My own assessment about Gujarat was that there is a 
questioning of the role of NGOs in the PIM process: that is, 
should NGOs pursue steady efforts at forming and replicating local 
level resource user organisations in canal irrigation, or should they 
seek to inform policy change.5 5 There is now a new focus within 
the N G O sector in the state on policy advocacy and dissemination, 
and training of farmers and irrigation engineers, where earlier this 
focus was mainly on creating and replicating local level resource 
user organisations.56 
Where the Gujarat experience differs from the Maharashtra 
experience is that in the former, NGOs, by pursuing advocacy and 
pressing for reform, have succeeded in making the Government 
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pass a series of resolutions.57 In Maharashtra, on the other hand, as 
also noted earlier, policy development has come to a virtual 
standstill since the mid-1990s (Mollinga 2001b). Further, unlike 
Gujarat, Maharashtra has successfully experimented with 
volumetric supply of water to user groups. However, with the slow 
and gradual pace o f reform, both states face a problem of 
replication and expanding the scale o f reform. 
Karnataka 
In Karnataka, as in other states, reform has been driven by a mix o f 
factors: compelling budgetary constraints, reform conditionalities 
attached to loans for the Upper Krishna Project from the World 
Bank and the evidence from PIM initiatives in other states, 
particularly Maharashtra and Andhra Pradesh (Mollinga 2001b). 
There has been some disenchantment with the bureaucratic top-
down approach of the Command Area Development Programme, 
with about 200 WUAs existing on paper. Further, the process has 
received some thrust forward through the formation of Sahqyog, an 
N G O , to serve as a platform for debating reform proposals and 
negotiating for further reform. 5 8 
However, the speed of the process has been very slow and the 
scope of changes proposed by the Government very limited. 
Introduction of reform has been sought through the Proposed 
Amendment Bill to the Irrigation Act of 1965. The Amendment 
Bill proposes registration of water users societies under the State 
Co-operative Act of 1960 and registration of water users 
associations at four levels of the system. Critics of this provision 
argue that by providing for the registration of the water users' co-
operatives under the State Co-operative Act, it gives very little 
autonomy and freedom to the users and confers a great deal of 
control with the state government. Essentially, this proposal gives 
more powers to the state government than it gives to the farmers, 
and the spirit of the proposed reforms does not promote a genuine 
devolution of powers to user groups. 
The spirit of reform here seems somewhat similar to that in 
Haryana: form water users associations, but retain real powers and 
control with the bureaucracy. However, where the Karnataka 
experience provides some learning, as also that of Gujarat, is in the 
emergence o f a platform where feedback on the policy process is 
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sought, through NGOs and farmers' organisations, and actors get 
an opportunity to negotiate before driving the reform process 
further. The response of farmers to whether they would be 
interested in such a policy change has been positive (Mollinga 
2001b). 5 9 The evolution of such a forum has potential learning 
both for the states of Haryana as well as Maharashtra, and generally 
for other states where efforts at WUA formation are at different 
levels of development. 
Conclusion 
At the level of the content of the policy, the critical difference 
between efforts at WUA formation in Haryana and Maharashtra is 
that they seek to accomplish very different levels o f change in 
control relations. In Maharashtra, control over system operation is 
transferred to farmers who enter into a contract for volumetric 
water supplies. In Haryana, control is centralised, with the 
bureaucracy, while farmers perform some functions in supervising 
lining of watercourses. Further, in Haryana, the policy resolution 
for WUA establishment has been the outcome of a more 
prescriptive approach that has received a push under a programme 
funded by the World Bank. In Maharashtra, there has been more of 
a process at that level itself, prior to the evolution of the PIM 
guidelines, in terms of NGOs organising farmers, negotiating and 
pressing for turnover, and making efforts to federate and replicate. 
However, there is much similarity in the experience of the two 
states as regards the implementation of the policy interventions. 
This process is characterised by the presence of resistance among 
the concerned actors and the poor availability of financial and 
material resources to carry out the reforms. 
The main critique of the reform process in Haryana is that it is 
hardly a reform process. WUA establishment has been carried out 
below the oudets, while the more pressing challenges are above the 
oudets. Another critique is that there has been no redefinition in 
the role of the Irrigation Department. In Maharashtra, the model 
for WUA formation is much more ambitious as a reform strategy. 
However, there are forces of resistance among vested interests that 
gain from the status quo and resist efforts at WUA formation. 
These issues get further strengthened in the following chapters. 
That the policy intervention for forming WUAs aims at different 
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levels o f changing control relations in the two states comes out in 
chapter 4, when I compare the case of two WUAs, one in each of 
the states. Chapter 5 describes further the processes of local water 
management in terms of the internal dynamics of the water users 
association. What happens after the WUA has been formed? That 
chapter shows that local level governance structures can be 
autocratic. PIM is not necessarily about community management. 
Notes 
1 Initially, the farmers were required to pay part of the costs of lining. 
Since the 1980s, the cost has been fully subsidised by the state (Brewer et 
al. 1999). 
2 The World Bank-assisted Water Resources Consolidation Projects are 
under implementation in the states of Haryana, Orissa and Tamil Nadu 
(Mathur and Sibal 2000). The main objectives of WRCP are: (1) 
improvement in agricultural productivity through rehabilitation and 
completion of irrigation schemes and farmers' participation (ii) water 
resources planning by river basin across all uses of water (iii) assuring 
sustainability of infrastructure and the environment and (iv) improving 
institutional and technical capability of managing the state's water 
resources. To achieve these objectives, the thrust areas under the project 
include system improvement, farmers' participation, enhanced O & M of 
the systems, water planning, research, and environment management. 
3 The WRCP in Haryana provides support for activities in the HID for a five 
to six year period through to the year 2000. These activities include 
infrastructure planning, design and construction, improvements to operation 
and maintenance, environmental training and institutional strengthening as a 
basis for intensive water resource planning and management including a 
State Water Plan. The WRCP's overall objective has been to further improve 
performance of the irrigation sector to meet the state's water requirements. 
Under the WRCP, Rs. 2651 million have been sanctioned for watercourse 
lining with an intended impact of "water conservation, better distribution to 
local farmers and rural water supply sources" (Worid Bank 1993, page iv, 
Table 1). One of the important components of WRCP is improving the 
water delivery system at tertiary level, mainly watercourses, (WCs) by way of 
lining 1,500 watercourses, and rehabilitating around 200 watercourses that 
were lined earlier. In addition, about 50 minors are planned to be extended 
along with the construction of lined watercourses. It is estimated that this 
will cover another 200 watercourses. A total of 1,900 WCs are programmed 
to be lined or rehabilitated under the WRCP (GOH 1998). The programme 
was given an extension till the year 2001. 
4 In 1973, the central government issued instructions to the states to establish 
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CAD authorities for irrigation schemes (MoIIinga 1998a). The CADP, of 
which the establishment of CADAs was an element, was supported by 
organisations like the USAID and the Wodd Bank. It was funded by the 
central government. The establishment of CADAs was the result of the 
recommendations of the National Commission of Agriculture (1973) and the 
Second Irrigation Commission (GOI 1972). CADAs were intended to be 
mter-disciplinaty organisations that integrated and had authority over the line 
departments that worked in the irrigation systems concerned. They were to 
focus on OFD (On-Farm Development) activities as field channel 
construction and introduction of Rotational Water Supply. The CADP 
would be a centrally sponsored scheme on a matching basis, implying that 
the central and state governments contribute financially in the same 
proportion for its implementation (Sivamohan and Scott 1992). Most states 
located CADAs under the Department of Agriculture. 
5 In the 1970s, there had been created a large irrigation potential of 20.70 
million hectares by the end of the fourth plan period (1969-74), while the 
potential utilised was only 18.6 million ha (Sivamohan and Scott 1992). 
6 CADA, Haryana entered into the task of watercourse lining in 1988 on 
the Jawahar Lai Nehru Canal. In 1993, lining was introduced on the 
Western Yamuna Canal (Personal Communication, Mr. O P Daiyya, 
CADA, Rohtak). Before that, CADA, Haryana had been involved in other 
activities such as land -leveling and providing financial support for drip 
and sprinkler irrigation sets. 
7 One of the reasons that CADA programmes have been understood not 
to be successful is the absence of farmer participation in them (see also 
Saleth 1996a). 
8 However, that is a function that farmers have been doing even 
otherwise. This point is elaborated further later in this chapter. 
9 "Hand-over completed" means that after modernisation or 
rehabilitation, the watercourse has been taken over by the WUA for 
future repairs and maintenance. 
1 0 The difference between rehabilitation and modernisation is that under 
rehabilitation, the existing (watercourse) structure is demolished and a 
new one is put in its place. Under modernisation, an existing watercourse 
is simply lined. Brick lining is carried out along the sides and on the bed 
level of the watercourse. O & M activities refer to recurring activities of 
watercourse maintenance such as desilting and clearing the watercourse of 
weeds. 
1 1 Personal Communication, HSMITC Head-Office, Panchkula. 
1 2 In an interview with a World Bank official, the justification presented 
for keeping reform at this level was the size of the watercourse; it was felt 
that forming WUAs at a scale larger than this (100-300 ha), may not be 
viable. The watercourse was considered a size large enough for the 
formation of a WUA. Interestingly, when I tried to seek his opinion on 
why the state governments found the WRCP loan attractive, he refused to 
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comment on this, saying,..'ask the state government., that is their domain. 
1 3 A related question is whether training programs for farmers for WUA 
formation serve as a feedback loop. That is, does CADA use any training 
programmes as a feedback mechanism for further improvements and 
development? When I asked this question to field level officials, I got 
different categories of responses. The first response was that training 
activities are the domain of HIRMI- the Haryana Irrigation Research and 
Management Institute- and research and evaluation is their responsibility. 
The second response is that training programmes come to the field offices 
from the head-office and it is they who do the monitoring. The third 
response is that "all those evaluations are done only on paper, but are not 
put to any constructive use". The fourth response is that the concept of 
WUAs is rather new and it will still take some time before a meaningful 
evaluation of training programmes is carried out. I could not make any 
further assessment than this of whether CADA used training programmes 
as a mechanism for feedback and monitoring. 
1 4 This point was virtually hammered on to the members of one of my 
water users associations in a training programme organised by HIRMI. 
1 5 See also Merrey (1996). Merrey argues that countries promoting partial 
turnover programmes face a serious problem: water users associations in 
parts of systems are not likely to become stable and effective institutional 
mechanisms for managing irrigation systems unless there is clear 
provision for mutual accountability between users and managers. "While 
public organizations, under various forms of pressure, have agreed to 
share many of the responsibilities - especially the expenses and hard work 
- of system management with farmer organizations, there is no significant 
change in the power relations between officials and farmers. Mutual 
accountability is absent. Officials have no incentives to foster independent 
WUAs. Farmer organizations remain dependent on the public 
organization legally, financially, and psychologically (Merrey 1996:1-2)". 
1 6 A related issue is whether the functions that are assigned to water users 
associations can be handed over to the village Panchayat. An interesting 
observation through my association with two WUAs in the state was that 
the Jaats, (the agriculturists), showed a strong resistance to this happening. 
Agriculture, and therefore, irrigation, is seen as the domain of those who 
have land. A village Panchayat, on the other hand, is supposed to be a 
democratically elected village body with representation from different 
communities. Among the farmers that I interviewed, there was a strong 
resistance to these functions being handed over to the village Panchayat. 
1 7 In fact, CADA is known to have two structural bottlenecks: (1) its staff 
are on deputation and there is little institutional continuity and (2) it is still 
seen as a technocratic agency staffed entirely by irrigation engineers and 
technician agronomists, without sociologists, professional trainers, rural 
economists, or rural development experts (Maloney 2000). Mollinga 
(1998a) argues that in Karnataka, CADA remained by and large 
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ineffective. On account of the weakness of CADA in number of staff, it 
remained extremely dependent on the Irrigation Department. The latter 
sought to protect its own territory and resisted the formation of a co-
ordinating organisation between CADA and itself. For a further review of 
the experience with Command Area Development, see also Hooja and 
Kavdia (1994). 
1 8 This point was reconfirmed through my association with the Sitapur 
and Rampur Water Users Associations. The formation of the WUAs in 
these cases did not change water distribution and management practices. 
Water continued to be distributed through the warabandi system and 
farmers continued to participate in watercourse cleaning activities as they 
did before WUA formation. They would get together and clean the 
watercourses serving their respective fields. Alternatively, a farmer would 
clean the watercourse serving his field on the day of his turn for taking 
water. One difference, however, was that a lined watercourse reduced the 
frequency of watercourse cleaning. 
1 9 Goldensohn presents a somewhat different critique. WUAs have been 
formed through desperate efforts at technical and social engineering, 
without considering what they actually mean for the people they are 
supposed to organise (Goldensohn 1984). WUAs are not associations of 
users of water, but of farmers who use water as an input into agriculture. 
Further, according to Goldensohn, WUAs would be more enduring if 
they were structured as multi-purpose organisations that were more 
central to the lives of their members. 
2 0 Singh (2000a) argues that the oudet-based irrigation committees of the 
late 1970s that were created by government departments under the 
CADA programme collapsed soon after being born because they were not 
connected with a higher level of the minor or the distributary. This made 
them inherendy vulnerable as they had little control over the dependability 
of water supplies. 
2 1 See the discussion in chapter 2. 
2 2 This is borne out particularly by the experience of Andhra Pradesh in 
India. See Peter (2000) and World Bank (1999b). 
2 3 See also Brewer et al 1999: 280-281, where the authors note that the 
chief reason for WUA formation being under serious consideration is 
"World Bank pressure". I found it interesting that the perception of the 
lower level bureaucracy was that the WUAs were being formed under 
World Bank pressure, while the senior management saw it more as an 
outcome of a process of persuasion on the part of the World Bank. 
2 4 During the later stages of my research, a field level CADA official also 
admitted to the significance of World Bank pressure behind WUA 
establishment. The current thinking is that no watercourse lining would be 
carried out unless a WUA has been formed. 
2 5 The Gowshala trust approached CADA for help in lining a 
watercourse that serves their fields. The demand for estabHshing a WUA 
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is mote of a reflection of a perceived need for lining a watercourse, since 
WUA formation is a condition for watercourse lining. What this reflects is 
that farmers are interested in lining of watercourse, but perhaps not in 
formation of WUAs. 
2 6 In one of the WUAs studied, the reason for the alienation of other 
members was that the WUA was dominated by three position holders 
who comprised the village elite. They were large farmers, with strong 
positions in local village networks. They also represented the tholas 
(ancestral family units) that were numerically the most powerful on the 
watercourse. These three position holders shared the information and the 
power mutually among themselves and did not involve other farmers or 
members of the WUA (See chapter 5). 
2 7 I elaborate more on this in chapter 5, where I describe the 
organisational dynamics of the Rampur WUA. 
2 8 For a review, see Dreze and Sen (1989) and Dreze (1995). The state has 
also intervened through watershed development and management 
programmes. See Dev (1996) and Kerr (2002). For a general review of 
the role of the state in agriculture and irrigation, see Mitra (1986, 1998) 
and Dev and Mungekar (1996). 
2 9 This discussion draws upon Brewer et al. (1999) and Barrett et al. 
(1999). 
3 0 In fact, Maharashtra has a long tradition of community-based water 
management. For a review of community based traditions of water 
management in the state, see Agarwal and Narain (1997). See also Lele 
and Patil (1994) and Brewer et al. (1999). 
3 1 It recommended a tiered structure, with primary co-operative societies 
at the distributary level, federal bodies at the sub-divisional level, and apex 
bodies at the divisional level. It said that a provision should be made 
under the irrigation rules for the handing over of water by measurement 
at the distributary head to the primary co-operative societies of irrigators. 
The primary co-operative societies would be responsible for the collection 
of irrigation charges from their members and remitting the amount to the 
Irrigation Department. The co-operative body at the sub-divisional level 
would be a federal body consisting of all the primary co-operative 
societies of irrigators within the sub-division. These sub-divisional 
societies would fix the rotation and quota of water for different 
distributaries and keep a watch on the working of the primary co-
operative societies. This model was advocated as a means of reducing 
complaints regarding undesirable practices against the lower levels of the 
Irrigation Department. 
3 2 This period also corresponds to what Pant (2000) calls the second 
phase in the evolution of the concept of Participatory Irrigation 
Management in India, (1985-90), with an emphasis on pilot projects. 
During this phase, the MOWR, GOI, asked all the state governments to 
select one minor in each CAD project as a pilot for farmer participation. 
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Consequently, in Maharashtra, pilot schemes were initiated in 
Khadakvasla and Jayakwadi projects. 
3 3 The late Padmashree Vikhe Paul established the nation's first 
cooperative sugar factory in the state in 1952-53. The state has taluk 
(block) and district level federations of sugar co-operatives (Brewer et al. 
1999). They serve as a lobby group to pressurise the government with 
respect to electricity rates and supply, and water rates. In fact, 
Maharashtra leads all other Indian states in sugar production. This is owed 
in large part to the tradition and character of rural leadership. Cooperative 
leadership has been associated with prestige, patronage and power. Many 
leaders of cooperatives become members of the state and central 
legislature, and cabinet ministers. There are several sugar co-operatives 
whose leaders compete and vie with each other for offering their 
members better prices and for acquiring positions in the State Legislative 
Assembly (Attwood 1995). 
3 4 See the discussion on the phad system in chapter 2. 
3 5 The USAID and the World Bank have insisted on WUA formation as a 
reform condition for financial support in the case of their projects on the 
Jayakwadi Dam (Pant 2000). 
3 6 For a review of the 'Thilippine model", see Korten and Siy (1989). 
3 7 See the discussion on shejpali in chapter 2. 
3 8 My interpretation is that farmers may not resent price increases when 
they are part of an overall reform strategy aiming at transferring control, 
making the bureaucracy accountable and improving water supplies. This 
has indeed happened in Andhra Pradesh. See Peter (2000) and World 
Bank (1999b). 
3 9 As an example, the Irrigation Department has a Paatkari to look after 2-
3 minors to report on repair and maintenance needs of canals, but the 
Mula Minor 7 WUA itself hires two full time Paatkaris. Thus, 
management and repair needs are better kept track of and communicated 
(Brewer and Sakthivadivel 2000). 
4 0 The Samvatsar society came into existence because newly irrigated areas 
were being acquired for private sugar factories during the early 1930s. 
This caused anxiety among the Mali community who had migrated from 
Pune district and had taken lands in the command on lease or purchased 
them outright. As a way out, eleven persons belonging to the Mali 
community formed a society (command 158 ha) to take water on a 
volumetric basis to grow sugarcane (Lele and Paul 1994). The other 
society, the Malinagar Irrigators' Water Supply Cooperative Society, was 
registered in July 1967 on the Nira Canals in Sholapur District. A peculiar 
feature of this society is that though the society formally exists, the 
management of water distribution is done by the Saswad Mali Sugar 
Factory Ltd, a private limited company formed in 1931. As a matter of 
fact, the agreement of water supply with the Government of Maharashtra 
is signed by the sugar factory and not by the co-operative water supply 
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society. An interesting observation common to both these societies is that 
the membership is restricted only to the Mali Community. Non-Mali 
irrigators in both commands are not members and they get supplies 
direcdy from the Irrigation Department. Though these were interesting 
institutional innovations, they were not replicated elsewhere (Lele and 
Paul 1994). For more on these WUAs, see also Bhogle and Bharas 
Wadkar (1994). 
4 1 The Vice-Chancellor of Mahatma Phule University, Sambhaji Rao 
Dorage and his colleagues, Dr. Desai, Dr. Bapat, and Dr. Magar took 
keen interest in the Action Research Programme initiated by 
SOPPECOM on the Mula Irrigation Project and offered to hold a 
seminar on the subject at the University. The seminar, held in 1990, 
enthused Shri Bapu Saheb Upadhye of the Samaj Parivartan Kendra, to 
form three water users associations in Waghad Project at Ozhar (Lele & 
Paul 1994). The WUAs at Ozhar were formed through the efforts and 
leadership of Shree Upadhye and Bharat Kawle. 
4 2 When I visited the Ozhar sites during my exploratory phase, there were 
some efforts at evolving bylaws for such a federation. However, I did not 
get a chance to revisit the developments later in my research. 
4 3 This statement may seem to contradict the observations made earlier in 
terms of the role of some officers of the Irrigation Department in 
facilitating management turnover. The point is that those efforts are more 
of the exception than the rule, but the general trend, from my own 
observations, is that of resistance. The evidence of this resistance is the 
long time that the Irrigation Department takes in effecting management 
turnover and the insistence on procedural formalities and red tape on its 
part. This observation came out in many of my interviews in the course of 
my fieldwork. I also describe more on this in chapter 4, when I discuss the 
case of the Action Research Programme initiated by SOPPECOM. 
4 4 Neither shejpali nor warabandi are designed to provide adequate, 
reliable and timely water supply for the entire crop water requirements 
(see Chapter 2). Perhaps what is implied by a statement such as this one is 
the failure of the Irrigation Department to provide water as per the 
schedules that are drawn for water deliveries. This point was evident in 
the case of the Mula Minor No. X WUA, described in the following 
chapter, where the main reason that farmers agreed to take over the water 
distribution function was the failure of the Irrigation Department to 
supply water as per the set schedules. This was indeed still the case in a 
neighbouring minor in the same village where the WUA had not been 
formed. Irrigators on that minor often complained that water supplies 
were undependable and not as per the schedules set by the Irrigation 
Department. 
4 5 This is not to suggest that a big bang approach is necessarily superior to 
a slow but steady, gradual, piloting approach. However, the absence or 
presence of a specific policy or legal provision do reflect how far a state 
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government is willing to push a reform initiative. In Andhra Pradesh, 
supportive legislation for WUA formation may be reflective of a 
prescriptive, top-down approach, but it surely reflects that the state 
government is really serious about the subject. 
4 6 For lower level staff, this means the loss of opportunity to extract illicit 
payments from farmers for releasing water. This also explains the 
resistance on their part. 
4 7 Lele (2000) reports that turnover in about 400 WUAs covering an area 
of 1.5 lakh ha is pending due to incomplete rehabilitation of the systems. 
The GOM has issued instructions to allocate 10% of the O & M grants 
for rehabilitation but even this is not monitored at the higher level, and is, 
therefore, not fully utilised for this purpose. Besides, Lele argues, this 
amount is inadequate. 
4 8 For instance, during my exploratory phase, I spent a long time with an 
Executive Engineer who had organised farmers on the Waghad Project 
into water users associations. His approach to convincing them was " if 
you do not assert your water right, someone else will snatch it away from 
you". 
4 9 For a similar analysis of the role of civil society organisations in 
irrigation reform in the state of Gujarat, see Shashidharan (2000). See also 
Ballabh (2002). For a further discussion of the role of NGOs in natural 
resource management, see Kolavalli and Kerr (2002). For a review of 
issues in NGO accountability, see Najam (1996). 
5 0 There is a more fundamental issue involved here: why should NGOs be 
involved in catalysing farmers for collective action ? Both in the states of 
Gujarat and Maharashtra, farmers themselves have come up with different 
forms of institutional innovation. When farmers themselves want this to 
happen, they would make it happen. Perhaps the answer to this question, 
as demonstrated in the case of the Lakshmi Narayan WUA that I describe 
in chapter 4 is that NGOs have certain strengths that facilitate the process 
of turnover by their acting as intermediaries between the farmers and the 
bureaucracy. 
5 1 Personal communication, Dr. R K Paul, SOPPECOM. 
5 2 For a review, see Brewer et al. (1999). See also Joshi and Hooja (2000) 
and Mollinga (2001b). 
5 3 For more on the Mexican model and its implementation in Mexico 
itself, see Kloezen (2002). 
5 4 Going back to the Haryana case discussed above, there is actually no 
"reform" or institutional transformation through WUA formation. 
5 5 During the earlier part of my exploratory research phase, I spent some 
time reviewing the PIM process in the state of Gujarat. I interacted with 
NGOs, community organisers, farmers, WUA leaders and members of 
the academic community. 
5 6 Parthasarathy (2000) notes other bottlenecks to PIM reforms in the 
state. There are difficulties in convincing fanners to participate and 
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differences in the understanding of PIM policy at different levels of the 
bureaucracy. Further, Parthasarathy argues that WUAs need to be more 
efficient in making allocative and investment decisions, for which a 
clarification of legal rights is imperative. 
5 7 Gujarat is now writing its own Act, following but adapting the Act of 
Andhra Pradesh. The Development Support Center, an NGO, has been a 
prime actor in this policy formulating process. 
5 8 The mandate of Sahayog is to assess whether farmers are motivated to 
claim reform from the Government and if so, to facilitate the organisation 
of farmers in a platform to discuss the desired policy changes (Mollinga 
2001b). It also seeks to sensitise the public, through mass media on the 
imperatives, objectives and modalities of reform. Sahayog serves as an 
mtermediary between the farmers and the irrigation bureaucracy and as a 
platform to bring different actors together to facilitate the formulation of 
an effective strategy and a transition to its implementation. The latest 
development on this front has been the formation of Pragathi, an off-
shoot of this organisation, by farmers who got disenchanted with a rift 
among the more professional leadership of Sahayog. The momentum of 
discussion on irrigation policy in the state has now shifted to tanks 
because of a World Bank loan for large—scale tank rehabilitation, but 
formation of WUAs and WUA federations is proceeding on a large scale, 
as of September 2002 (personal communication, Peter Mollinga). 
5 9 In about a years' time, federations of water users associations were 
formed in 8 major irrigation systems, and the formation of a state level 
apex body was under discussion (Mollinga 2001b). Following from a 
consultative process led by Sahayog, one point that emerged was that 
instead of registering the WUAs under the Co-operative Societies Act, 
1960, they should be registered under the Societies Registration Act, 
which might give more freedom and autonomy to the water users. 
4 
Transferring Control to Water Users 
Associations 
Does design matter? 
This chapter is about the processes and effects of WUA formation 
in two of the cases that I studied. It describes the "corning about" 
of these WUAs and the motivations and processes involved. The 
first case presented is the Lakshmi Narayan Water Users 
Association located on the Mula Minor No. X of the Mula Right 
Bank Canal in Maharashtra. The second is the Sitapur Water Users 
Association located at the tail-end of the Sitapur Minor of the 
Western Yamuna Canal in Haryana. 
In the former case, the formation of the WUA is aimed at 
changing control relations between the users and the bureaucracy. 
The process is a gradual one, carried out by an N G O through a 
series of steps convincing farmers of the benefits of WUA 
formation, having meetings with the bureaucracy and effecting 
management turnover. The formation of the WUA is designed as a 
strategy to shift control over system operation from the Irrigation 
Department to the WUA. The Irrigation Department enters into a 
contract with the WUA for supplying volumetric quotas of water 
for each season as per the schedules drawn by the latter. The 
formation of the WUA has significant effects on water 
management and distribution practices that are similar to those 
conceived of by the initiators of the turnover process. 
In the latter case, WUA formation is carried out through a 
bureaucratic procedure by contacting an officer from CADA. It is 
not motivated by an intention of changing control relations 
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Sitapur WUA 
Parameter Lakshmi Narayan Sitapur WUA in the 
WUA in the shejpali warabandi system of 
system of Maharashtra Haryana 
Formation of the WUA With the support of an By approaching an 
NGO, through a officer of CADA, 
systematic, step by step through a bureaucratic 
process procedure 
Motivation behind Changing of control Assigning the WUA 
WUA formation relations between the some functions to secure 
users and the watercourse lining, with 
bureaucracy no corresponcling 
change in their rights or 
powers 
Contract on water Yes No 
supplies with the 
Irrigation Department 
Control over water Yes No 
supplies: volume and 
timing 
The WUA's room to High Small 
manoeuvre 
Enabling support High Low 
received by the WUA 
WUA formation alters Yes No 
the balance of power 
between the 
bureaucracy and the 
farmers 
Through this comparison, I show that analysis o f situations o f 
Irrigation Management Transfer requires an analysis of the extent 
to which the relative roles of the irrigation bureaucracy and the 
farmers undergo a change. "Self-governance" in canal irrigation 
occurs when essential water management tasks and activities are 
between the users and the Irrigation Department, but by the 
intention of getting a watercourse lined. The WUA is assigned 
some functions, but there are no corresponcling powers or rights. 
Control continues to vest outside the WUA, technically in the main 
system and organisationally with the irrigation bureaucracy. 
TABLE 4 . 1 A comparison between the Lakshmi Narayan WUA and the 
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The Gowda Village2 
Gowda is a village in Ahmednagar district of Maharashtra. The 
village has well-developed social and physical infrastructure. It has 
primary, middle and secondary schools, and a primary health centre 
BOX 4.1 Time line: Gowda village 
1956 Primary School 
1965 High School 
1973 Water flows from the Mula Right Bank Canal 
1975 Electricity Connection 
1978 First borewell in the village 
1980 TV comes to the village 
1985 First telephone in the village 
1990 Dev Raj becomes Sarpanch (head of the gram panchayat) 
(BJP) 
1995 GB Shelke becomes Sarpanch (BJP) 
2000 Rajaji Jawle becomes Sarpanch (Congress) 
Source: informal discussion with villagers 
taken over by the farmers' groups from the Irrigation Department 
and control relations between these two sides undergo a change.1 
Thus, much depends on the motivations behind WUA 
establishment. In the latter part of this chapter, I show that the 
extent to which control relations between the users and the 
Irrigation Department can undergo a change is shaped by the 
technology, or the design of canal irrigation. Design influences the 
potential for change in water management and distribution 
practices through WUA formation. Table 4.1 summarises the 
differences between the two WUAs. 
The Lakshmi Narayan WUA 
In this section, I document the formation of the Lakshmi Narayan 
WUA. I describe first the Gowda village and its setting, followed 
by the genesis of the WUA. I then present a brief account of its 
institutional history and describe the process and implications of 
management turnover. 
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The people and livelihoods 
The village has a population of about 12, 000. This population 
comprises different castes. The Malis and the Marathas are the 
more powerful groups, numerically and in terms of land ownership. 
Dahatonde, Shelke, Gaekwad, Pehre and Adhsure are the important 
Maratha groups. The Dahatondes are the original inhabitants o f the 
village and take great pride in their descent from Kakaji 
Dahatonde, who is said to have served the army of Shivaji some 
300 years ago.3 Malis are the traditional agriculturists in the 
Maharashtrian society. They have been traditionally associated with 
irrigated agriculture, from a bawdi (dug well). Jawh, Punde, and 
Chawre represent the Mali communities in the village. Within this 
broad group of Marathas and Malis, the Dahatondes are the most 
powerful numerically and in terms of land ownership, followed 
closely by the Jawles, Gaekwads and Shelkes. 
Ahlat, Gadhve and Adhav represent the Christian communities. 
Some Chandekars are Brahmans while some others are Christians. 
The village also has a sizeable presence of Muslims. Some Muslims 
and Christians practice agriculture while some Muslims also pursue 
trade, work as construction labourers or run meat-shops. The Jains 
and Marwaris are the businessmen and traders. 
A number of other smaller groups inhabit the village. Sutaarare 
the carpenters. Navhi are the barbers. Kumbhaars do pottery. 
Maatank make ropes. Dohaar work with leather and Lohaar work 
with iron. Vadaar have traditionally provided agricultural labour; 
but agricultural labour no longer comes from any specific caste. 
Similarly, while traditionally agriculture has been the domain of the 
Malis, it now cuts across castes and groups. 
At the entrance of the village is the village market and Panchajat 
Ghar (office of the gram panchayat). In the market are a number of 
shops selling agricultural inputs, groceries, meat, clothes, shoes and 
slippers. Soon at the entrance, to the right hand side, live the 
Muslims. Further down is a church and the region around that is 
and three private dispensaries. The village is equipped with a post 
office that has telephone facilities. It is connected to the state 
power grid. Box 4.1 presents a time line of the major events and 
milestones in the development of the village. 
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Agriculture and cropping practices 
There are three cropping seasons. Kharif (July 1-October 15) is the 
rainy season with litde or no irrigation. Rabi (October 15-March 
end) is the main irrigation season. The hot weather season is from 
March 15-June end. 
The main crops in the kharif season are pearl millet, sorghum, 
sugarcane, some paddy, chillies, and tur (a variety of pulses). In the 
rabi season, the main crops are wheat, sorghum, chickpea and 
sugarcane. In the hot weather season, the main crops are 
groundnut and sugarcane. The predominant rotation is wheat-pearl 
millet. Besides, farmers grow a variety of fruits and vegetables such 
as papaya, guava, tamarind, chillies, aubergines, onions, cauliflower 
and coconut Wheat is both a cash crop and a food crop. Pearl 
millet is a staple food crop and it is also a source of fodder. It is 
BOX 4.2 Visit to Pehre's fields 
30/11/00 
.. .Pehre (whose fields were located near the head of the minor) then 
showed me around his fields. He had 7 acres of land on the left hand 
side of the canal where he had grown fruits, vegetables and some 
wheat. On the right hand side, he had 2 acres of land where he had 
sugarcane fields. He had planted chillies, papaya and tamarind. Some 
land had been prepared for sowing wheat. He told me that fruits and 
vegetables were sold in the market in Gowda and in Ahmednagar. He 
had also planted some cauliflower. There were mangoes, coconut and 
some bananas. 
Source: field notes 
used for making chapattis (flat wheat bread), a major component of 
the household diet. Boxes 4.2 and 4.3 describe the cropping pattern 
inhabited by Christians. Beyond the market live the Baniyas and 
Jains. The Marathas and Malis are scattered all over, to the left of 
the village. Some of them also build small houses near their farms. 
The members o f the scheduled castes live in a secluded section at 
the outskirts of the village. 
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Irrigation 
The cultivated area in the village is irrigated by two minors from 
the Mula Right Bank Canal of the Mula Dam, the Minor No. X and 
the Minor No. Y . 4 The Mula Minor No. X has 13 oudets while the 
Minor No. Y has 20. The Mula Minor X , which was the minor 
chosen for this study, passes through Gowda and Hastinapur 
villages. The Minor X takes off directly from the Mula Right Bank 
Canal. It runs for 2.2 kms. The 13 oudets along the minor are each 
designed for one cusec flow. The area commanded by an oudet 
varies from 72.77 ha to 6.27 ha. The water in the Minor X first 
flowed from the MRBC in 1973. The command area of the minor 
is estimated at 500 ha of which 300 ha Ees in Gowda village. The 
minor also serves the neighbouring village of Hastinapur situated 4 
km from Gowda. 
Farmers also tap groundwater through bawdis and some 
borewells.5 The depth of the water table varies between 50 and 100 
feet. The water table falls in the hot weather season and rises 
during and after the rainy season. Thus, the aquifers are recharged 
both from the canal waters as well the rainfall. 
Irrigation from surface and ground water is used to 
supplement each other; water from the canals recharges the 
groundwater while groundwater is used when the canal rotation is 
off or inadequate. When there is not enough water in the dam, or 
when the canal irrigation is off, irrigation is through the bawdis. 
During the start of the rainy season, for instance, when canal 
and field layout of a typical farmer in the Gowda village. 
BOX 4.3 Interview with Tukaraam Gangadhar Kaale 
1/12/00 
Tukaraam was a tail-ender. He had 2.5 acres of land. I spoke to him 
and his wife; their land lay on the left hand side of the tail outlet. In 
the rabi season, he grows sugarcane, wheat and chickpea. In kharif, 
he grows pearl millet and pulses. In the hot weather season, he grows 
sugarcane and pulses. The land is of the heavy, black cotton type. It 
is not fit for the cultivation of fruits. If soils are light, they can grow 
some fruits, but he can not.. 1 
Source: field notes 
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Institutional arrangements in agriculture 
Apart from self-cultivation, two land use relations exist in the 
village. In one, sharecropping, the land and water are provided by 
the owner while the tiller provides labour, seeds and inputs. The 
produce is shared as one half each; in some cases, the proceeds are 
shared as 2:1 between the tiller and the owner. This is called batai. 
In another arrangement, when the land owner is away from the 
village, he gives out his land on lease for a year and shares 5 0 % of 
the produce as well as 50% of the expenses with the lessee.7 
Labour relations, inputs and markets 
Almost all landowners employ agricultural labour. Labour for 
agricultural operations is needed throughout the year. It is 
employed for a variety o f agricultural operations such as sowing 
wheat and harvesting pearl millet, sorghum and wheat.8 The usual 
practice is that farmers work on their own fields but also employ 
labour for part of the agricultural operations. Some smaller farmers 
supplement the income from their fields either by working on the 
lands of others as labourers or by entering into contractual 
arrangements for sharecropping. 
The main source of agricultural credit is the Shree Ganesh 
Society, set up in the village in 1935. It is a multi-purpose cooperative 
society that provides agricultural loans and sells agricultural inputs. 
Other sources of credit are the Ahmednagar District Co-operative 
Bank Ltd, Gowda and the Central Bank of India, Gowda. Besides, 
there is some informal lending in the village and the rate varies from 
4 % per month to 12%. Most farmers prefer to take crop loans from 
the Shree Ganesh society. Some seeds are bought from the Lakshmi 
Narayan Water Users Association. There are also some private 
irrigation is off, farmers irrigate from the bawdis. In between canal 
rotations, too, farmers irrigate from the bawdis. There is no selling 
of groundwater, though some farmers take water from their 
neighbours.6 Most farmers resort to groundwater for the 
cultivation of fruits and vegetables. This is because fruits and 
vegetables require watering much more frequendy, which the canal 
irrigation cannot provide. 
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Village Politics 
The village politics are split between the BJP-Shiv Sena and the 
Congress. The village Panchayat comprises a Sarpanch and 17 
other members. They are elected every five years. The village has a 
new Sarpanch from the Rashtrawaadi Congress party since August 
2000 while the last two Sarpanches were from the Bharatiya Janata 
Party (BJP). 15 members of the 17 at present belong to the 
Rashtrawaadi Congress. 2 belong to the BJP. Usually, the Sarpanch 
hails from the Dahatondes or Jawles, the castes that are numerically 
and socially powerful. Politically, the Ahmednagar area has been a 
strong hold of the Congress party. 
Institutional history of the Lakshmi Narayan WUA 
In 1985, an N G O called CASAD was looking for a site for WUA 
formation as part o f an Action Research Programme. One of the 
representatives from CASAD met G A Punde, a political worker 
from Gowda village, at the office of the irrigation sub-division, 5 
kms away from Gowda. Punde said that they had not got water 
from the Irrigation Department for the last 30-40 days. The 
CASAD representative offered to help them in buying water in 
bulk from the Irrigation Department and organising the 
distribution of water more effectively themselves. Punde said that 
he would have to consult the other farmers. He promised to return 
after 15 days. 
suppliers of seeds and fertilisers in the main market of Gowda village. 
The Vardaan Society is a cooperative society that provides credit for 
business purposes. 
Wheat and pearl millet are sold in the market in Ahmednagar. 
Sugarcane is sold at the two co-operative factories located at a 
distance of 15-20 kms from Gowda: the Nyaneshwar Sahakari 
Shakkar Karkhaana and the Mula Sahakaari Shakkar Karkhaana. 
These factories have been around for more than 20 years. The 
village has a lively weekly market every Saturday where colourful 
clothes, groceries, fruits, vegetables and other household items are 
sold. 
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The farmers in Gowda village were unhappy since they had not 
received water as per the schedules set by the Irrigation 
Department. Sometimes, the Irrigation Department would say that 
the water would come in 10 days but it would not come even in 30 
days. Punde consulted the farmers and returned after 15 days. He 
said that they were willing to organise management turnover, 
provided CASAD helped them. The CASAD representative said 
that they could experiment and if over one year, they were not 
satisfied, they could revert to the old situation and hand the 
management and water distribution back to the Irrigation 
Department. 
USAID (The United States Agency for International 
Development) extended some support and a conference was 
organised in Pune where Punde and some other farmers were 
invited to participate. The idea of forming a WUA to take over the 
water distribution function from the Irrigation Department took 
shape. In February 1987, a General Meeting of the farmers on the 
minor was called and the proposal for WUA formation was 
explained to them (Lele and Paul 1994). 120 farmers attended this 
meeting. The following points were made in the meeting: 
(1) The Irrigation Department would deliver measured supplies of 
water at the minor head. 
(2) The WUA would carry out the distribution of water to farmers. 
(3) The Irrigation Department would be paid on a volumetric 
basis while the farmers would pay the WUA on a crop-area 
basis. 
(4) The WUA would decide the cropping pattern, based on water 
allocation. 
Two additional points were also discussed. The first had to do 
with the choice of the unit for WUA formation. There were two 
possibilities: the first was to organise one unit for the minor and 
the second was to form a number of separate entities for each of 
the 13 oudets. The farmers realised that the oudet societies would 
be too small in terms of financial viability and management. It was, 
therefore, decided to have one society for the minor as a whole. 
The second issue related to the legal status of the water users 
association. Here, too, there were two possibilities. The first would 
have been to register the WUA as a co-operative society under the 
Registration of Societies Act. The second would have been to 
register it as a company under the Companies Act. The farmers 
opted for the co-operative form, as it was the more familiar to 
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Village leadership and support 
From within the village, leadership came mainly from N T 
Gharonde and GA Punde. Punde and Gharonde found strong 
allies in each other, and received the support of two other farmers: 
KC Pehre and NA Punde. 
GA Punde was a political worker. He enjoyed a strong clout in 
the local politics and had served as a village Sarpanch earlier. At the 
state and district level politics, though, he remained litde more than 
a handmaiden to Shelke, a member of the state legislature, who 
came from the Congress Party. However, he (GA Punde) enjoyed 
the confidence of small farmers. Whenever he went to 
Ahmednagar, they would request him to convey their problems and 
concerns to the concerned officers. He had also been on the board 
of the Shree Ganesh Society.1 0 Thus, he had a political clout at the 
local level and enjoyed the faith and confidence o f the smaller 
farmers. This helped him influence them. He never studied beyond 
primary school but had worked as a contractor in the Irrigation 
Department. 
Punde has a strong commitment to the ideals of Gandhi and 
them. 9 
After this meeting, two tasks had to be performed by the 
farmers and the N G O . The first was to approach the Irrigation 
Department for a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) 
between the department and the proposed WUA. Under this 
MOU, the terms and conditions for the switch over o f the control 
of water management to the society would be laid out. Second, 
they would have to arrange for the registration of the WUA under 
the Cooperative Societies Act. 
Soon after that, CASAD employed two field organisers and 
two supervisors in the area to discuss the related issues with the 
farmers regarding the formation of the WUA. The organisers 
started discussions with small groups of farmers. They also 
identified the farmers who would be able to work in the Managing 
Committee in the initial period. 
This was followed by a series of negotiations between the 
farmers and CASAD on the one hand and the Irrigation 
Department, Government of Maharashtra and the Co-operatives 
Department on the other. 
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Vinoba Bhave, which have guided his motivation in organising 
people. He is devoted to these ideals and laments their loss in the 
current management. This came out very strongly in my interviews 
with him. While he normally looked old and weak, his eyes would 
suddenly brighten up and he would be totally charged and energetic 
when talking about his motivations behind WUA establishment. 
Punde's chief consideration had been that all the farmers should 
share in the water equitably and should have a right to water for 
irrigation. He struggled very hard during the years 1985 to 1989, 
the formative years of the WUA.."only I know the struggle that I 
had to face.. .the senior people never wanted to co-operate" , as he 
would often put it in my interviews with him. He would further 
say proudly.." when I made this organisation, I put my spirit into 
it..." there are 400 WUAs in the state... but none is as good.. .they 
are not well-planned". He had strong ideas about what a good 
water users association should be like. His perception was.. .".even 
a thief earns profit. When a WUA also exists only to earn profit, 
how is it different from a thief.... A WUA should help the farmers 
grow and diversify the water distribution should be 
equitable...the views of Bapu and Vinoba Bhave have to be 
brought back into our society.." 
N T Gharonde, popularly called Gharonde Sir, was the other 
key WUA leader. He is a teacher in the village high school. He was 
also on the Board of Directors of the Shree Ganesh Society. 
Gharonde Sir is a very articulate speaker. At the time of the 
formation of the WUA, he was the bearer o f a sugarcane block and 
was related to an officer in the Irrigation Department.1 1 He himself, 
therefore, did not have a problem getting the supply of water from 
the canal. In fact, he initially was not keen on the idea of taking 
over the management of the system. However, the CASAD 
representative warned him about what would happen if the officer 
got shifted or moved to another place. Gharonde Sir thought again. 
While Gharonde Sir was ambitious personally and did aspire 
for a position on the governing board of the water users 
association, Punde himself did not seek an official position inside 
the water users association. Further, though a political worker 
himself, I did not see any evidence o f Punde's political aspirations 
being expressed inside the water users association. 
These two leaders received the support of K C Pehre and N A 
Punde. KC Pehre was also on the board of Directors of the Shree 
Ganesh Society and the Vardaan Society. G A Punde supported 
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Pehre and helped him acquire the Directorship of the Nyaneshwar 
Sahakari Shakkar Karkhana, one of the two co-operative sugar 
mills in the vicinity of the village. KC Pehre is affiliated with the 
Bharatiya Janata Party and contested the elections to the Gram 
Panchayat in August 2000. NA Punde is the brother of GA Punde. 
He is the priest of the Someshwar temple. He is known to be a 
hard working and progressive farmer with a keen sense o f 
agricultural experimentation. 
In the early days this group provided the basic leadership. GA 
Punde provided a link between the farmers and CASAD. He 
played an important role in organising farmers and convincing 
them of the benefits of the collective effort. Gharonde Sir, with his 
good oratorical ability, participated in a series of meetings with the 
Cooperatives Department, the Government of Maharashtra and 
the Irrigation Department. GA Punde and Gharonde Sir served to 
lobby on behalf of the farmers to press for management turnover 
o f the system to farmers. They bore the organisational burden, and 
did so effectively. 
In a series of meetings and individual discussions held with 
farmers in 1987 and 1988, CASAD explained the benefits that 
would accrue to the irrigators if they managed water distribution 
below the minor. These meetings, held in Bombay and Pune, 
involved several rounds of negotiation and discussion, to arrive at 
an MOU that was later to become the basis of PIM guidelines 
issued by the Government of Maharashtra.12 
Overcoming obstacles and bureaucratic resistance 
The WUA leaders faced several obstacles in the process of 
organising the management turnover. This resistance was shown at 
different levels of the state machinery and can be seen as indicative 
o f the reluctance of those in command to let go. The Cooperatives 
Department first insisted that the promoters of the water users 
association should get a clearance from the Maharashtra State 
Electricity Board, as it did also from lift irrigation co-operatives. 
The WUA leaders worked hard to convince them that this being a 
surface irrigation scheme, there was no need for a clearance from 
the Electricity Authorities; no lifting of water was involved. 
The office of the Co-operatives Department created several 
other hurdles that made the process of registration bureaucratically 
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The early years 
The formation of the water users association conferred several 
benefits to the member farmers.17 Earlier, they had to go to the 
sub-division of the Irrigation Department to apply for water. Now, 
their applications were processed in the office of the WUA within 
the village. This saved them a lot of time and effort. Further, it 
removed the element of illicit payments that had to be made to the 
officers of the Irrigation Department for releasing water to operate 
the gates. Virtually all the members that I interviewed in the course 
of my association with the WUA confirmed that the employees of 
the Irrigation Department had to be bribed to open the gates along 
the minor as well as the gate at the head of the minor. This pattern 
was inequitable since the capacity to bribe would vary with the 
social and economic position of a farmer. 
In the elections to the WUA that were held in 1990, Gharonde 
Sir was elected as the Chairman. K C Pehre became the Vice-
Chairman. Also on the Board was Ukeerde, a former Sarpanch of 
complex, long and cumbersome. This included insisting on detailed 
information, and not keeping commitments and postponing dates 
for meetings. Both Gharonde Sir and GA Punde, in my interviews, 
expressed the view that this was because the bureaucracy feared a 
loss o f power, which it was reluctant to let go of. Another problem 
was that the Talati (village level record keeper) would have to 
furnish details on every individual farmer, his gat (revenue record) 
number and land holding size. For each, he would also charge 
some 'fees'.1 3 This process was simplified to the effect that one 
common listing for all farmers would do. 
For these reasons, it took about 22 months to register the 
society and arrive at an MOU with the Irrigation Department (Lele 
and Paul 1994). 1 4 The Society finally became operational in July 
1989, with the signing of the MOU on 30 t h June 1989. The first 
General Body meeting was held on March 16 1989, with 
attendance from 35 members. 
The WUA entered into a contract with the Irrigation 
Department to supply water on a volumetric basis and a season-
wise quota was fixed.15 The operation of the 13 pipe oudets along 
the minor was taken over by the Paatkaris employed by the water 
users association.16 
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the Hastinapur village and a former board member o f the Village's 
Gram Vikas Samiti (village development council).1 8 This team 
continued to provide the essential leadership in the early years and 
represented the farmers' case forcefully. The management turnover 
gave some bargaining power to the water users association.19 In 
1992-93, there was a financial crisis and the financial recoveries o f 
the WUA dipped very low. The leadership, led by Punde and 
Gharonde Sir, went around convincing people to pay up. At one 
time, the farmers were in short supply of seeds. WALMI suggested 
that they make use of their position as a collective entity and write 
a request for procuring them. 
While CASAD provided much support during the infancy 
phase, it soon withdrew. In most activities, it remained a spectator. 
After the earlier years, there were several occasions when the 
organisation offered advice, but the WUA acted on its own. For 
instance, on one occasion they suggested that the WUA should 
give a higher salary to the Secretary; the WUA refused, feeling that 
this may not be sustainable in the long run. After one year o f 
formation, CASAD asked the WUA members if they wanted the 
distribution to continue, or they wanted it handed back to the 
Irrigation Department. The members felt that they were better off 
and did not wish the management to be returned to the hands of 
the Irrigation Department. 
Soon the WUA began diversifying in other areas. Its General 
Body Meetings became a forum for discussing better crop 
management practices, water saving techniques and other problems 
of farmers. It also received support from other organisations. 
CADA, the Command Area Development Authority, organised a 
special visit of about 50 farmers from the minor to WALMI, 
Aurangabad, to the Agriculture University, Rahuri and to other 
projects, to educate them on better water management, new 
varieties of crops, farming practices and drip and sprinkler 
irrigation. WALMI, The Water and Land Management Institute, 
Aurangabad took a keen interest in the experiment and sent their 
teams of trainees for studies o f farmer managed systems and 
organised special training of farmers from the minor. The faculty 
of WALMI visited the area and also gave suggestions to the WUA 
members on several occasions. The Secretary and Paatkari of the 
water users association received training at WALMI. 
Being the first of its kind, the Lakshmi Narayan Water Users 
Association became a showpiece. WALMI gave the WUA a base to 
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The management shuffle 
The next major turning point in the history of the WUA came 
about in the elections to the WUA in 1995, when a new 
management body headed by KC Pehre came into power. On the 
new Committee was Changdeo Gaekwad, a former Sarpanch of the 
Gowda village and a member of the Board of the Shree Ganesh 
Society. He is an affiliate of the Bharatiya Janata Party. Also present 
on the board now was N A Punde, the brother of GA Punde. 
There were several factors behind the management shuffle of 
1995. First, Gharonde Sir was essentially a schoolteacher and that 
took up most of his time. Further, many farmers felt that he used 
the WUA as a base for self-propagation. Apparendy, his 
participation in several conferences and forums reduced his 
availabüity to the WUA. At the same time, the limelight that he and 
Punde received aroused the envy of others and made a position on 
the Governing Board more attractive to them. 
Other close observers of the WUA felt that Gharonde Sir did 
not believe in teamwork. He gave all credit to himself and to 
Punde. This was also my impression of him and became evident in 
the manner in which he described his association with the WUA 
and with Punde, whenever I spoke to him about the WUA. When I 
asked him if he would contest the next elections to the WUA, he 
refused vehementiy and asserted arrogantly .."I will not contest the 
elections, but if all the members appealed to me to take over the 
management o f the WUA, only then would I do so." Gharonde Sir 
resented the loss of his authority as the leader of the WUA. GA 
Punde, on the other hand, said that he was now too old to contest 
elections, but would be happy to train farmers. 
expose itself. Gharonde Sir and GA Punde became invited 
speakers. Gharonde Sir, in particular, became used to speaking to 
audiences with thunderous applause and standing ovations. The 
WUA started drawing the attention of visitors from far and wide. 
Soon within the first one and a half year o f its formation, there 
were about 50 distinguished visitors. In January 1999, when I made 
my first visit to the water users association, it had already had about 
350 visitors. On the last day of my association with the WUA, I 
learnt that an international delegation was visiting it to learn how it 
managed water. 
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Some WUA members felt that Gharonde Sir and G A Punde 
tried to drive the WUA at a level that not all could keep pace with. 
Gharonde Sir and Punde tended to be forceful and rigid about 
their ideas and tried to impose them upon other members. The 
members, on the other hand, wanted a more down to earth, simple 
leadership. For most farmer members, my impression is that they 
basically want a mechanism that delivers them water when they 
need it; it does not matter who comprise their governance 
structure. 2 0 
A third and perhaps more subde reason was a purely political 
one. Both K C Pehre and Changdeo Gaekwad are affiliates o f the 
Bharatiya Janata Party, while Gharonde Sir and Punde were 
supporters of the Congress Party. In fact, G A Punde, as noted 
earlier, was a political worker from the Congress Party. 1995 was 
the time when the BJP-Shiv Sena coalition came into power at the 
state government level in Maharashtra. The third factor behind the 
management shuffle was an expression of the changed political 
configuration at the higher levels of the adrninistrative hierarchy. 
My understanding was that this was initiated from the higher levels 
of the bureaucracy. Gharonde Sir, in my interviews with him, often 
hinted that the Co-operatives Department did some political 
manipulation. Though initially this was just a hunch, it got 
confirmed later through my interviews with him and with the other 
members of the WUA. Many observers of the WUA expressed the 
view that state level politics had a direct bearing on district and 
village level politics. Further, that politically influential people used 
WUAs to add another feather in their cap. 
While Gharonde Sir and GA Punde provided the initial thrust 
and leadership, this could not be sustained over into the long term. 
GA Punde, with his strong sense of socialist ideals, could not drive 
all the members along with him. Some present members actually 
viewed him with disgust. I was often surprised with this, 
considering the role that he and Gharonde Sir had played in 
organising the management turnover and improving the water 
distribution process. After enjoying the status of the co-promoter 
of the WUA, he probably tried to control the water users 
association; but he did not receive the support o f the other 
members. 
This committee worked on till 1999, when K C Pehre resigned 
and asked Changdeo Gaekwad to take over. K C Pehre was unable 
to give time to the affairs of the water users association. Sharad 
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Current Status 
A few observations can be made about the composition of the 
present Executive Committee (see Box 4.4). Firstly, they hail 
mainly from the dominant/upper castes (Dahatonde, Jawle, and 
Shelke from Gowda village and Ukeerde from Hastinapur). 
Secondly, they are people who have served in positions of power 
and prestige in the village society (former Sarpanches, or members 
o f the Executive Committee of the other important local bodies 
and co-operatives). Two of them, namely, Changdeo Gaekwad and 
K C Pehre, have political affiliations. 
Thus, the governance structure of the water users association is 
dominated and controlled by the village elite. There can be two 
possible explanations of this. The first is that they seek to 
consolidate their power and position through interlocking 
leaderships that give them clout and position. The second is that 
people wish to be led by those who already have demonstrated 
their leadership experience. The explanation, perhaps, lies in both 
factors. Besides, all o f the WUA position holders are large 
employers of agricultural labour. Many of the WUA members work 
on the fields of the WUA position holders. Patterns of power 
relations as captured by relationships of domination and 
subordination in the agrarian structure and the village society also 
find expression in the constitution of the Executive body. 
It is interesting to note that the present chairman has a very 
small size of land holding that is irrigated from this minor. Most of 
his land is located on another minor.2 1 His motivation as a WUA 
chairman is not so much to use his position to be able to irrigate 
more effectively. His motivation as a WUA leader is to use it as 
platform to consolidate his political position. 
There is a strong rift between the present management and the 
earlier one. Gharonde Sir and G A Punde both are critical of the 
management.2 2 There is also a small segment of members that feel 
Rao Dahatonde took over as the Vice Chairman. Among the 
present members, both Gaekwad and Pehre have a political 
affiliation. They are affiliated with the BJP. At present they provide 
most time to the activities of the WUA. They attend to visitors, 
entertain correspondence, and chair the meetings of the Executive 
Committee. 
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BOX 4.4 Profile of the Members of the Executive Committee of the 
Lakshmi Narayan WUA 
Changdeo Gaekwad, the present Chairman, has 0.9 hectares served by 
the minor. He was earlier on the Gram Panchayat and the Gram Vikas 
Samiti. He is an affiliate of the BJP. Ukeerde has 2.8 ha served by the 
minor. He is from Hastinapur village. He was a former Sarpanch and 
on the Gram Vikas samiti. K C Pehre has 1.4 hectares served by the 
minor. He was the vice-Chairman on the first committee and the 
chairman on the second committee till 1999. He is an affiliate of the 
BJP and contested the village Panchayat elections in 2000. Earlier on, 
he was on the board of the Shree Ganesh Society, the Vardaan society 
and the sugarcane cooperative society. Sumanbai Shelke has 1.3 ha 
served by the minor. She is the female representative. She represents 
women on other village and district level bodies. NA Punde has 3 
hectares served by the minor. He is known to be a hardworking and 
innovative farmer. Sharad Rao Dahatonde has 1.56 ha served by the 
minor. Dhonde has 0.34 hectares served by the minor and represents 
the backward classes. R B Dahatonde and G Y Jawle are the other 
members of the Executive Committee. 
There is some sense of complacency in the water users 
association as well as the Irrigation Department, that have become 
used to entertaining visitors and projecting the association as the 
"best water distribution society in the region". Firsdy, the 
association does not charge the farmers (both members and non-
members) for groundwater because it would displease them and 
cause them to resent a perceived injustice. It is clear that well 
owners derive this water through seepage and percolation from the 
canal. In contrast, the WUA at Ozhar, which came up after the 
Gowda experiment does charge the members for groundwater, 
since most o f the availability of ground water in the region is 
that the water users association has lost some of its initial vigour 
and robustness, largely because the earlier drive and leadership is 
absent. There is a section of the WUA membership that believes 
that the position holders of the WUA should not be elected. The 
management o f water is a technical and specialised activity that 
should remain the domain of those who have the expertise. This 
segment believed that the earlier leadership, with GA Shettye, who 
had technical expertise since he had worked as a contractor in the 
Irrigation Department, was much more robust. 
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Operational implications of management turnover 
Having described the institutional history of the WUA, I focus 
more specifically on the impact o f management turnover. As 
through the recharge through percolation from canal water. At 
Ozhar, too, when this was done, it was a difficult task, and it 
required concerted and persistent efforts on part of the leadership. 
Secondly, some close observers of the WUA feel that the 
WUA is not experimenting with increasing agricultural 
productivity, taking on new varieties of seeds, and other activities 
as it did in its earlier years. In contrast, Ozhar, which came up after 
being inspired by the success of the Lakshmi Narayan Water Users 
Association, is much more innovative. Thirdly, their recoveries are 
on the lower side. While they pay to the Irrigation Department 
100% of the dues, internally they are able to recover only about 65-
7 0 % . 2 3 However, the WUA is negotiating with the NABARD 
(National Bank for Agricultural and Rural Development) that is 
proposing some support for the introduction of drip irrigation 
systems; the exact form of support is still to be finalised. They also 
wish to move into a new office shortly. 
The analysis of the institutional history of this WUA sheds 
some light on the role of WUA leaders and facilitators as 
intermediaries between the farmers and the bureaucracy. While 
N G O s do have specific strengths in this role, it is necessary for 
them to identify the extent to which they would support a local 
level initiative. It is one thing for the N G O to help an organisation 
as this one in its infancy, and yet another thing to extend support 
to it indefinitely. In this case, the N G O withdrew after support in 
the infancy of the WUA, and the WUA had robust leadership 
internally to sustain it further. At present, this WUA turns to the 
N G O only periodically for advice. However, my understanding was 
that while the initial leadership under Gharonde Sir and Punde was 
dynamic, the present leadership lacked that sense o f vision and 
dynamism. My own assessment was that the loss of the initial 
vigour and robustness of the WUA was largely attributable to the 
change of leadership. While charismatic leadership can impart a 
resource user organisation its vigour, it makes it vulnerable when 
the WUA depends entirely on it for its sustenance, as happened in 
this case. 
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explained in chapter 2, the water distribution system in 
Maharashtra is shejpali. It is designed to be a partially demand 
driven system, where farmers make an application indicating the 
area and the crops that they wish to irrigate. At the same time, for 
these benefits to be realised, certain operational requirements of 
this system need to be fulfilled. These requirements are as follows. 
On the Mula Minor No. X WUA, water flows from the head -
regulator at the head of the Minor through a pipe oudet (Picture 
It is a gated pipe oudet, with a pipe o f a diameter of 1.5 feet. It 
has a screw type gate, located on the upstream side, that has to be 
rotated to lift the gate in order to release water from the canal into 
the minor (Picture 4.2). 
PICTURE 4.1 Pipe outlet at the head of the Minor No. X 
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Then, there are 13 gated pipe oudets along the minor, oyer a 
length of 2.2 kms (Picture 4.3). These are pipe oudets with shutter 
type gates that are located on the upstream side. The diameter of 
the pipes is 30 cms. Each of these gates has to be lifted to release 
water from the minor into the watercourse. Thus, for the water 
distribution function to be performed, this apparatus has to be 
operated. The head-regulator has to be operated to release water 
into the minor and each of the gated pipe oudets has to be 
operated to release water into the watercourses. 
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PICTURE 4.3 Gated pipe outlets along the Mula Minor No. X 
As noted in chapter 2, an operational implication of the water 
distribution process arises from the characteristics of the gated pipe 
PICTURE 4.2 Screw-type gate of the outlet at the head of the 
Minor No. X 
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outlets along the minor from which water is released into the 
watercourses. Hydraulically, these oudets are non-modular 
structures (Bolding, Mollinga and Straaten 1995; WALMI 1998a). 
This imphes that the discharge depends both on the upstream and 
the downstream water levels. A stable supply through the oudet 
requires continuous adjustment of the gate opening and each 
structure needs individual calibration. Along the minor, since all 
oudets do not run simultaneously, it causes water levels in the 
minor to fluctuate considerably. This requires constant adjusting of 
gates and measurements to ensure that 1 cusec water flows through 
the pipe oudets. In the case o f this WUA, this task is accomplished 
by mstalling a Parshall flume on the downstream side o f the 
oudets; a red mark put on the Parshall flume serves as a benchmark 
to ensure that a stable supply of 1 cusec is maintained through the 
oudets. 
Before the formation of the water users association, the 
employees of the Irrigation Department operated the gate at the 
head of the minor as well as the gates along the minor. This system 
had several drawbacks. Firsdy, there was a high dependence on the 
Irrigation Department to operate the gates. From my interviews 
with the members of the WUA, it seemed almost as i f the gate 
operation depended upon their whims and fancies. As a result, 
water supply was unpredictable and unreliable. Secondly, while it 
conferred control over the outlets with the Irrigation Department, 
it created opportunities for corruption. Several farmers and 
founder members admit that these employees of the Irrigation 
Department had to be bribed to open the gates. " I f you gave 
money to the Paatkari, he would open the gates, if you simply filed 
an application, he would not", as one member explicidy put it. 
This resulted in frequent fights and conflicts among the 
farmers as they were not sure about when the water would be 
released, or whether each farmer would get water as per his 
application. However, there were a few exceptions. Some powerful 
farmers did not face any difficulty in getting water. Among them 
was a founder member who openly admits that because of his 
position and status in the village, the Paatkari and Canal Inspector 
never gave liim any trouble getting water. 
With the formation of the WUA, a number of changes have 
taken place. Firstly, there is a contract between the Irrigation 
Department and the farmers. As noted in chapter 2, a season-wise 
quota has been fixed for supplying water to the water users 
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association on a volumetric basis; when there is less water in the 
dam, the quota is proportionately cut. The allocation is: 0.434 
million m 3 for kharif cropping season, 1.058 million m 3 for rabi and 
0.283 million m 3 for hot weather.2 4 Thus, the water right o f the 
farmers has acquired a legitimate basis. As one founder member 
said, "as long as there is water in the dam, the farmers on Minor 
No. X have a right to it. This can not be said about the Minor No. 
Y " . 
The WUA pays the Irrigation Department for water on a 
volumetric basis and sells it to the farmers on a crop/area basis. 
The rates that are charged by the Irrigation Department to the 
WUA are Rs 22 per thousand m 3 in kharif, Rs 33 per thousand m 3 
in rabi and Rs 66 per thousand m 3 in hot weather. 2 5 The crop/area 
rates charged by the WUA to the farmers are the same as that 
charged direcdy by the Irrigation Department to farmers at other 
places in the state, barring for sugarcane, in which case the rates are 
fixed by the WUA itself. However, there is some margin that 
allows for financial -viability. A 2 0 % discount is given to the WUA 
for submitting its bills on time and a 5 % discount for early 
payment. For minor repairs, there is an annual grant of Rs 20 per 
hectare. 
Secondly, the operation of the pipe oudets along the minor 
was taken over by the Paatkaris employed by the water users 
association. Thus, control over the operation of these outiets 
moved from the Irrigation Department to the farmers.2 6 Thirdly, 
earlier, the Irrigation Department used to make the water 
distribution schedule on the basis of the applications received. 
Now, this function is performed by the WUA. 2 7 Thus, with the 
formation of the WUA, essential water distribution and 
management functions were "turned over" to the farmers from the 
Irrigation Department. 
Simplified procedures 
As noted earlier, a major benefit of the turnover of the system to 
the farmers has been in terms of the time and effort for making 
applications for water. Earlier, the farmers had to go all the way to 
the office of the Irrigation Sub-Division to file their applications 
for water. This meant not only an involvement of time and effort, 
but also money (they would have to spend on transport). Now, 
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these appHcations are made through the WUA and are submitted 
to the Secretary of the WUA. Thus, now, they deal with the WUA 
inside the village itself. Before the formation of the WUA, the 
Canal Inspector had to deal with every individual farmer to collect 
fees. Now, he deals only with the WUA. For the Irrigation 
Department, as well as for the farmers the task of water fees 
collection has become simpler. For the farmers it has meant greater 
convenience and for the Irrigation Department a lower 
administrative burden. 
Greater control and flexibility 
A major benefit to the farmers in the new situation is that after 
accounting for evaporation losses, the water quota that is saved in 
the rabi season can be used in the hot weather season. During the 
hot weather season, farmers need to irrigate sugarcane and 
groundnut. This facility was not available to the farmers before the 
formation of the water users association.28 
There is another benefit in terms of flexibiHty. The same quota 
o f water can be taken in two rotations instead of one. When a 
farmer has already taken water in one rotation, he can still apply for 
another, if need be, at the end of the rotation, by paying a 
surcharge of Rs 30 per acre. This facility, again, did not exist before 
the water users association was formed. During the year 
1999-2000, when I was associated with the WUA, there was 1 
rotation in the kharif season, 3 rotations in the rabi season and 2 in 
the hot weather season. During the last kharif irrigation (that took 
place in August 2000), some farmers had to take water a second 
time for irrigating millets. This would have been difficult without 
the WUA since they would have had to make several rounds of the 
office of the Irrigation Department. 
Farmers' perceptions 
The bargaining power of the farmers increased with the formation 
of the WUA. It has meant an assured supply of water in terms of 
the contract with the Irrigation Department, and within that, 
greater control and flexibility. The expressions that farmers use to 
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Operation and processes o f the WUA 
The water users association is run by a Secretary and two 
watermen, both employed by the Association. The Secretary 
liaisons with the Irrigation Department, invites and receives water 
applications and manages the collection of irrigation fees by the 
farmers. The Paatkaris prepare the water distribution schedule and 
monitor and supervise the water distribution process. 
There is an Annual General Body Meeting and a monthly 
meeting of the Executive Committee. The latter provides a forum 
to discuss essential issues, approve budgets and expenditure and 
discuss proposals among members (See Box 4.5). Present in the 
meeting are the office bearers and the Board members. Though 
officially it is open only to the members of the Executive 
Committee, many other members walk in to lodge complaints or 
discuss proposals. 
describe benefits from WUA formation are "assured and 
guaranteed water supply " and "regular water supply". 2 9 These are 
powerful expressions that convey farmers' perceptions of the 
benefits o f forming the water users association. Earlier, there was 
no surety about when the farmers would get water. Since now there 
is greater surety about when the farmers would get water, they are 
able to match the cropping schedule with the water supply. 
Another common perspective among farmers is presented thus: 
"now that we know for sure that we will get water, why should we 
fight amongst ourselves ?" 
Thus, what happened with the formation of the WUA is that 
control over the outlets and regulating devices shifted from the 
Irrigation Department to the members of the water users 
association. In this case, there actually occurred a shift in who 
controlled and operated the technology for water distribution. It 
was put very effectively in the words of a founder member who 
said " we only wanted to be the people who would lift the gates". 
3 0Another senior member echoed the same sentiment when he said, 
"Earlier the gates used to be operated by the Irrigation 
Department.. Now our own self-appointed people do so... this 
makes a lot of difference.." he further went on saying .. "now we fix 
the water rates., this is also a big achievement for us." 
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BOX 4.5 Monthly meeting of the Executive Committee of the 
Lakshmi Narayan WUA 
29/11/00 
I reached the office of the WUA at about 10.15 a.m. There were still 
no signs of the meeting. Thitte, the Paatkari, was there and so was a 
dark, fat and heavy man by the name of Sunaone. I started chatting 
with him. 
Ukeerde, a former Sarpanch and the representative of the Rastapur 
village in the Executive Committee, arrived around 10.35 a.m. He had 
this silent air of authority about him, and looked very composed. He 
came and sat on the bed to my left. At 10.45 p.m. arrived Punde, 
another Executive Committee member and the brother of G A 
Punde, one of the founder members of the association. At 11 p.m. 
came Gaekwad, the Chairman, and Dahatonde, the vice Chairman. 
They sat on the seats that were facing me, next to each other. 
Gaekwad was a former Sarpanch of the village, and sat with a cold 
attitude of indifference, as if whatever happened did not really matter 
to him, but he was there for the people. 
They started sharing some light jokes. Most of the conversations took 
place between Punde and Dahatonde. They were soon joined in the 
meeting and in the conversations by Jawle, another executive 
committee member. Meanwhile, a farmer who had just walked in and 
sat on the comer seat facing me started complaining that some users 
of bawdi water were emptying the water from their fields on the 
minor and needed to be stopped from doing so. Sunaone, who was 
sitting right next to me, started getting up to make an exit, but was 
urged by Gaekwad and Dahatonde to keep sitting. "Where are you 
going ? The meeting has just started; keep sitting", he said. 
Punde, Dahatonde and the farmers kept talking; while Gaekwad 
browsed through the newspaper casually. He was, most of the time, 
indifferent, listening gently to what the others were saying, at other 
times, just nodding his head. At 11.30 we were still waiting for the 
Secretary. At this point, arrived the husband of Suman Bai; Suman Bai 
is the female representative on the Executive Committee. Ever since 
the reservation policy for women has been introduced, this seat had 
been reserved for a woman. Suman Bai exercised her right by 
nominating her husband to attend on her behalf (H). 
At this point entered Dhonde, the representative of the backward 
classes and came and sat in a comer, a position that was 
inconspicuous by its very location. He was accompanied by Pehre, the 
former chairman, and they both sat rather quiedy. At 11.30 arrived 
Veerkar, the Secretary; he came and sat in his office seat. Suman Bai's 
husband shared a light joke; Gaekwad only participated by sharing in 
the jokes. Veerkar did not speak in the meeting; but was only making 
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(Box 4.5 continued) 
minutes of the proceedings. In the meanwhile, Punde left the 
meeting because he had some urgent work. 
The first proposal that was discussed in the meeting was that of a 
water theft. Gharonde Guru, Gharonde Sir's brother, had taken 
water for irrigating .5 acres of groundnut without applying for it. 
He was charged a double rate, as the norm is. He said that he would 
pay the fine and that was not really the issue but he had actually not 
committed the water theft. But the others present in the meeting said 
that he had actually taken water and the members as well as the 
Paatkari had seen him. 
The other issue that was discussed was that some people were 
releasing water from their bawdis into the minor and they had to be 
urged to stop doing so. The Forest Department people have also 
made a proposal that they will plant some trees along the minor for 
3 years and they will then hand them over to the association. These 
trees could be of the choice of the water users association and the 
revenue would go to the water users association. 
At this point, tea arrived and was served to all who were present. I 
was told that Gharonde Guru took water for irrigating groundnut for 
.5 acres of land. We were all offered tea. Veerekar paid for the tea. It 
cost Rs. 21. The Paatkari came in and wiped off the floor for the tea 
that had fallen on the ground. 
The Secretary then presented the expenditure proposals that had to 
be approved of. Rs 11, 200 had been spent on repairing the minor. 
Rs 1300 were incurred on the Annual General Meeting and this 
proposal also had to be passed. Throughout the meeting Dhonde 
kept sitting quiedy. His presence was conspicuous by his silence. 
Dahatonde, Suman Bai's husband, and Jawle did most of the talking. 
I turned my eyes towards Gaekwad and found him swinging his key 
chain in the air in a circular motion. 
The following proposals were passed (Veerkar made the minutes and 
the register was circulated and signed by all those who were present): 
1. Gharonde guru would be fined for taking water out of his turn. 
He would pay double the rate for irrigating one acre of 
groundnut 
2. those who were emptying water from their fields into the minor 
will be asked not to do so 
3. an application will be made to the Irrigation Department for 
allowing the Forest Department to plant trees along the minor. 
Gaekwad lit a cigarette and walked out; he then came in and browsed 
the newspaper. Members exchanged some light jokes. Veerekar 
asked me my impressions of the meeting and encouraged me to 
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(Box 4.5 continued) 
record them in the visitors' book. The meeting got over by 12. 30 
p.m. and all members made a gradual exit. I got up to interview 
Veerekar about irrigation in the last kharif rotation, since my 
observations had left some questions unanswered. 
Source: field notes 
Conclusion 
T o summarise, in the case o f the Lakshmi Narayan WUA, the 
formation of the WUA created an institution that better matched 
the operational requirements that the shejpali system imposes, and 
in the process, it improved the farmers' control over water. These 
requirements include making and processing applications for 
irrigation, operating gated pipe oudets and measuring discharges. 
An operational weakness of the system of operating gated pipe 
oudets was overcome by mstelling measuring devices. 
In this case, a transformation of control relations took place 
with WUA formation, that was very close to the original objectives 
o f the initiators of the transformation process and to general 
conceptions of IMT. In terms of water control, a technological and 
institutional change took place, amounting to a change in power, 
and supported by an enabling process and environment. Changes 
took place in how water was managed and distributed. I now 
contrast this case with the Sitapur WUA, where these control 
relations did not undergo a change with the formation of the 
WUA. The effects on water management and distribution 
practices were also limited. 
The Sitapur Water Users Association 
In the Sitapur WUA, WUA formation was not part of the process 
of changing control relations between the users and the 
bureaucracy. There are also no changes in water management 
practices with WUA formation, in contrast to the Lakshmi Narayan 
case discussed above. The Sitapur WUA is formed through a 
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procedure that has little enabling support and environment. 
The Sitapur village 
Sitapur is a small village in Jind District o f Haryana. The village lies 
at the tail of the Sitapur Minor of the Western Yamuna Canal, 
about 16 km from its head. The village has a high school, a school 
for girls, another one till class X , a veterinary hospital, a branch of 
the State Bank of Patiala, and a cable factory. The village has had 
electricity supply since 1976. The present Sarpanch of the village 
comes from the supporting faction of the Lok Dal and O P 
Chautala, the Chief Minister of the state. 
People and society 
The village is inhabited by thirty-six castes. The Jaats, who are 
numerically the largest among them, are the agriculturists. Known 
for their industriousness, they have led Haryana through India's 
green revolution. The Brahmans have traditionally been the priests, 
but also pursue agriculture and have diversified into a wide range of 
services. The Baniyas are the moneylenders, traders and 
businessmen. However, they also pursue agriculture and serve in 
the government and private sectors. A number of smaller 
communities also inhabit the village.31 
The total number of households in the village is 925. O f these, 
95 households belong to the Brahmans, 45 to Chamaar, 45 to 
Dhanak, 4 to Valmeeki, 18 to Nai, 18 to Kumbhaar, 21 to Lohaar, 4 to 
Maniyar, 5 to Sunhaar, 7 to Baniye, 4 to Chimbhi, 26 to Jogi, 32 to 
Khati, and 6 to Jheemvar. The remaining households, about 600, 
belong to the Jaats. 
The Jaats are the most powerful numerically and in social 
status. The Jaats have the most land and are actively engaged in 
farming. About 10% of the land is owned by Brahmans, 85% by 
the Jaats and 5 % by the rest. The society of the Jaats is organised 
into thoias (ancestral family units). The village has 3100 electoral 
votes. 
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Labour and landuse relations 
Apart from private ownership, there are two land use relations 
in agriculture. Under saajedaari (sharecropping), farmer X provides 
land and water and farmer Y provides labour. They share all other 
expenses and share the proceeds of the produce in equal 
proportion. Thekedaari is tenancy. Under this arrangement, the land 
is given out on theka (contract) for one year. The farmer who takes 
the land on theka retains the proceeds of the agricultural produce. 
Labour is employed for a variety of agricultural operations 
mcluding paddy sowing and harvesting, sowing and picking of 
cotton and cutting of sorghum. The terms of employment could be 
contractual, per kila, (acre, or one fourth of a hectare) or on a daily 
wage basis. On a daily wage basis, the rate is about Rs.50 for half a 
day or Rs. 100 for a full day. Sometimes, the rate charged for a full 
day is Rs. 60 per day plus two meals per day. 3 4 
Geographically, agricultural labour comes from within the 
village. It is provided mainly by the Harijans, Chamaars and other 
Cropping practices and irrigation 
According to the records of the Patwaari (village level record 
keeper), the total land in the Sitapur village is 1098 ha. O f this, 942 
ha is cultivable land. 156 ha is non-cultivable. There are two 
cropping seasons; kharif and rabi. October is the month of the 
kharif harvest, while April is the month of the rabi harvest. The 
rabi crops are wheat, channa (chick pea), mustard and burseem and jai 
(fodder crops). The kharif crops are paddy3 2, sugarcane, sorghum, 
millet, tiL udad, moong, arhar and some vegetables.33 Most of the 
land in the village is irrigated from the tail o f the Sitapur minor of 
the Western Yamuna Canal. A part of the land is also served by a 
distributary of the same canal. It is on this part of the land that 
some sugarcane is grown. Another source o f irrigation is 
groundwater. According to the records of the village Patwaari, 
there are 45 tubewells in the village. 
Along the Sitapur Minor, farmers have started growing paddy 
over the last two decades. Thus, the oudets are often manipulated 
to increase discharges for the cultivation of paddy, reducing the 
discharge at the tail-reaches and adversely affecting the availability 
of water to the irrigators in this village. 
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landless. Some small farmers from the Jaat community supplement 
their incomes by working as labourers on the fields of other 
farmers. Some farmers cultivate a portion of their lands on their 
own, and give out the rest on theka or enter into saajedaari 
arrangements. There is also some migratory labour from the East 
Indian state of Bihar. 3 5 Dangosra is a labour use relation in which 
members of one family work on the fields of another family in 
reciprocation.3 6 
TheSitapurWUA 
The Sitapur WUA was formed when some farmers whose land was 
served by the tail of the Sitapur minor approached CADA to get 
their watercourse lined. As explained in chapter 3, in Haryana, 
WUA formation has become a condition for getting a watercourse 
lined. A meeting of all the farmers on the watercourse was called in 
the village high school. There are three pannas (geographical sub-
boundaries) in the village whose land is served by the watercourse. 
From each Panna 2-3 representatives were selected to serve on the 
Executive Committee. 
The association was registered on 17 t h July 1998. It has 90 
members. 3 7 
In the case of the Lakshmi Narayan WUA, the WUA took 
over the essential function of irrigation, namely water distribution. 
So much so that it reflects in the name of the water users 
association in itself. It is called the Lakshmi Narayan Pani Waatap 
Samiti (pani means water and watap is distribution). Thus, the WUA 
is essentially a water distribution organisation. This means that it 
performs an essential function, repeated from one season to 
another and from one year to another. 
In contrast, the Sitapur WUA has very little to do. Unlike the 
Lakshmi Narayan WUA, there is no change in the relative roles of 
the farmers and the Irrigation Department and no role of the WUA 
in system operation. The only function that the WUA performs is 
mamtairiing a lined watercourse. 
All that happened when the WUA was formed was that all 
members whose lands lay along the watercourse paid Rs 50 per 
hectare of land. CADA paid Rs 450 per hectare. This money had 
to be put in a bank and the interest that would accrue on it was to 
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The tail-end problem 
The weak position of the WUA is perpetuated by its location at 
the tail end of the Sitapur minor. The Sitapur village is located at 
the tail o f the Sitapur minor, about 16 km. from its head. It receives 
be used for repairing the watercourse in future. This was a 
condition for getting the watercourse lined. Should there be a need 
for lining or repairing the watercourse, the members of the WUA 
are required to approach CADA. CADA would send their staff to 
assess the situation. Then, CADA would give out the contract for 
the repair work and the members of the WUA would 'supervise' 
the repair work. 
What has essentially happened is that some duties have been 
given to the WUA. However, unlike the case of the Lakshmi 
Narayan WUA, this WUA has no matching rights or powers. The 
perspective o f the Chairman, when I first met him, was apdy put 
forth by him thus: "They have made me the Chairman, but have 
not given me any powers." 
PICTURE 4.4 Open Hume outlet at the tail of the Sitapur Minor 
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BOX 4.6 Interview with Canal Patwaari 
05/05/2000 
I arrived in the office of the Nahari Patwaari. He explained that the tail of 
the Sitapur minor is entitled to 1 foot and 8 inches of water; the village 
does not get its share because the farmers upstream take more than their 
allocation. 
The first reason that the farmers in Sitapur do not get their authorised 
share is that people steal water by installing siphons upstream, on the 
minor. They also increase the discharge (on their fields) in two other 
ways. They lower the crest (base) of the opening of the APM oudets. The 
crest has an iron plate that is 2 " thick. It is broken by a khudali (iron rod). 
This increases the height of the opening. The other way of tampering 
with the oudet is by breaking the brick along the side of the iron cast. 
This is called side bugli. This increases the width of the opening. Both 
these factors enable them to draw more than their authorised share and 
reduce the discharge to the tail reaches. 
There was another reason for the farmers on the Sitapur minor not 
getting their authorised share of water. The Sitapur minor was lined in 
1985. When this happened, there appeared an imbalance in the surface of 
the minor. 
He went on to explain that at the head of the Sitapur minor there is not 
a gate but what is called a kadhi system. This is a block of logs of wood. 
These logs are placed to accommodate the desired discharge.... 
Source: field notes 
The authorised share at the tail of the Sitapur minor is 1 foot 
and 8 inches of water. Through the period that I was associated 
with it, it never crossed a level of 1 foot, barring a short period of 
one week during the monsoon rains in the month of July (July 28, 
2000). I present below some measurements of the level o f water 
that I took during different periods of my association with the 
water from an open-flume outlet (picture 4.4). It suffers from the 
typical tail-end problem. The members o f the WUA do not receive 
their authorised share o f water because farmers upstream along the 
minor take more than their authorised entidement. 
Along the minor, there are 23 oudets (21 of the Adjustable 
Proportionate Module type and 2 pipe oudets). It is a common 
practice along the minor for farmers to draw more than their 
authorised share by inserting siphons or by breaking the oudets, 
reducing the supply to the tail reaches (Box 4.6). 
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BOX 4. 7 Visit to the head of the Sitapur Minor 
2/10/00 
I arrived at the head of the Sitapur minor. In contrast to the short, 
stunted growth of paddy and jowar in the Sitapur village, there was dense, 
tall growth of paddy, here. There were some small tracts of land near the 
canal that had a stunted, scattered growth of paddy. I was told that this 
land had become unproductive because of overirrigation near the canal. 
The gauge along the distributary showed a reading of 4 feet 8'. The 
gauge reader said that at the moment, at the head of the Sitapur minor, 
they had installed 8 kadhis. The gauge reading at the minor itself could 
not be made, since the gauge was immersed inside the water flowing 
through the minor. The flow of water from over the stop logs produced a 
gushing sound. Along the minor I could see a dense growth of weeds. 
The beldaar said that at the tail of the minor, water was only about 5 
inches. It did not reach the tail because there was a dense growth of 
adanga (weeds) all along. He said that this was the saved water that had 
been released. It would run like this till Friday. The minor depth was 5 
feet 5'.. 
Before I started to leave, I asked him what he was doing. He was cleaning 
the adanga along the distributary. I asked him if he would also clean the 
adanga on the minor, since he himself had pointed out that that was 
disrupting the supply to the Sitapur village; he said, he would, but only 
when instructed by the JE. So far he had received no such instructions... 
Source: field notes 
On April 16, 2000, when I arrived in the Sitapur village, I 
learnt that a group of village folk had gone up the minor to ask the 
beldaar to release more water. The water supply at the tail of the 
minor was only 1 foot. There was an acute scarcity of water and 
Sitapur WUA. I confirmed through several interviews with the 
farmers and the Irrigation Department that this is indeed the usual 
trend for the rest of the year as well. 
Date Actual Discharge 
March 16,2000 8 inches (rabi season) 
April 16, 2000 1 foot (end of rabi) 
July 29, 2000 2 feet (Kharif- the monsoon period) 
October 3, 2000 6 inches (between kharif and rabi) 
The problem is compounded in the months of September and 
October when the flow of water is reduced because of the dense 
growth of weeds and the heavy occurrence of silt along the minor 
(See Box 4.7). 
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the farmers complained that their johads (village ponds) were dry 
and livestock was dying. I learnt that at that point of time, farmers 
had inserted siphons at four places along the minor. This had 
disrupted the supply of water to the village. There was some 
negotiation with the Regulation Beldaar who relented to remove 
one more kadhi; this released enough water to fill one johad. 
The farmers in Sitapur village also turn to different levels of 
administrative and political authority to justify their claim over 
water, though, with littie sustained corrective response. They have 
written and sent petitions to the SDO, X E N and J E (position 
holders in the Irrigation Department). They have also made 
representations to the present and previous Chief Ministers of the 
state. In September 2000, the Chief Minister of Haryana, O P 
Chautala, was passing by the village on one of his "sarkaar aap ke 
dwaar " (government at your door-step) programme tours. A large 
group of farmers assembled along the minor to stop his fleet of 
cars and to draw their attention. The usual response of the farmers 
to how effective this strategy is thus:" for some days, water flows as 
per the desired standard, then it is back to normal". 
Another manner of intervention is that the farmers of the 
village go up along the minor to clear it of weeds. During the 
monsoons, there is a tendency for a strong growth of weeds and 
accumulation of silt along the minor. In the first week of October 
2000, the irrigators went up the minor, to a distance of about 2 
km., to clear it of weeds, to marginally improve the prospects of 
water. None of the measures described above, however, provide a 
sustained corrective response. 
There is yet another angle to this lop-sided equation between 
CADA/Irrigation Department and the WUA members. There is a 
portion of the watercourse that has still to be lined. This is the last, 
tail-end portion. The WUA has been trying to get the watercourse 
lined, but to no avail. Excerpts from my interview with the 
Secretary of the WUA reproduced below (Box 4.8) narrate the 
story. 
The Sitapur WUA was formed simply as a vehicle for project 
implementation, i.e. WUAs are seen as an agent to secure CADA's 
policy goal o f watercourse lining. Unlike the case of the Lakshmi 
Narayan WUA, there is no attempt at changing control relations 
between the users and the bureaucracy. The WUA has been given 
some functions to perform but there are no real powers; there is no 
shift in control relations between the users and the bureaucracy. 
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BOX 4.8 Interview with the Secretary of the Sitapur WUA 
2/11/00 
I entered the house of Mahaveer's cousin. It was a large, old, pucka 
house, very typical of Jaat houses in Sitapur, with a large, wooden 
door and a roof of sal wood. There were four cots spread out across 
the ground, and it must have been a meeting place for exchanging 
conversation and playing cards as well, very much like Mahaveer's 
own house. At the point that I entered, Mahaveer's father was 
smoking his hookka (community pipe), as the usual pastime is, along 
with four other eldedy men. I introduced myself to him. His name 
was Meeru. 
After describing the formation of the WUA, he added that most of 
the watercourse had been lined in the first go when the water users 
association was formed. In the next round another few metres were 
lined. For the lining of the last portion, the four position holders of 
the WUA (chairman, vice-chairman, Secretary, Treasurer) went to 
Jind along with some others. The SE, CADA, Jind recommended it 
to the Chief in Chandigarh; this was done within 6 months of the 
second round of lining. The Chief Engineer, CADA sanctioned it. 
After that, however, he retired. Then after this, the new Chief came. 
He put a stay order and refused on grounds that there was a shortage 
of funds. 
I asked him if they had enough resources to do the watercourse lining 
on their own. Mahaveer said ". . . CADA gives a grant that can not be 
withdrawn for 5 years. There is only some interest on it that is about 
Rs 2000-3000 and rather inadequate to meet any working expenses. 
There could be a provision for us to raise some other resources by 
levying a fee on all the farmers. That can be a good resource base. 
(right now)we can repair the watercourse only through the 
permission of CADA, by writing to them. We can not act on our 
own, you see..." 
Source: field notes 
Thus, left without an independent resource base and with litde 
powers, the Sitapur WUA is little more than an arm of the 
bureaucracy, carrying out the functions handed out to it, without 
any real control or powers. Neither is there control over the 
resource (water), nor an independent resource base to carry out the 
functions assigned to it. A farmer whose land lies at the tail o f the 
watercourse put it thus... "saahab (sir), they took money from me 
for lining the watercourse., but my portion of the land is still 
unlined.. my land is right at the fag end of the watercourse, and 
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very little water reaches there anyway., the cornrnittee members say 
that CADA can not get that segment of the watercourse lined.. 
committee they have formed .. but who listens to us anyway ?" 
Assessment and Comparison 
The point raised by Wade and Chambers (1980) about managing 
"the blind spot" is particularly relevant in the case o f the Sitapur 
WUA. Technical and institutional reform below the oudet is 
meaningless in the absence of effective management of the main 
system, when there are water thefts along the minor. Forming 
WUAs in a desperate bid to replicate small-scale community 
irrigation systems is futile unless there is control over the main 
system and a balance between the rights and obligations o f the 
Water Users Associations is struck.38 
Effects of WUA formation on water management and distribution 
practices 
I now show that the effects of WUA formation on water 
management and distribution practices were also different in the 
two cases, and that this difference relates to the different 
technologies for water distribution. As different technologies for 
water distribution, these systems have a different potential for 
reform through WUA formation. In the warabandi system of water 
distribution, the effects of WUA formation on water management 
and distribution are likely to be very limited, as compared to the 
shejpali system. In the table below, I trace the specific water 
management practices and whether they did or did not change after 
the formation of the WUA in the two cases. 
The table demonstrates that the effects o f WUA formation are 
much more significant in the case of the Lakshmi Narayan WUA. 
This difference, in turn, relates to the different technology for 
water distribution. Shejpali has a stronger potential for reform 
through WUA formation than does the warabandi system. The 
practice o f shejpali requires a number of different procedures to be 
performed at the irrigators' level, ranging from sanctioning and 
processing of applications to the operation of gated pipe oudets 
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Table 4.2 Effects of WUA formation: Lakshmi Narayan and Sitapur 
WUAs 
Function Lakshmi Narayan WUA 
in the shejpali system of 
water distribution in 
Maharashtra 
Sitapur WUA in the 
warabandi system of Hary ana 
, Maintaining 
watercourse 
and field 
channels 
Fee fixation 
and collection 
Operation of 
the head-
regulator 
Operation of 
oudets 
Water 
distribution 
process 
Maintenance 
of the minor 
Role of WUA 
Earlier watercourses were 
maintained by farmers, 
now by the WUA 
Earlier the Irrigation 
Department collected from 
individual farmers; now, 
the WUA collects and 
hands over to the Irrigation 
Department. The WUA 
also fixes the fees that it 
charges from the farmers 
Performed by the Canal 
Inspector (Irrigation 
Department), but on the 
request of the Secretary of 
the Water Users 
Association in accordance 
with the water delivery 
schedule prepared by the 
WUA 
Switch from Paatkari of the 
Irrigation Department to 
the Paatkaris employed by 
the WUA 
Earlier, managed and 
inspected by the Irrigation 
Department; now, by the 
Water Users Association 
Earlier carried out by the 
Irrigation Department. 
Now, it is the prerogative 
of the Water Users 
Association. 
Overall management of 
water distribution process 
including filing 
applications, collecting and 
paying dues, and 
supervising water 
distribution 
No change. Even after the 
formation of the WUA, this 
task is carried out by farmers 
No change; the task is carried 
out by the Lumbardaar (an 
employee of the District 
Administration) 
Not applicable. But the 
overall operation of the 
system does not change. It is 
handled still by the Irrigation 
Department 
Not applicable. But the 
overall operation of the 
system still remains with the 
Irrigation department 
No change. Carried out by the 
warabandi process 
No change. It is the 
responsibility of the Irrigation 
Department. However, some 
times farmers go up the 
minor to clean it of silt and 
weeds 
Maintaining a lined 
watercourse 
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Function Lakshmi Narayan WUA 
in the shejpali system of 
water distribution in 
Maharashtra 
Sitapur WUA in the 
warabandi system of Hary ana 
Overall extent High Negligible 
of change in 
water 
distribution 
and 
management 
practices after 
turnover 
and measurement o f discharges. There is a potential for turning 
over these functions to farmers. 
This scope is limited, or in fact, absent in the warabandi cases. 
Introduction of volumetric measurement in the warabandi system, 
while technically possible, would question the whole design 
principle of it, namely, that of proportional division. This type of 
measurement would not match the way water rights have been 
defined in this system, while in Maharashtra volumetric definition 
of rights at the system level is consistent with volumetric 
measurement. 
As different technologies for water distribution, these systems 
place different requirements for the organisational structure needed 
for their operation. A consideration of the technology or the design 
of canal irrigation and its operational and managerial implications 
should serve as a starting point for debates on Irrigation 
Management Transfer and on WUA formation. Policy makers 
contemplating WUA establishment should address themselves to 
this question: what is it that can be changed by WUA formation, 
and what do we want farmers to do by forming WUAs? 
In India, irrigation reform has come to be equated with WUA 
establishment. This analysis and comparison suggests that there is a 
need to look further than this: under what conditions can WUA 
establishment be designed as a strategy for reform? As noted 
above, in shejpali, WUA establishment can be equated more closely 
with irrigation reform. In warabandi, WUA establishment can 
hardly be seen as an irrigation reform strategy. 
In both the cases of Haryana and Maharashtra, much has been 
written about 'TIM". 3 9 In both these states, efforts at WUA formation 
are conveniendy clubbed under the tide of TIM". It is important, 
however, to distinguish between WUA establishment that is carried 
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out primarily from an instrumental perspective, and WUA 
establishment that seeks to actually change control relations between 
the farmers and the bureaucracy, and to that effect bring about a 
"turnover" of control, in its technical, social and managerial 
climensions. 
Another critical difference between these two WUAs was in terms 
of the process followed for WUA establishment and the enabling and 
environment that facilitated the process. The Lakshmi Narayan WUA 
was formed through a more systematic process of convincing the 
irrigators of the benefits of WUA formation and a step by step process 
of effecting turnover. In the process and in its operations, it received 
the support of not only the NGO that was associated with its 
formation, but also from other organisations in the state, notably 
CADA and WALMI. Thus, it operated in much more of an enabling 
and facihtating environment than did the Sitapur WUA. The Sitapur 
WUA, on the other hand, was formed through a haphazard 
bureaucratic procedure with little enabling support or a facilitating 
environment. 
Finally, the analysis of the Lakshmi Narayan WUA offers some 
insights into the temporal dimension of organisational dynamics. 
As organisations, WUAs could pass through phases of high and 
low performance. This is shaped in large part by the support that 
they are able to receive from the external environment as well as by 
the nature and character of their own leadership. A critical factor, 
in such a situation, that shapes institutional robustness is the extent 
to which a WUA can stand up on its own once external support is 
withdrawn. The Lakshmi Narayan WUA drew some of that 
strength from its charismatic leadership in the initial years. 
However, it lost some of its initial vigour and reached a plateau 
soon after that. Thus, when a WUA comes up through external 
support, much of its institutional viability is shaped by the extent to 
which its internal leadership can continue to impart that strength 
and vitality, once the external support is withdrawn. 
Notes 
1 This could be contrasted with new institutionalist definitions of self-
govemance that focus on rules for resource appropriation from a 
perspective of sustainability (Ostrom 1990,1992). 
2 The purpose of the village profiles is to provide a description of the 
context in which the WUA is embedded. These become relevant when we 
Does Design Matter? 153 
contextualise the case of this WUA, to examine the factors that helped 
sustain it. This is the theme of chapter 5. However, to avoid duplication, 
the entire case study is presented here. Understanding the village setting is 
also essential for understanding the position, in the village, of the people 
who control the governance structure of the WUA. This will become 
clearer when we leam that position holders in the WUA are the village 
elite, who hold positions in other government bodies at the village level, 
hail from the numerically and socially powerful castes and occupy critical 
positions in village networks. While I provide a complete discussion of 
this WUA in this chapter, the thematic focus of this chapter is the 
changing of control relations between the users and the bureaucracy, for 
which I contrast it with the Sitapur WUA. In the next chapter, I present a 
discussion of the contextual factors-local leadership and domination by 
village elite - when I discuss these issues for the Rampur WUA. 
3 Shivaji is known to be the brave leader of the Maratha Empire, who 
took as his mission the eradication of Muslim rule. He is known for his 
tussle for supremacy with the Mughal Empire in the Deccan and is 
considered a hero of the Marathas all over the state. 
4 There is another oudet located on the Mula Right Bank Canal between 
the two minors that serves some land in the village. 
5 Most of these wells (about 90%) were dug after the Mula Right Bank 
Canal started flowing, that is, after 1975 (Lele and Paul 1994). Before the 
advent of the Mula project, there were only 22 wells. Well digging activity 
got an impetus after 1975, when on the operation of the canal system 
farmers found a considerable ground water recharge. There are now about 
182 wells in the command, a few of them being bore wells. 
6 This is not for a payment. Groundwater sales have not become 
institutionalised. 
7 However, both these arrangements are gradually on the way out. Leasing 
out is no longer considered profitable. 
8 The terms of employment include both daily wage labour as well as 
contractual labour. The wage rate is Rs 35-40 per day for women while for 
men it is Rs 60-70 per day. When the payment is on a daily wage basis, it 
is made for 3-4 days at one go. Labour comes mainly from inside the 
village, but also from the surrounding villages. 
9 As mentioned earlier in the chapter, a large number of other co-
operative entities already exist in the village. 
1 0 As mentioned above, the Shree Ganesh Society is the name of the 
multi-purpose agricultural credit society in the village. 
1 1 See the discussion on the block system in chapter 2. 
1 2 See also the discussion on the policy environment for PIM in 
Maharashtra in Chapter 3. 
1 3 This was voiced to me in many of my interviews with members of the 
catalyst NGO that was involved in establishing this WUA. 
1 4 SOPPECOM (1997) and Lele (2000) note that WUAs that are being 
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formed now still face much the same resistance and procedural delays. 
This is reflective of the (lack of) keenness in the bureaucracy for 
estabUshing WUAs. 
1 5 These quotas, and a comparison with the allocation on the non-
transferred canals, have already been mentioned in chapter 2 (see Box 
2.1). 
1 6 These Paatkaris were hired afresh by the WUA. It was not a case of 
redeployment of Irrigation Department staff. 
1 7 See the discussion on the shejpali system of water distribution in 
chapter 2, as also the implications of the gated pipe outlets. 
1 8 As mentioned earlier, some land served by the minor falls in the 
neighbouring village of Hastinapur. 
1 9 For instance, in the hot weather season of 1990, the quota of water that 
was allocated to the association was exhausted, though one more watering 
was needed for crop maturity (Lele & Paul 1994). The society represented 
the case to the concerned officers and got a good response. 
2 0 1 describe the water distribution process further in chapter 6. 
2 1 See also my observations of his role in the meeting of the Executive 
Committee (Box 4.5) 
2 2 Once while I was waiting for the meeting of the WUA to start, GA 
Punde was passing by on a motorcycle. He stopped to talk to me. I said, 
"will you not come for this meeting?" " I am a Gandhian", he said. 
"When I do not approve of something, I boycott it totally.... This 
chairman., he is an idiot.. ..He does not know how to run a WUA..." 
2 3 The balance is met through the reserve of the water users association. 
2 4 During the year in which I was associated with the WUA, it made a 
requisition for its full quota for each of the seasons and the full quota was 
also released to it. 
2 5 At the time of this research, one US Dollar was equivalent to 
approximately Rs. 48 (48 Indian Rupees). 
2 6 An interesting piece of evidence is that in the Annual Report of the 
Water Users Association, these Paatkaris are listed as sewaks (servants) of 
the association, while the government employees of the Irrigation 
Department are typically called adhikaaris (an adhikaari is a position 
holder or an office bearer). 
2 7 See the process of making and sanctioning water applications in shejpali 
in chapter 2. 
2 8 The WUA has made use of this facility several times in the period of its 
existence (IIM-A/IWMI 1999). 
2 9 As noted earlier, the internal processes of water distribution are 
examined in further detail in chapter 6. 
3 0 This includes the gates along the minor as well as the gates located at 
the head of the minor. The latter are opened by the Canal Inspector 
according to the schedule prepared by the WUA. 
3 1 These include the Teli, Sunaar, Dhobi, Lohaar, Nai, Chamaar, Sutaar, 
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Dhanak and Valmiki. Their roles and occupations are described in greater 
detail in the discussion of the Rampur WUA, where these details are 
much more relevant. 
3 2 There are two varieties-basmati and desi. 
3 3 Very litde cotton is produced in the village. In my interviews with 
farmers, they often complained about the effects of pest invasion and the 
ineffectiveness of pesticides. 
3 4 The cost of labour has risen in recent years. This is cited by many 
farmers as posing a burden and reducing the profitability of agriculture. 
3 5 The Bihari labour is cheaper. For instance, local labour is paid Rs 550 
per acre on a contractual basis for sowing paddy, while the Bihari labour is 
paid Rs 450 per acre. 
3 6 This practice is widely prevalent among families that have good 
relations with each other. It is a sign of friendship and solidarity. Besides, 
it is also a way of saving money. This activity is common during the 
harvest of paddy. 
3 7 All landholders along the watercourse are eligible to be members. 
3 8 See also Hunt (1989), Ambler (1994) and Maloney and Raju (1984). 
3 9 See the discussion in chapter 3. 
5 
Beyond Community 
Demythologising participation in irrigation 
management 
In this chapter, the embedded nature of the process o f local water 
management is examined. I describe the organisational dynamics o f 
the Rampur WUA and how they relate to other aspects o f social 
organisation-the division of society into social units, domination by 
local elite, the reproduction of power relations inside the water 
users association and the embedded nature of conflicts. The 
discussion in this chapter shows that the possibilities o f the 
emergence of collective action in situations of local water 
management are shaped by social relations, especially relations of 
power. The processes of the WUA can be captured by the village 
elite, who can use the WUAs to pursue their own interests and 
agenda. The location of WUA leaders in village networks that 
allocate resources and inputs can enable them to evade 
accountability to their members. 
In the later part of this chapter, I revert to a discussion of the 
Lakshmi Narayan WUA presented in the previous chapter. I draw 
some conclusions from both these cases about leadership and rule 
implementation and enforcement. I show that rules serve as 
resources that individuals mobilise to accomplish certain objectives. 
The ability of individuals to mobilise rules is shaped by social 
relationships, especially the relations of power. Individuals also 
shop among different forums to settle disputes; here, too, they 
mobilise their networks and social relationships. 
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The Rampur Water Users Association 
Before I present a description of the Rampur WUA, the Rampur 
village is described. This description is essential to understanding 
the broader context in which the WUA was formed, in particular, 
the pattern of social organisation and the village networks that 
allocate resources and inputs. These assume significance later when 
the reproduction of power relations inside the WUA is examined. 
The Rampur village 
Rampur is a village in Rohtak District of Haryana. At the entrance 
o f the village are a huge market and a point where several public 
buses and jeeps start and terminate. A landmark of the village is a 
huge Gumdwara (the house of worship of the Sikhs, a religious 
community). Legend has it that Guru Gobind Singh, a religious 
founder and leader of the Sikhs, visited it about 319 years ago, area 
1700. 
People and settlements 
According to the records of the Patwaari, the total population of 
the village is 10,500. Thirty-six castes inhabit the village. The Jaats, 
who are the strongest numerically and in terms of land-ownership, 
are engaged in farming. The Brahmans, traditionally the priests, 
also pursue agriculture. The Baniyas are engaged in trade and 
business. Brahmans and Baniyas also serve in the government and 
private sectors. A number of smaller communities also inhabit the 
village.1 According to the records of the village Patwaari, the total 
number of households in the village is 1250; there are 700 Jaat 
Houses, 100 Brahman houses, 250 Harijan (a term coined by 
Mahatma Gandhi to describe members of the lower castes such as 
the Valmiki, who engage in menial activities) houses, and 200 
houses belong to the other communities. 
The society of the Jaats is organised into tholas or ancestral 
family units. Several tholas constitute a panna, or settlement, and 
several pannas make up the village. It is believed that the village 
was settled five hundred and nineteen years ago by a person called 
Ram. 2 Ram had three sons; Gangdaas, Kharat and Buddaan. Five 
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sons descended from Gangdaas: Sotraam, Jagde, Fatiye, Kirpa and 
Siddaan. The descendants o f each of them constitute a thola.3 
Gandhre and Rau thola are two other smaller tholas that migrated 
into the village. O f these, Buddaan is numerically the most 
powerful thola, followed by Kharat. The Buddaan thola has about 
700 votes in the village.4 Kharat has 650 votes. Rau have about 250 
votes. Fatiye thola has 200 votes. The Siddaan thola has 150 votes. 
The Gandhre thola has 60 votes. 
The village has several chaupaals. The village chaupaal is a place 
where village get-togethers, functions and ceremonies take place. It 
serves as a place for socialising among men, receiving guests and 
holding the meetings of the statutory (and other) Panchayats. Local 
disputes are often settled in village chaupaals. A Managing 
Committee comprising representatives of the respective tholas 
looks after each chaupaal. The village has a Temple Committee and 
a Gurudwara Committee.5 
Agriculture and cropping practices 
According to the records of the village Patwaari, the total land area 
of the village is 1800 hectares. The cultivated area is 1505 ha. The 
non-cultivated area is 295 ha. All the cultivated land has been 
brought under canal irrigation. 
The average land holding size is 2 kilas (0.8 ha).6 There are two 
cropping seasons; kharif and rabi. October is the month of the 
kharif harvest, while April is the month of the rabi harvest. The 
kharif crops are sugarcane, paddy, sorghum, millet and cotton. The 
rabi crops are wheat, chickpea, mustard, burseem and jai. In 1995, 
Rohtak succumbed to a flood. The cultivation of chickpea has 
come down somewhat after the flood, since it cannot stand excess 
moisture. The cultivation of paddy, on the other hand, increased 
after the flood of 1995. 
As in the case of the Sitapur village, apart from private 
ownership, there are two land use relations in agriculture. Saajedaari 
or sharecropping literally means partnership farming. Under this 
arrangement, one farmer provides land and water and another 
provides labour. All other expenses are borne in the same 
proportion and the proceeds of the produce are also shared in the 
same proportion. Under thekedaari or tenancy, the land is given 
out on theka for one year. The rate varies from Rs 4000 per acre to 
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Rs 10000 per acre annually, depending upon the quality o f land.7 
The farmer who takes the land on theka keeps the proceeds o f the 
agricultural produce. 
Labour relations, markets and inputs 
As in the case of the Sitapur village, labour is employed for a 
variety of agricultural operations. Employment could be 
contractual (per kila), or on the basis of a daily wage. Agricultural 
labour comes mainly from within the village. It is provided 
predorninandy by the Harijans, Chamaars and other landless. Some 
small farmers from the Jaat community supplement their incomes 
by working as wage labourers. Some farmers cultivate a portion of 
their lands on their own, and give out the rest on theka or enter 
into saajedaari arrangements. There is also some migratory labour 
from the East Indian state of Bihar. Dangosra is a labour use 
relation in which members of one family work on the fields of 
another family in reciprocation.8 These labour use relations cut 
across tholas. 
Farmers buy seeds and fertilisers from the shops of private dealers 
near the bus stand on the main road. They take loans for agricultural 
purposes from the local branch of the State Co-operative Bank. There 
is also some informal lending inside the village @ 2-5 % per month. 
The rate of interest in the formal (organised) sector is 1.5% per 
month. Wheat is sold at the Rampur market, while paddy is sold at 
another market in the neighbourhood, about 10 km away. Sugarcane is 
sold at the co-operative sugar mills that are located about 20 km 
away.9 In my interviews with farmers, they often complained of rising 
input prices and falling support prices.10 
Livestock, fodder and fuel 
Buffaloes and goats are the main form of livestock." The main 
sources of fodder for catde are sorghum, burseem and jai. These 
crops are grown on the farmers' fields. Sorghum is predorninandy a 
kharif crop. Burseem and jai are rabi crops. Another source of 
fodder for catde is tuda (residue from the harvest of wheat). Goats 
are reared over the Panchayat land or on the farmers' fields. 
Surplus sorghum over and above the household requirements is 
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sold. The rate varies from Rs 30 to 40 per murla (1 murla is 16.5 
feet x 16.5 feet). The buyers are those who do not have much 
land, or enough of it to grow sorghum. Among them are some 
Jaats and members of the Harijan community. These Harijans 
depend on the Jaats for their supply of fodder as well as fuel wood 
and work on their fields.1 2 
The main sources of domestic fuel are 
(1) cotton harvest residue 
(2) LPG (Liquefied Petroleum Gas) cylinders 
(3) the dried branches of trees grown on the fields: Safeda, 
Kikarznd Shisam. These give yield through the year and 
(4) dung cakes made from cow dung in the winter season and 
kept and used for the rest of the year.1 3 
Sources of water and irrigation 
For irrigation, farmers rely mainly on canal water. Canal water is 
preferred over groundwater because (1) the latter is saline and (2) 
canal water is cheaper. There are five canal outiets serving the 
village, all from a distributary branch of the Western Yamuna 
Canal. The agricultural fields of this village are located along this 
distributary. The head of this distributary is about 12 km away. 
Another source of water for irrigation are tubewells. Tubewells 
have depths of 30 to 70 feet. Due to higher salinity at greater 
depths, they are not dug deeper than this.1 The discharge of the 
tubewells falls mainly in the range of 6-8 1/s. Mainly diesel 
tubewells are used. There is poor electricity availability in the village 
and the uncertain rate of well success does not justify electric 
tubewells. The water table shows some seasonal fluctuation: rising 
after the monsoons (table 5.1), peaking during the winters and 
lowering again during the arid summer months. 
The main sources o f drinking water are the piped water supply 
served through the Mis (public taps) and the open wells. Piped 
water was introduced in the village about ten years ago. This is 
supplemented by open wells operated manually by a pulley. The 
village has about 50 open wells. 1 6 There are also 5 johads in the 
village. The johads are mainly a source o f water for the livestock. 
They store rainwater during the monsoons and dry out during the 
summers. The ownership of the johads vests with the village 
Panchayat. Fishing rights of the johads are auctioned annually. 
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TABLE 5.1 Water table level of Rampur village 
Year 
Month 
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Jan 3.88 1.01 1.63 1.73 1.93 3.13 
Feb 3.94 1.14 1.76 2.11 1.98 3.19 
Mar 3.88 1.19 1.84 2.33 2.41 3.20 
Apr 4.18 1.68 1.93 2.19 2.95 2.73 
May 4.31 2.13 2.38 2.4 3.03 3.45 
Jun 4.13 2.21 2.43 2.68 2.7 3.43 
Jul 3.96 2.10 2.35 2.70 2.65 3.13 
Aug 3.91 .18 2.08 3.03 2.78 2.48 
Sep .13 -.28 1.79 2.15 2.81 2.48 
Oct 1 1.9 2.93 2.96 
Nov .72 1.36 3.3 1.78 3.17 
Dec .85 1.37 3.21 2.07 3.16 
Source: Ground Water Atlas of Rohtak District. Ground Water Cell. Agriculture 
Department, District Rohtak 
Infrastructure, administration and politics 
The village Panchayat is the local level aclministrative unit. It is 
entrusted with looking after the welfare of the village population. It 
carries out such tasks as building and repair of roads, mamtaining 
streetlights, and auctioning fishery rights of the village ponds and 
the Panchayat land. The Sarpanch is a lady who was chosen on the 
basis o f a reservation quota for women. Three parties have a 
political base in the village; the Indian National Lok Dal, the BJP 
(Bharatiya Janata Party), and the Bahujan Samaj Party. 
The Rampur Water Users Association 
The Rampur Water Users Association was formed in September 
1998. It has 102 farmers as members with a CCA (Culturable 
Command Area) of 648 acres (260 ha). 1 7 The lined watercourse 
serving the farmers on this oudet had been first built by the 
HSMITC in 1978. Over time, however, it had been damaged. 
Cracks had appeared at several places. In 1995, there was a flood 
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and that served as the coup degrace. 
Mahaveer Singh, a retired member of the armed forces, whose 
land lies at the tail of the watercourse, knew a CADA officer at 
Rohtak as a family relative. His frequent contacts and interactions 
with him made him familiar with CADA's programme for lining 
the watercourse.1 8 Mahaveer took the initiative and called a meeting 
of farmers who owned the land along the watercourse and 
introduced the idea of getting the watercourse lined. 
It was explained that CADA would repair the watercourse i f all 
members paid Rs 20 per kila of land and CADA would contribute 
Rs 180 per kila. This money would be put in a Fixed Deposit and 
the interest on that would be used for meeting the future repair 
expenses of the WUA. 
At the time of the formation of the WUA, the members 
deposited a contribution of Rs 13, 120 while the government's 
share was Rs. 116, 333. Together, this amount, a sum of Rs 130, 
453 was put in a deposit in the Punjab and Sind Bank. The CADA 
office at Rohtak coordinated with their head -office at Panchkula. 
The necessary paperwork and formalities were completed and the 
WUA got registered. 
Embedding the institution 
CADA required the farmers to form an Executive Committee for 
managing the affairs of the WUA. The Executive Committee was 
chosen by drawing representation from each of the seven tholas 
whose land is served by the watercourse.1 9 These are the following: 
a) The Buddaan thola. Naphe Singh was chosen from this thola. 
He was chosen as the Chairman. Lajpat Rai, affectionately 
called Lala in the village, was also chosen from this thola. 
b) The Gandhre thola. Mahaveer, the Secretary of the Water Users 
Association, belongs to this thola. He has an education above 
the average and has served the army. Besides, being a tail-ender 
liimself, he takes a lot of interest in the affairs of the WUA. He 
took the lead in the initial organisation and managed most of 
the affairs. Effectively, he ran the show. My assessment of him 
was that he was astute and well informed. He revealed a keen 
interest in government policies and was also their strong critic. 
c) The Rau thola. Satbeer was chosen from the Rau thola. Most of 
the land of this thola, however, lies on another outiet in the 
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village. Satbeer also represents two other tholas who have 
some land lying on this watercourse, namely, Jagde and 
Sotraam. 
d) The Fatia thola. Om was chosen from the Fatia thola. Some 
members o f the Fatia thola say that he was chosen because he 
was an elderly person who could give some time to the affairs 
o f the WUA. He is considered the Chaudhury (Lord) of the 
watercourse, implying that he knows how to manage its affairs. 
e) The Kharat thola. Surajbhaan Pandit comes from the Kharat 
thola. Ram Singh was also chosen from this thola. The Kharat 
thola has two sections: the Jaats and the Brahmans (lachhoo). 
Suraj Bhaan Pandit was chosen to represent the Brahmans, 
while Ram Singh was chosen to represent the Jaats. Suraj 
Bhaan Pandit was the deputy sarpanch of the village before the 
Panchayat elections took place in the year 2000. He is 
affiliated with the Congress Party. 
f) The Siddaan thola. Tarachand was chosen from the Siddaan 
thola. Tarachand is a large grower of sugarcane. 
Among them, the position holders own one-sixth of the area 
commanded by the oudet. Naphe Singh has 7 kilas on this oudet, 
Mahaveer and his two brothers have 24 kilas of land on this oudet, 
Satbir and his brother have 20 kilas of land, Om has 8 kilas along with 
his brothers (he only has 1.5 kilas of his own), Lala Lajpat Rai has 36 
kilas of land, Suraj Bhan Pandit has .5 kilas of land and Tarachand 
and his brothers have 33 kilas of land. 
The major benefit of forming the WUA has been that 
responsibility has been ascertained for repairing and mamtaining the 
watercourse. A benefit cited by all the members is that the watercourse 
is better looked after. The WUA has emerged as a fine imposing 
body, imposing fines on those who break the watercourse. 
Elite dominance and power structures 
However, the formation of the WUA has strengthened the existing 
power structures among the members o f the watercourse. Three 
large, powerful farmers, who already have a power base inside the 
village, have acquired some more powers. They share this power 
mutually to their benefit. There is no transparency and no sharing 
of information. There is also some arbitrary exercise o f power. The 
activity of the WUA has come to be dominated by three position 
holders; Mahaveer, the Secretary, Naphe Singh, the Chairman, and 
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Tarachand. These farmers represent tholas that are numerically the 
strongest on this watercourse, namely, Gandhre, Buddaan and 
Siddaan. 
The close association of Mahaveer, the Secretary, and Naphe, 
the Chairman, inside the WUA is akin to their association outside 
the WUA. They have been friends for the last 30 years, ever since 
Mahaveer left the army. Mahaveer is usually found in the home o f 
Naphe, smoking hookka and playing cards, even when Naphe 
himself is not there. 2 0 The Buddaan thola and the Gandhre thola, 
to which Naphe and Mahaveer respectively belong, live adjacent to 
each other. The fields o f Naphe and Mahaveer are also located next 
to that o f each other. 2 1 Mahaveer and Naphe have strong ties with 
the local police. 
The "lord like" position of these position holders in the WUA 
is akin to their "lord like" position in the village society and in the 
social networks. These three farmers are economically powerful 
and the relations o f economic dependence of which they are a part 
reproduce themselves in the working of the water users association. 
They are large owners of land, and lend money to other members 
of the water users association. They take land on theka outside the 
geographical boundaries of the village. Two members o f the 
Siddaan thola take a tractor on hire from Tarachand. There is some 
land (36 kilas) that belongs to the Pracheen Sri Ram Mandir (the 
village temple) that is put to auction every year. In the year 
preceding the one in which I carried out my fieldwork, Tarachand 
was cultivating a part of this piece of land (12 kilas). 
Mahaveer and his two brothers on the one hand and Naphe 
and his sons on the other, are parties to the auction of the 36 acres 
of Panchayat land that takes place every year. Mahaveer and his 
brother Balu have been cultivating the Panchayat land for the last 8 
years, even when the same person cannot (officially, in principle), 
cultivate it for more than 2 years at one go. It is shown in some 
one else's name, but is cultivated nevertheless by them. Among the 
36 kilas of Panchayat land that are auctioned every year are 12 kilas 
of land that are to be cultivated by the Harijans. In principle, this 
land is to be sown by the Harijans and the proceeds from the 
auction of the land are to be used for the welfare and upliftment of 
the Harijans. This land is taken over by Mahaveer's family. 
The Harijan and Chamaars view this act as a threat to their 
security in the village, but do nothing about it because they depend 
upon the Jaats for their supply of food grains and fodder. They 
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Poor accountability and transparency 
My association with the WUA confirmed that (1) there was no 
transparency in the working of the water users association (2) there 
was no mechanism for the accountability of the three position 
holders to other WUA members and that (3) the other members 
were isolated from the "committee". For all practical purposes, 
what we would like to call the water users association is only the 
management committee, popularly called "the committee". This 
"committee", further, is essentially only Mahaveer, Naphe and 
work on their fields as agricultural labour for cash or for food 
grains (See Box 5.1 below). 
BOX 5.1 : Interview with village watchman 
05/05/2000 
While I was waiting for the Patwaari, I noticed this frail looking man. 
He was short, dark and walked with a slight limp, a brown stick in 
hand. He kept silent all the while Mahaveer (the Secretary of the 
WUA) was there. Later, when Mahaveer left, he spoke up. He said 
that he was the village watchman. Harijans in the village own some 
12 kilas of land. These plots have been registered four times in their 
name. The Jaats do not let this land remain with (hem. This land is 
shown as belonging to the Panchayat and is put to auction every 
year." If this happens", he said, "the Harijans would soon have to 
leave the village". The Chamaars provide field labour to the Jaats. If 
the Jaats themselves do this auction, they will be sent to jail", he said. 
"So, they put pressure on us to take the auction. Later, they take the 
land from us and pay us and then sow it themselves. We are not 
allowed to sow it." 
He explained that the BDO (Block Development Office) holds the 
auction. He and his fellow men get fodder and grass from the fields 
of the Jaats. They also work on their fields in exchange for food 
grains. Sometimes, the Jaats promise some rate and give some other 
(lesser) rate. For example, he continued, " once I had taken a 
contract to cut 3 kilas (acres) in exchange for some grains. They 
refused to give grains. I reported to the chowki (police station). The 
policeman said that I could take the grains from him but should not 
fight with the Jaats. If we fight with them, our children will suffer. 
How will we feed them ? 
Source: field notes 
166 Institutions, Technology and Water Control 
Tarachand. The perception among the other members of the WUA 
is that it is "their committee". There is some vague sense of aura 
about them; some sense o f mystery as i f "we do not know what 
they are up to." In some cases there is also a negative 
sentiment". . . . i f they ever impose a fine upon me, I will never pay 
i t Why should I? They never told us where our money went. They 
never call us for a meeting... have they ever told us what they are 
up to?" 
The response of the members of the Executive Committee to 
this allegation about poor transparency is that there is an annual 
audit. Mahaveer says that the biggest stumbling block to the 
effectiveness of the water users association is the unpadhta 
(illiteracy) of the members. His perspective is " I f they want 
information, they can come and ask me.. I will not go house to 
house, giving them information.." The Executive committee looks 
down upon the other members for their being "illiterate" and 
"incapable o f managing the watercourse". 
PICTURE 5.1 A Chaukhat or turnout 
The leadership is very autocratic. These three position holders 
use the funds of the WUA to meet their own ends. 2 2 For instance, 
they use them to get the watercourse serving their fields repaired or 
for getting their own chaukhats (turn-out) installed or repaired 
(Picture 5.1). Other members o f the WUA also made appeals to 
them to replace their chaukhats, but to no avail. The watercourse 
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has been lined only till the point where Mahaveer's fields are 
located. The extreme tail end of the watercourse, further down 
from Mahaveer's fields, is still unlined. The tail-enders always 
protested against the management committee, and in particular 
Mahaveer, when I spoke with them. There is another portion of 
the watercourse that does not serve the fields of either Mahaveer, 
Naphe or Tarachand. That also still lies unlined. When other 
members request the position holders for mstalling chaukhats or 
lining the watercourse, they are turned down on the pretext that 
"the funds have been exhausted" or, "there are no funds allocated 
for this purpose". There was also a meeting and training 
programme offered by HIRMI but other WUA members did not 
know about it. 
Embedded conflicts 
I now describe three specific conflicts inside the WUA. These 
episodes describe the embedded nature of conflicts. The first 
conflict is an expression of a family feud within the Gandhre thola 
between Mahaveer and Jaswant, another member of the WUA. The 
other two are an expression of a conflict between the Kharat and 
Buddaan tholas in the village. 
As noted above, the watercourse has only been lined till 
Mahaveer's fields. The fields of Jaswant and Ram Kumar, two 
other WUA members from the Gandhre thola, he further down 
from the fields of Mahaveer. Jaswant and Ram Kumar often asked 
Mahaveer to get their watercourse lined, but he did not heed to 
their requests. Besides, there is some unevenness in the surface of 
the watercourse, because of which the full flow of water does not 
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reach their fields. 
During one of the irrigation tarns, Jaswant and Ram Kumar 
asked their sons to break the watercourse. When this act of 
breaking the watercourse was noticed, Mahaveer called a meeting 
of the Executive Committee and the WUA members in the village 
chaupaal. Also present were the village elderly and the members of 
the local Panchayat. It was decided that this loss of breaking the 
watercourse had to be made good. Jaswant and Ram Kumar would 
have to pay a fine of Rs 1100 each. 2 4 They were given a period of 
15 days to deposit the fine. 
Some of Jaswant's supporters urged Mahaveer not to fine him. 
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Jaswant even said that he would get the watercourse repaired. But it 
was to no avail. Mahaveer had threatened that if Jaswant did not 
pay the fine, he would report the case to the police. Jaswant paid 
the fine under the fear and threat posed by Mahaveer. Jaswant and 
some other members o f the Gandhre thola complained to me that 
they did not know where the fine went and how it was used. They 
complained that there was no explanation for the amount o f Rs 
1100; how it was arrived at and what use it was put to. Later, 
Jaswant was given the assurance by Mahaveer that the amount 
would be returned but that never happened. 
The father of Jaswant (Munshi Ram) retaliated by filing a case 
in the Consumer Redressal Forum of the Civil Court at Rohtak. He 
filed a case against Mahaveer, alleging that water was not reaching 
his fields and his fields had had to be left devoid of any cultivation. 
Mahaveer appeared in the Civil Court. In 1998, the lined 
watercourse had been repaired. Much to his ingenuity, Mahaveer 
produced a copy of the mal (payment for the water fees to the 
Irrigation Department) for the previous years that had been made 
by Jaswant. This served as proof that the water actually had been 
reaching Jaswant's fields and he had been irrigating in the past. A 
representative of the Civil Court paid a visit to the chak. He 
observed that water from the watercourse was indeed irrigating all 
the fields that lay adjacent to Jaswant's fields. This included fields at 
the tail end that were at a slighdy higher level. Jaswant's claim was 
thus proved to be a false one. The members of the Executive 
Committee view this episode with great sarcasm. 
As what would be a sequel to this conflict, Munshi Ram, the 
father o f Jaswant, lodged a complaint on the following grounds 
through a letter dated September 11, 2000 to the District Collector. 
The application read thus 2 5: "On oudet No. X , some members of 
the village committee withdrew Rs 90, 000 from CADA for 
repairing the watercourse length of 37 kilas. They repaired 20 kilas 
o f the watercourse, but 17 kilas still remain. When we enquired 
from them, they said that the funds have been exhausted. The 
committee members have Rs 40000 with them. But this money has 
not been accounted for correctiy.... Therefore I request you that 
some action be initiated and some accountability be instituted 
against these people. And that the concerned higher-level officer 
should inspect the watercourse. I f no action is taken against this 
request, I will proceed to the office of the Chief Minister, 
Chandigarh. Because on account of the watercourse not being 
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repaired, some land has been left uncultivated in the recent years. 
Date 1 1 / 9 / 0 0 " 
I discovered during the later phases of my research that there 
has been a long-standing family feud, going down several 
generations, within the Gandhre thola between the farnilies o f 
Mahaveer and Jaswant. They do not work on each other's fields (do 
not enter into dangosra arrangements) and do not socialise with 
each other. These two farnilies have been engaged in a tussle inside 
the water users association. Every time I visited Jaswant's family, 
they complained about Mahaveer. When I went to Mahaveer's 
family, they asserted that their complaints were false. During one 
of my meetings with Mahaveer and Naphe in the farmer's house, I 
said., "some members are very unhappy with your committee". 
Mahaveer's instant reply was.. . "I am sure one of them must have 
been Jaswant and his friends." 
Imposing a fine by Mahaveer was essentially an expression of 
this hostility; perhaps the episode of breaking the watercourse was 
an excuse for expressing this vengeance on Mahaveer's part. 
Mahaveer justified the imposition of the fine on the grounds that 
the byelaws of the water users association empowered him to do 
so. I confirmed through my reading of the byelaws and discussions 
with CADA officers that no such rule exists. Thus, a rule, namely 
that a fine can be imposed for breaking the watercourse (when 
actually no such rule exists) was taken as a resource to turn to for 
expressing another hostility. 
The second expression of this conflict was when Jaswant's 
father filed a case against him in the civil court. As the third 
expression, Jaswant's father lodged a complaint against Mahaveer 
to the District Collector. An alternative would have been to take 
the complaint to CADA. However, the concerned CADA officer is 
a family relative of Mahaveer (see the discussion on the formation 
of the WUA). In fact, he had played an important role in the 
formation of the water users association itself. That factor, perhaps, 
affected Jaswant's and his father's choice o f forum. Thus, 
individuals turn to different forums for resolving disputes. The 
choice of these forums is influenced by their networks and social 
relationships. 
A management shuffle 
I now describe two other conflicts inside the water users 
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association. In the village, there has been a tussle for superiority 
between the Kharat and Buddaan tholas that are numerically the 
strongest. The Kharat thola views the Buddaan, Siddaan and Fatiye 
tholas with ridicule, calling them T3 S F' and refuses to even 
recognise the Gandhre thola as a thola, on account of its small 
size. 6 Inside the WUA, the Kharat thola has been alienated from 
Buddaan, Siddaan and Fatiye. 
The WUA ran with the Executive Committee described in the 
earlier section of this chapter for some time. Soon, however, one of 
these members, Ram Singh, who represents the Kharat thola, had a 
fight with Mahaveer. Mahaveer had hired some labourers for repair 
work on the watercourse. Ram Singh, who is also on the Executive 
Committee, offered to provide some labour. Mahaveer paid some 
dehaadi (compensation) to the other labourers but did not offer 
anything to Ram Singh, on grounds that his services had to be 
honorary. Ram Singh insisted. Mahaveer asked him to quit. He 
wrote to the concerned CADA officer and told them that he had 
asked him to leave. "He was very old anyway", says Mahaveer. 
According to Ram Singh, he did have a fight with Mahaveer on 
the dehaadi issue but he was still on the committee and had not 
been thrown out. "He cannot throw me out," he would say. Other 
members of the Kharat thola said that if Ram Singh were thrown 
out, he would have to be replaced by another person from the 
Kharat thola. I learnt at the later stages o f my research that in the 
village, there has been a tussle for superiority between Kharat and 
Buddaan tholas. Asking Ram Singh to quit was essentially an 
expression of this conflict. 
There was another conflict inside the WUA that was 
representative of a conflict between the Kharat and Buddaan 
tholas. As noted earlier, the WUA position holders take part in the 
auction of the Panchayat land. For the year 2000, Bhoru Pandit 
won the auction of cultivating 12 acres of the Panchayat land. 
Bhoru Pandit belongs to the Kharat thola and owns a bicycle shop 
in the market of Rampur village. This land lay between Naphe 
Singh's land and that taken by him in the auction from the 
Panchayat. Naphe did not allow him to take water from the 
watercourse that passed by from his fields. Bhoru Pandit had to dig 
an extra field channel through 8 kilas to bring water to his fields. 
Then, Naphe tried to take water for his fields from this field 
channel and Bhoru Pandit stopped him. 
The episodes described above point to the embedded nature of 
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conflicts inside the water users association. They suggest that they 
are a reflection of other conflicts in society. They also show that 
individuals shop among different forums to resolve these conflicts, 
mobilising their own networks and social relationships. 
Role of leadership and interface with the bureaucracy 
However, in Mahaveer, the WUA does have a good and dynamic 
leader, in terms of the interface of the members with the Irrigation 
Department and the bureaucracy. Mahaveer is astute and well 
informed. He reveals a grasp of contemporary issues well above 
that o f his peers and has very strong opinions on political and 
administrative matters. He is critical of the current government and 
the effects of the agrarian policy environment on farmers in 
Haryana. 
The essential role of the WUA Executive Committee, led by 
Mahaveer, is lobbying for resources. The association approaches the 
MITC for a remodelling request, and pursues it for action.27 The 
MITC gives a tender and the WUA supervises the repair work. 
The first request for remodelling the watercourse was made in 
June 2000. Mahaveer went to the office of MITC, Bhiwani. Some 
officers came from Bhiwani and inspected the watercourse and 
surveyed it. The Superintending Engineer, MITC, Bhiwani 
sanctioned the remodelling and recommended it to the head office 
o f the MITC in Chandigarh. The second recommendation came 
from the Principal Director, HIRMI. It has now been finalised by 
the MITC head office, i.e., by the Chief Engineer, Chandigarh. 
However, Mahaveer had to make several rounds of the offices. 
"This is not England, this is India. Here you have to chase a person 
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to get some work done", as he bluntiy puts it. 
MITC gave the tender for remodelling the watercourse and the 
role o f the Executive Committee was to supervise the remodelling 
work. Mahaveer said that they told MITC to invite the bids and 
that would prevent other WUA members from pointing fingers 
over the Executive Committee. This was another expression of the 
distrust that prevailed between him and the other members o f the 
water users association.29 When my period of research was drawing 
to a close, work on remodelling the watercourse had already 
started. Mahaveer worked very hard and spent the hot days o f 
summer supervising the work. Thus, occasionally, he did step out 
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of his own personal motives in the larger interest of the water users 
association. 
Conclusion 
The case o f the Rampur WUA gives some insights into the 
embedded nature of the processes of local water management. The 
embeddedness comes out in (1) the manner in which the Executive 
Committee is constituted, by drawing representation from the 
tholas whose lands are served by the watercourse (2) the 
reproduction of power relations inside the WUA and (3) the 
embedded nature of conflicts inside the WUA. The most important 
insight from this case study is in demythologising "community". 3 0 
In the case o f this WUA, the information and power are shared by 
the three position holders to the exclusion of others. They use the 
resources of the WUA to further their own ends or to get the 
watercourses serving their fields repaired. Thus, there is little sense 
o f "participation". Further, there are conflicts inside the WUA that 
are embedded in other conflicts in the village society. What is called 
'Participatory Irrigation Management" in current policy discourses 
is not necessarily about community management. 
Discussion and Comparison with hakshmi Narayan WUA 
I now discuss some contextual factors that helped shape and 
sustain the water users associations, both in the cases of Rampur 
well as the Lakshmi Narayan WUA, which is discussed in the 
previous chapter. 
Role of leadership 
In theorising about the actions and behaviour of WUA leadership 
in both these cases, it could be argued that the behaviour of 
leadership in the WUAs is shaped by their strategic locations in 
village networks, their belonging to dominant castes and groups as 
well as their position in other village bodies and organisations. 
WUA leadership is embedded in the wider social, economic and 
political context. 
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The local leadership often comes from people who are 
influential in the society. In the case of the Lakshmi Narayan 
WUA, leadership came from people who also held, or had held in 
the past, positions on other influential village bodies, such as the 
village multi-purpose co-operative credit society, the sugarcane co-
operative factories and the village Panchayat. Two of the present 
members also have political affiliations. In fact, one of them has, at 
some point o f time or the other, held positions in virtually all the 
local level organisations: the sugarcane co-operative factory, the 
multi-purpose village credit co-operative society and the village 
Panchayat.31 Similarly, in the case of the Rampur WUA, one of the 
members was a former Deputy-Sarpanch. Those people who 
already have a power base in the village society seek to consolidate 
it by aspiring for positions on the management board of the water 
users association, or aspiring for interlocking leaderships.32 
Leadership serves as an intermediary between the farmers and 
the bureaucracy and would stand out as a strong contextual factor 
shaping and sustaining the organisational effort. In particular, it 
plays an important role as a catalyst in an organisational effort and 
in lobbying for change. This role is exercised by (1) convincing 
farmers of the benefits o f collective organisation (2) bearing the 
organisational burden in terms of negotiating for management 
transfer and (3) lobbying for change and representing the case of 
farmers to the Irrigation Department. This is true in the case of 
both the Rampur Water Users Association as well as the Lakshmi 
Narayan Water Users Association. 
This role assumes importance particularly when the formation 
of water users associations involves a shift in the equation between 
the bureaucracy and the water users, as it did in the case of the 
Lakshmi Narayan Water Users Association. In this case, the WUA 
leadership participated in several rounds of negotiation with the 
Irrigation Department to finalise the terms of contract under which 
management turnover took place. This was an uphill task since 
there was resistance from the bureaucracy that created several 
hurdles in the process by postponing dates for meetings and 
insisting on several formalities, such as the production of several 
documents. There was also a time when the WUA faced a financial 
crisis. The leadership went around convincing the members to pay 
up their dues. 
In the Rampur case, too, leadership plays a lobbying role. The 
Secretary follows up with the bureaucracy for remodelling the 
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Influence of patterns o f social organisation: the expression of social 
relations and the relations o f power 
General patterns of social organisation, such as organisation by 
castes and groups, local politics and domination by those already in 
positions of prestige and power find expression in the processes of 
local water management. Representation and dominance are 
important aspects of the processes of local water management. 
In the case of the Executive Committee of the Lakshmi 
Narayan WUA, membership mainly draws from the upper caste 
Marathas and Brahmans (Dahatonde, Jawle, Shelke and Ukeerde). 
These castes are the more powerful castes in the village, 
numerically and in terms of land ownership. Similarly, in the case 
of the Rampur WUA, the society of the Jaats is organised into 
tholas or ancestral family units. The membership of the Executive 
Committee was constituted by drawing representation from each 
thola. 3 3 The leadership is concentrated among three position 
holders. They are three large farmers, who take part in the auction 
of the village Panchayat Land and lend money to other smaller 
farmers and provide agricultural implements and tractors on hire. 
There is a divergence between what legal provisions empower 
WUA members to do, and what they actually do. In the case of the 
Rampur WUA, the secretary used a rule (that does not exist in 
principle, or on paper) to penalise a member with whom he has 
had a personal animosity. Thus, rules serve as resources that 
individuals mobilise to accomplish certain objectives. Actors also 
differ in their ability to mobilise rules, and this ability is shaped by 
social relationships and the relations of power. 
watercourse. This entails making several visits to the offices of the 
government organisations, bunding contacts and following up 
when necessary. When the remodelling work on the watercourse 
started, Mahaveer worked very hard to supervise the activity. In 
fact, in this case, the success of the WUA has come to hinge upon 
the personality only of Mahaveer. What is interesting is that even 
though the relationship between Mahaveer and the other WUA 
members is not always favourable, outwardly, Mahaveer is a strong 
liaison with the irrigation bureaucracy. 
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Expanding the numbers and coverage of WUAs 
I now devote some attention to contextualising the success o f the 
Lakshmi Narayan Water Users Association, contributing to some 
thinking on discussions of expanding the numbers and coverage of 
water users associations. To begin with, as explained earlier, the 
WUA gained through a very effective leadership under Gharonde 
Sir and G A Punde. Combined with the support of the N G O , this 
coalition served to lobby on behalf o f farmers and effected the 
management turnover. Though there was initially resistance among 
the Irrigation Department, it finally relented and did extend 
support. 
It becomes easier to contextualise this case when we place it in 
comparison with the Mula Minor No. Y , in the vicinity of this 
minor, in the same village. Some land in the village is served by the 
Mula Minor No. Y , where a WUA has not been formed. Here, the 
farmers apply for irrigation to the office of the Irrigation 
Department at the irrigation sub-division. They have to travel a 
distance of about 4 km. The Irrigation Department makes the 
irrigation schedule and hands it over to the farmers. The Canal 
Inspector from the Irrigation Department monitors the water 
distribution. The repair and maintenance of the minor is still the 
responsibility of the Irrigation Department. 
The farmers on Mula Minor No. Y wait for the Irrigation 
Department to open the gate, both at the head of the minor as well 
as along the minor. There are frequent cases of water disputes. 
Sometimes, some farmers who do not apply for water also take it 
when the rotation is on. This generates conflicts. There is some 
sense of anarchy; the larger, more powerful farmers, who are able 
to bribe the Paatkari, are able to take water first. It is easier for the 
Dahatonde and Jawle farmers, who are socially and numerically 
powerful, to bribe the Paatkari and to take water out of turn. The 
Paatkari stands to gain from the status quo. The Paatkari wields 
some power because of his position and ability to release water, 
that is, he has some control over the water distribution mechanism. 
This provides him a mechanism to extract illicit payments from 
farmers. There is no uniform set of rules. There are also water 
thefts at night. The opening of the head regulator can be increased 
by rotating the screw using a radial or spanner. 
The Secretary of the Lakshmi Narayan WUA tried to form a 
water users association on the Minor No.Y. My understanding of 
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the situation, based on my interviews with farmers and the 
Secretary, and observation of the irrigation process on the Minor 
No.Y, is that there is resistance from the larger and powerful 
farmers who thwart these efforts. They stand to gain from the status 
quo, by appropriating water through a mechanism for illicit 
payments to the Irrigation Department Paatkari. Besides, they 
make good use of their position of privilege to exercise other forms 
of power, or bunding obstructions on the canal to take water. 
These actors, who gain from the status quo, resist the formation of 
the WUA. 
SOPPECOM tried to form a federation of WUAs along the 
distributary, but attributes its failure to the absence o f support 
from the Irrigation Department. Thus, there is resistance from the 
Irrigation Department as well as the farmers who gain from the 
status quo and see a change as a threat to their current position.3 4 
One factor that emerged from my discussions with those who 
have been associated with the Mula Minor No. X as well as other 
places in its vicinity is that in this case, the WUA has not been 
factionalised. At many other places, the fact of farmers coming 
from different political parties creates factionalism and prevents 
them from coming together. In the Mula Minor No.X case, this has 
not happened in its day-to-day functioning. From my discussions 
with other observers of the PIM process, particularly the Irrigation 
Department, there are about 20-odd WUAs on the Mula Right 
Bank Canal, but none has survived for as long as the Mula Minor 
No. X . The reason that was cited most often for this is that they 
have become politicised. Their members come from different 
political groups, and they refuse to co-operate.3 5 
The point that needs emphasis from this discussion, as well as 
the discussion in the preceding chapter is that there are always local 
contextual factors that shape the processes of local water 
management and influence the conditions under which collective 
action would, or would not emerge. Further, the case of the 
Rampur WUA suggests that forming WUAs may not always be a 
valid policy prescription, if WUAs are dominated by village elite 
who can mobilise them for the furtherance o f their own interests 
and agendas.3 6 An important challenge, then, is in devising 
mechanisms for instituting and ensuring accountability o f local 
level governance structures to their members. Otherwise, the 
creation of organisations for local governance could simply create 
new centres of control. 
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1 These include the Teli, Sunaar, Dhobi, Lohaai, Nai, Chamaar, Sutaar, 
Dhanak and Valmiki. Traditionally Telis have been engaged in extracting 
oil. Sunaar are the jewellers. Nai are the barbers. Dhobi are the 
washermen. Lohaar are the blacksmiths and make and sell agricultural 
implements. Sutaar are the carpenters. Dhanak are the weavers. Mochi 
make and repair shoes. Chamaar work with leather. Valmiki, also called 
Chuhre or Bhangi, are the scavengers. These groups have no land, or very 
little of it. Most of them have moved outside their traditional occupations 
and work as labourers on agricultural farms or in construction work. 
Some of them pursue animal husbandry or petty trade. They also run tea-
stalls and fruit and vegetable shops. A few of them serve the government 
and the private sector. 
2 Most villages in Haryana derive their name from the earliest known 
inhabitant, or the person who settled the village. Legend has it that Ram 
came to this village with his wife; they saw a lion and a goat drink water 
from the same pool a rare sight by all means, and thought that this would 
be a wonderful place to settle down. This would have been circa 1500 
A.D. 
3 The members of a thola live together geographically and their 
agricultural lands are located adjacent to that of each other. They are also 
together on social occasions as marriages and chndbirth in the family. 
4 These are electoral votes for the administrative bodies at the village, 
district, state and national levels. 
5 These committees look after the upkeep and maintenance of the temple 
and gurudwara, respectively. The temple committee also carries out the 
annual auction of the temple land for cultivation. 
6 1 kila is 1 acre. 2.5 acres make one hectare. 
7 The land next to the canal commands the highest price, on account of 
proximity to source of water. 
8 As noted in chapter 4, this practice is widely prevalent among families 
that have good relations with each other. It is a sign of friendship and 
solidarity. This activity is common during the harvest of paddy. 
9 At present levels of input and output prices, sugarcane cultivation was 
cited by the farmers as being the most profitable, followed by paddy and 
wheat. 
1 0 Farmers would often describe their main problems as (1) the absence 
of real control over the source of irrigation (2) uncertainty about input 
prices (3) uncertainty about output prices and (4) the occurrence of pests 
and disease. Another factor that had increased the element of risk facing 
the farmers in this village was that earlier the Government of Om Prakash 
Chautala, the Chief Minister of the state, had promised waivers in energy 
and water prices. This was done at the time of the state government 
elections in the year 2000. They were now told that the waivers would be 
Notes 
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withrlrawn. 
1 1 Buffaloes are predominantly a source of milk, used for direct domestic 
consumption as also for making lassi (buttermilk) and ghee. Some surplus 
is sold to the dudhiyas (milkmen) and taken to Delhi. They are also a 
source of domestic fuel (uple, or dung cakes, made from cow dung). Goat 
milk is used mainly for self-consumption. Goats are kept by the members 
of the lower castes; dhanaks, chamaars and chuhres. 
1 2 The price of jowar fodder varies by season. In the dry season, the rate is 
about Rs 30 per murla. During the rest of the year, it is about Rs 20-25 
per murla. Burseem is sold at the rate of Rs. 90 per murla. Jai is sold at 
the rate of Rs. 30-40 per murla. These sales are confined to the winters. 
1 3 Dung cakes are used mainly for heating water and milk while fuel wood 
from the Kikar, Shisam and Safeda trees is used for other cooking 
activities. Dung cakes are sold at the rate of Rs 1 each. All varieties of fuel 
wood are sold at Rs 80-90 per quintal. These rates stay the same through 
the year. 
1 4 Data on water quality for Rampur is presented in chapter 6. 
1 5 This data was obtained from the office of the Ground Water Cell of the 
Agricultural Department, Rohtak. 
1 6 The open wells are usually dug near the johads to benefit from 
proximity to them. However, with the introduction of piped water supply, 
the use of open wells is on the decline. In principle, different communities 
draw water from different wells in the village. However, it is no longer 
unusual to see the Chamaars and Harijans draw water from the same well 
as the Jaats and the Brahmans. 
1 7 All landowners whose lands are served by this oudet are eligible to be 
members. 
1 8 See the discussion on the policy environment for WUAs in chapter 3. 
1 9 This means that the structure of the Executive Committee was 
essentially patriarchal. I thank Margreet Zwarteveen for bringing this 
point out in one of my discussions with her. 
2 0 It is a common tradition and pass time among men to sit together, 
smoking the hookka and playing cards. The place where they sit is usually 
the part of the house that is called the gher; it is a courtyard in the house, 
with an open space and some space for tying and feeding buffaloes. 
Women are not allowed to enter the gher, though with time, this 
restriction seems to fade away. 
2 1 As noted earlier, the village settlement pattern corresponds to the 
location of the farmers' fields. 
2 2 These funds comprise the share money that is deposited in the name of 
the WUA. See the discussion in the section on WUA formation. 
2 3 Along the watercourse, there is a depression, over which water tends to 
accumulate and the full flow does not teach the fields of the tail-enders. 
Towards the end of my fieldwork, work had started on remodelling the 
watercourse and Mahaveer was confident that this snag would be 
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corrected. 
2 4 These amounts could be seen written in Mahaveer's diary. I was very 
impressed with Mahaveer's meticulous attention to detail. 
2 5 This has been translated from the original application that was written 
in Hindi. 
2 6 Note also that the numerical distribution of the members across tholas 
on this oudet is different from that in the village. 
2 7 See also the discussion on the role of the MITC in Chapter 3. 
2 8 This presents an interesting contrast with the Sitapur case described in 
the preceding chapter where the WUA could not succeed in getting the 
last segment of the watercourse lined. The WUAs differed strongly in 
terms of the ability of their leaders to mobilise resources. 
2 9 This "distrust" came out in many of my interviews with the WUA 
members, particularly other members of the Gandhre thola as well as 
many other farmers who were alienated from the working of the water 
users association. 
3 0 "Community" and "participation" have been glorified in recent 
discourses on irrigation management. See, for instance, Groenfeldt (2000) 
and Hooja and Joshi (2000). 
3 1 Carter (1976) notes that power in rural Western Maharashtra has been 
concentrated in the hands of relatively few persons and a large majority of 
those who hold power are members of one small section of the 
population. "Power in the countryside is distributed unequally " (Carter 
1976: 3). In Maharashtra, the sugarcane revolution in the early 20 t h century 
gave a new stature to the rural elite. This elite comprises large sugarcane 
growers who vie for top positions in sugarcane co-operatives as also the 
State Legislative Assembly and enjoy a prominent place in local politics 
(Attwood 1992; Baviskar 1995; Attwood and Baviskar 1995b). In 
Haryana, the green revolution gave a new position to the rural elite. For a 
discussion of the social effects of the green revolution, particularly, the 
widening of income disparities, see Paul (1989) and Kumar (1989). For a 
discussion of patterns of rural leadership in North India, see also Sharma 
(1979) and Mehta (1972). 
3 2 See also Kloezen (2002). Kloezen in Mexico found that WUA leaders 
tried to make use of their political power to become re-elected as WUA 
leaders, even when this was not allowed in principle. They also used their 
position as WUA leaders to further expand the economic and political 
networks on which the existence of the WUA depended. 
3 3 This means that the Executive Committee had representation from only 
the Jaats. There was one representative from the Brahmans (the lacchoo 
section of the Kharat thola). 
3 4 See also the discussion in chapter 3. 
3 5 Sometimes, though, they simply come from different factions, which 
may not necessarily be affiliated with different political parties. 
3 6 See also Agrawal and Gibson (1999) and Kumar (2002). 
6 
Water distribution, water rights and equity in 
protective irrigation 
This chapter examines the process o f water distribution in the 
oudet command areas o f the WUAs that I studied. It describes the 
irrigation practices in warabandi and shejpali. The analysis shows 
how irrigators seek to overcome a constraint that is posed by a 
system of designed scarcity. They mobilise rules and social 
relationships to improve flexibility in water deliveries as well as to 
get extra water. 
The irrigation practices among the members of the Rampur 
WUA under the warabandi irrigation regime are first described. My 
own empirical observations of equity within the command of the 
oudet are presented. In chapter 6, I have referred to the 
domination of the WUA by the village elite; in this chapter, I show 
that this domination does not spill over into the water distribution 
process. Finally, a discussion of the water distribution process in 
the case o f the Lakshmi Narayan WUA is presented. It is shown 
that WUA formation in shejpali can have equity enhancing effects. 
This is not true of warabandi. The chapter concludes with a 
discussion of the different forms of interaction between irrigators 
and engineers that develop in the water distribution process and 
that irrigators mobilise to improve their access to water. 
Irrigation under Warabandi: Responses to Scarcity by Design 
Chapter 2 has described the genesis and characteristics o f 
protective irrigation. To briefly recount the basic tenets, the 
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purpose of protective irrigation is to divide a supply thinly over a 
large area, rather than to match supply with demand. Thus, the aim 
is to optimise production per unit of scarce water (Jurriens, 
Mollinga and Wester 1996). Protective irrigation systems are 
characterised by high duties and low irrigation intensities. 
Cropping intensity is supposed to be low. 
Since protective irrigation systems seek to maximise 
productivity per unit of water, while farmers seek to maximise 
productivity per unit o f land, there is an inherent conflict between 
farmers' objectives and government objectives. Initially, the 
combination of the warabandi system with light crops such as 
wheat allowed the systems to work as designed. Later, however, 
with the onset of the green revolution and the introduction of 
HYVs (High Yielding Varieties) of seeds and the consequent 
cornmercialisation of agriculture, this pattern got disrupted. The 
initial high design duties became inadequate. Farmers wanted to 
irrigate in two seasons instead of one. They also wanted to irrigate 
all their land as against the low planned intensities, or at least more 
than planned. There was an increase in productive irrigation and 
rice cultivation (Jurriens 1993). 
In this backdrop, two factors are significant in understanding 
the design characteristics o f canal irrigation in Haryana. First, since 
irrigation is protective in nature, the aim is to ration out water 
through a system of rotations through the warabandi system, rather 
than to match supply with demand. Second, the control and 
operation of the system are totally centralised. A fall-out of these 
factors is that in principle, farmers have no control over the 
availability of water from the main system, or their ability to match 
water supply with crop water requirements.1 
In my research, however, farmers were observed to employ a 
number of strategies to increase control over water supplies.2 These 
strategies are as follows: 
1. engage in time exchanges 
2. supplement canal irrigation with tubewell irrigation 
3. tamper with oudets 
4. insert siphons over the canal or distributary. This takes the 
form of a water theft or a bribe to the canal patroller 
5. apply for a rice shoot 
I describe each of these below. The first of these, namely the 
time exchange, improves flexibility of water application and may 
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bring about some efficiency gains. The other four enable an 
irrigator to get extra water. 
Time exchanges 
The most common response to a system of scarcity is a time 
exchange. That is, a farmer who needs water outside his turn 
borrows from another farmer and returns it another time. This 
deviation is justified on the basis of bhaichaara based organisation. 
Bhai means "brother" and bhaichaara is indicative of a feeling of 
brotherhood, friendship and affection. While the water right is 
constituted through state law, it is realised, often, through a 
different normative system, namely, that o f bhaichaara. This points 
to the existence of legal pluralism in the process o f water 
distribution, that is, to the existence of different normative systems 
with regard to the same set of activities.3 
Under the warabandi system, a period of one-week (168 hours) 
is divided in proportion to the size of the land holdings falling 
under one chak, the area served by one mogha (oudet). Each piece 
of land, then, is supposed to receive water for a fixed time and day 
of the week. An irrigator's water right is determined in proportion 
to the size of his landholding.4 The pucka warabandi schedule is 
supposed to determine the water distribution below the oudet. It is 
framed by the Irrigation Department and it has a legal basis in 
Section 55 (A) of the Haryana Canal and Drainage Act of 1974. It 
specifies the time period and day for which an irrigator will irrigate 
his land. In local language, it is said to be manjoor shuda (approved, 
having been sanctioned by law). 
In practice, within the overall framework of the warabandi 
schedule, farmers follow a distribution pattern that is based on 
their mutual understanding, cooperation or bhaichaara. Farmers 
explain bhaichaara as "being born from the same womb", "familial 
ties", "a feeling of friendship", and "a sense o f brotherhood". 5 It is 
used in several contexts, such as a bhaichaara Panchayat, referring 
to the local Panchayat, a loose informal congregation of village 
elderly. A bhaichaara committee is the one that is formed on the 
basis o f mutual consent rather than through the force o f law.6 
When I asked the Secretary of the Rampur Water Users 
Association to explain what bhaichaara is, he said, "it is when we 
give up our own self-interest for a greater common good." 
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BOX 6. 1 Visit to Kishan's fields 
While I was sipping my tea at the dhaaba (village eating joint), a man 
called Kishan introduced himself. He had .5 kilas of his own land and 
had taken 16 kilas of land on theka.1 We then reached his fields at 
about 10.45 a.m and started walking towards the point where his field 
channel took off. His awsara (turn for taking water) started at 10.50 
a.m. When we reached the head of his field channel, he showed water 
flowing to his neighbour's fields. A small embankment of mud lay 
across the head of his field channel. All he had to do was to break that 
embankment and insert that mud over the head of his neighbour's 
field channel so that water would start flowing to his fields instead. 
They conversed with each other and I started inspecting his fields. 
Kishan said then that we should go back. I was surprised, I looked at 
my watch and said 'but your awsara has started., it is past 10.50.1 have 
come to see you irrigate'. 'No, he said, pointing to his neighbour, he is 
taking my share of 50 minutes today'. At this point in time, his 
neighbour intervened, " next time, I will give him my 50 minutes. 
Then, he will have a total of 1 hour and 40 minutes to irrigate." I was 
quite impressed. The transaction of a time exchange had taken place 
in front of my eyes with great felicity and smoothness and I was 
amazed at how little effort was involved in it. We then started walking 
further down and there was another mogha that belonged to the 
village 
It is rather difficult to precisely estimate how widespread this 
mutual exchange is. However, it is more common for crops such as 
sugarcane and paddy in kharif and wheat in the rabi season. These 
crops are the relatively more water consumptive crops. When I 
asked farmers about how often they engaged in these swaps, I got 
such responses as "saahab, that we do 24 hours.. ." or "..what is 
As a rationing response to distribute scarce water, a farmer 
only gets to irrigate for a fixed time period on a particular day of 
the week. This is often inadequate to irrigate his crop, or the entire 
area covered by it. So, he seeks to fill this gap by borrowing an 
irrigator's share on the basis o f bhaichaara and returns it another 
time. This borrowing is an effort on the part of the farmer to more 
closely match water supply with crop water requirements. 7 Time 
exchanges on the basis of bhaichaara form an optimisation strategy 
through which farmers cope with a regime of water scarcity created 
by a system of water rationing.8 
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there in it, saahab, that is always on." What is also interesting is the 
collective toleration of this practice by the bureaucracy. The 
attitude of the irrigation bureaucracy as summed up in the words of 
a Zilledaar is thus.."Yes, time exchanges are prohibited under the 
Haryana Canal and Drainage Act., but we do not interfere with 
what they (the farmers) do on the basis of their own bhaichaara".9 
It is not uncommon for a farmer to lend his entire water share to 
another farmer (see Box 6.1). 
A time exchange takes a more specific form in the nature of 
accumulating time-shares. Some farmers have a very small size of 
landholdings such as 1 acre or half an acre. Several such smaller 
farmers accumulate their timeshares and irrigate by turns. For 
instance, if farmer A, B and C have 1 acre each and the entitlement 
is 15 minutes per acre, then in one irrigation week, A borrows from 
B and C and irrigates for 45 minutes, in the next week, farmer B 
irrigates and then, in the following week, farmer C irrigates. 
Time exchanges also cut across seasons. For instance, if in the 
kharif season farmer A has grown paddy and farmer B has grown 
sorghum, farmer A, with greater water requirement borrows from 
B. In the rabi season, if farmer B has grown wheat, and he has an 
extra water requirement, he takes the share back from A. One 
response of the tail-enders in terms of time exchanges is to skip 
irrigation in one season (kharif) and accumulate water shares so 
that one crop (wheat) can be grown in the rabi season. In kharif, 
they concentrate on crops such as millet, cotton and sorghum. 
These are the less water consumptive crops and farmers also rely 
on kharif rains for their cultivation. 
In chapter 5 ,1 have made a reference to the organisation of the 
society o f the agriculturists into tholas. I found the institution of 
time exchange to cut across tholas, though it was more common 
among the members of a thola, owning adjacent pieces of land. As 
one irrigator described the practice " bhai ka diya, bhai ka liya" 
(taken from brother, returned to brother). These characteristics o f 
time exchanges can be summarised as follows: 
(1) They cut across tholas: they are more common among 
members of adjacent pieces of land, but they also take place 
among members whose fields are distant on the watercourse. 
(2) They cut across oudets. Farmer A, who irrigates from oudet X 
would exchange his time slot with farmer B , who irrigates from 
oudet Y. 
(3) Sometimes, the negotiation and decision about the exchange 
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takes place before the dates on which the distributary is run. 
Sometimes, it takes place after the irrigation has started and 
sometimes, it is quite spontaneous, i.e., at the spur o f the 
moment. 
(4) Time-shares cut' across seasons. The tail-enders accumulate 
their time shares by skipping irrigation in kharif and irrigating 
from rainfall, crops such as sorghum, millet and cotton. They 
give their timeshares to those who need water in kharif, say, for 
paddy cultivation. Then, they use their accumulated time-
shares to irrigate wheat in the rabi season. 
I summarise my argument as follows: 
The water distribution process in the warabandi areas of 
Haryana is supposed to be governed by the pucka warabandi 
schedule. This schedule lays out the time and day of the week for 
which a farmer takes water and effectively determines his water 
right. This schedule has a legal backing under the Haryana Canal 
and Drainage Act of 1974. The rigidity of the warabandi schedule 
means that there may be a mismatch with the actual water 
requirements of crops. Further, with small land-holdings, turns may 
become very short and field application efficiency can become low. 
Therefore, farmers devise a way to make the system more flexible 
to get a better match with crop-water requirements and increase 
the efficiency of water use. 
Thus, we could argue that the institution of time exchange 
arises because of (1) a well-defined water right, through the pucka 
warabandi schedule, that defines the basic unit of exchange (2) the 
protective nature of canal water supplies, that allocates water scarce 
relative to demand, creating a practical problem for field irrigation 
(3) the rigidity in the turn allocation and the small size of land-
holdings that lead to short irrigation durations which become 
unpractical and inefficient and (4) the existence o f plural legal 
repertoires. 
Other transactions in canal water 
While water rights are tied to land, a transaction in a water right 
could take place along with or exclusive o f the land. For instance, 
some farmers give their land on a tenancy arrangement for a year 
to others. 1 0 This is done along with the warabandi share of water. 
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The rate at which they give out the land includes the water share. 
This arrangement is known as giving land on theka. It is a common 
practice among smaller farmers to take land on theka. Larger 
farmers also give out their land on theka in smaller parcels or 
fragments at the same time to more than one smaller farmer or 
simultaneously cultivate their own land and those of other farmers. 
This status quo o f the water right is maintained under saajedaari 
agreements. In this case, the landowner provides the piece o f land 
and the concomitant share of water. The landowner and the 
partner each contribute for other agricultural inputs in equal 
proportion and the produce is shared equally between the two as 
well. Sometimes, however, a farmer who does not depend pn the 
canal water for irrigation may sell his water share to another 
farmer, for the whole year, while he continues to irrigate his land 
from other sources. This may be the case when a farmer has access 
to his own source of groundwater. The other kind of sale o f water 
right is for a specific turn, when a farmer does not need to irrigate 
during that turn. This rate varies. Some farmers are quick to point 
out that this rate depends upon the 'demand' for water. During the 
summers water selling does take place at the rate o f about Rs 200 
per hour/ during the winter season, it could be about Rs.100-150 
per hour. This sale is not for the period of the entire year, but only 
for one round of irrigation. I also noticed one case where 
transactions in surface and ground water were combined. Farmer A 
took water from farmer B ' s tubewell and in return gave his surface 
water right for one irrigation turn. 
Thus, there are two kinds of water sales. The first is for the 
entire year, when the farmer chooses not to irrigate from the canal 
at all and the second is a sale for a specific turn, when a farmer 
does not need to irrigate for that turn. Once again, it is interesting 
to note that statutory law as in the case of warabandi does not 
provide a basis for a sale. But this sale does take place, outside the 
purview of statutory law.11 
The institution of time exchange is a more popular form than a 
water sale.1 2 While there are water right sales, they are confined. A 
farmer prefers to lend his water share instead of selling it, since 
lending creates a prospective future claim to water. When a farmer 
borrows a timeshare o f a fellow farmer, he is under an obligation to 
return it. On the other hand, a water right that is sold is either an 
irrigation turn that is given up, or the entidement for an entire year 
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foregone. A farmer's response to whether he would sell his water 
share was "how would I Slimy stomach then?" 
Supplementing canal irrigation with ground water irrigation 
The second response to a system of 'scarcity by design1 is to 
supplement canal irrigation with groundwater irrigation. Farmers 
usually wait for the canal, since it is much cheaper. They usually 
have information on when the distributary would be running the 
next time. If, however, they need to irrigate outside that schedule, 
they use tubewell water. Similarly, when the distributary is 'on' and 
they feel that their share is inadequate relative to their requirement, 
they supplement it by tubewell water, that also rushes through the 
same watercourse. 
The general practice is that when the canal is 'off and irrigation 
is needed, farmers run their own tubewell and when they do not 
have their own tubewell, they buy groundwater. For instance, 
during the rabi season (2000-01), the first wheat irrigation was from 
the canal, while the second and third were from the tubewell. Some 
farmers who earlier used to buy groundwater dug their own 
tubewells for greater surety over the supply of water. 
The nature of transaction in groundwater depends on the 
relationship between the buyer and the seller. Groundwater is 
usually sold at the rate of Rs 40 per hour. 1 3 Alternatively, the buyer 
provides the required amount o f diesel. There is also a third form 
of arrangement, a contractual year basis: the seller provides 
groundwater at the rate of Rs. 1000 per acre per annum. 
Some of the tail-end farmers do not receive water from the 
canal, or very little of it, and so have to fully depend upon 
tubewells.14 When they do not have their own tubewells, they have 
to buy from those who do. An interesting issue is that when tail-
enders take tubewell water, it is from a tubewell that is located near 
the head reaches. Tubewells near the tail reaches have saline water. 
At the head reaches, on the other hand, the groundwater is of a 
superior quality because of proximity to the canal. 
The Groundwater Cell of the Agriculture Department, Rohtak, 
monitors the water quality through observation wells. The 
parameter used is electrical conductivity (e.c). The following 
classification is observed:1 5 
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0-2000: fresh 
2000-4000: marginal 
4000-6000: marginally saline 
above 6000: saline 
For an observation well in Rampur village, the electrical 
conductivity was found to be 4600 (October 2000), placing it in the 
'marginally saline' category. This water has high concentration of 
salts of calcium and magnesium. The observation well mentioned 
above is located in the interior o f the village (about 3 km from the 
canal). Water till a distance of about half a kilometre from the canal 
is sweeter because of seepage from the canal that washes down 
some of the salts. 
Water thefts along the canal 
Another way of obtaining additional water is through water thefts. 
In the case of the Sitapur WUA, I have described the nature and 
practice of water thefts along the Sitapur minor in chapter 4 and 
how they reduce the supply of water to the tail reaches. In the case 
of the Rampur WUA, water thefts take the following form. 
The oudet providing water to the Rampur Water Users 
Association is the pipe cum hawdi type oudet. It has a pipe at the bed 
level o f the canal that opens into a hawdi (a circular embankment) 
(see pictures 6.1 and 6.2). It is a cement pipe with a diameter o f 1.5 
foot. It comprises three pipes each of which is 8 feet long. The 
hawdi is made of bricks and cement. 
At the other end of the hawdi is an iron cast called the APM, 
(the Adjustable Proportionate Module) from which water flows 
into the watercourse. Water first flows from the pipe into the 
hawdi and then opens into the watercourse through the APM (see 
Picture 6.3). 
The pipe is placed at the bed level on both sides o f the canal.1 6 
Thus, the water level in the hawdi is the same as that in the parent 
canal. I f it is placed at a higher level and the water level in the 
parent canal is low, then water would not flow through the pipe 
The APM is a semi-modular oudet.1 7 The dimensions of this 
oudet are in proportion to the area to be irrigated. This particular 
oudet has a height of 4" and width of 3". 
PICTURE 6.2 The hawdi of the outlet (on watercourse side) 
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PICTURE 6. 3 The watercourse taking off from the hawdi 
A water theft can take place by inserting a rubber siphon over 
the hawdi o f the oudet, opening over into the watercourse. Thus, 
water is taken in excess of the water that flows from the hawdi into 
the watercourse. Another way is to break the brick along the side 
of the iron cast in the APM. This is called side bugii. Both these 
activities increase the discharge flowing from the hawdi into the 
watercourse. When an APM is installed without the hawdi, 
similarly, the brick can be broken from the side o f the APM cast 
pipe-
When either o f these acts comes to the notice o f the Canal 
Patroller or Mate who serves as a watchman on the canal, he is 
supposed to report it to the J E (Junior Engineer). The J E is 
supposed to issue a penalty and the SDO and Canal Patwaari 
inspect the site. The Patwaari then issues a Tawan (statement o f 
offence) case. The X E N (Executive Engineer) gives a hearing and 
takes a decision. The X E N is empowered to levy a fine to the tune 
of as much as 30 times the water rate. However, the convicted can 
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Equity in Irrigation 
I now turn attention to a discussion of equity in water distribution 
in the Rampur WUA. I studied equity at two levels. The first is in 
terms of the difference across the command of the oudet, in terms 
of equity in the head-tail differences. The second was equity at the 
interpersonal level, in terms of the relationships between the elite, 
large farmers (the WUA leaders) and the other WUA members. 
Equity across the head and tail reaches 
T o gauge equity across the head and tail reaches, I relied on the 
cropping pattern as an indicator. The main crops in the head 
reaches are paddy, sorghum, burseem, wheat and some mustard. 
There is no sugarcane since it is vulnerable to a threat from the 
nilgai (the blue bull) 1 9 and some primates inhabiting the adjacent 
make an appeal to the Supermtending Engineer for a 
reconsideration of the case. 
During my association with the Rampur WUA, water thefts did 
take place, and went unreported and/or unnoticed. During my 
interface with the Sitapur WUA also, I noticed water thefts along 
the minor, as I moved along the minor. A farmer's version of this 
phenomenon was thus.." a rich farmer can bribe the Beldaar to 
allow hrm to insert a siphon., a small farmer simply steals water by 
inserting i t . . . " 
Creating a water right: applying for a rice shoot 
Apart from these strategies, a farmer has the opportunity o f 
creating a water right. Under warabandi irrigation, a farmer can 
actually create a water right by making an application for a rice 
shoot. A rice shoot is a temporary pipe outlet, given for paddy 
irrigation, during the months of July-September, when surplus 
water is available, following the monsoons. During the monsoon 
season of the year 2000, a total of 16 rice shoots were sanctioned 
along the length of the Sitapur Minor. 1 8 At the end of the season, 
the Irrigation Department removes the rice shoots. 
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jungle plantations. There are no millets and cotton because they 
cannot withstand proximity to the canal. In the middle reaches, it is 
the same cropping pattern but there is also sugarcane. At the tail 
reaches, there are mainly the less water consumptive crops such as 
mustard, millets, cotton, sorghum and some wheat 
The other difference between the head-enders and the tail-
enders is in terms of vegetables. Some head-enders grow some 
seasonal vegetables as spinach, carrots, radish, onions, garlic and 
potatoes. The tail-enders do not grow any vegetables. Some 
mustard is cultivated along with the wheat, while some springs up 
on its own. 
In the tail reaches, there is a heavy concentration of the less 
water consuming crops such as mustard in the rabi season and 
cotton, millets and sorghum in the kharif season. This is because 
not only does the water from the canal not reach the tail-end as 
effectively as it reaches the head, but the groundwater is also more 
saline than at the head reaches, where it is o f a better quality 
because of proximity to the canal. At the head reaches, good 
quality groundwater is found at a depth of 15 feet to 150 feet. At 
the tail reaches, it is saline even at a depth of 15 feet. 
Thus, the tail-enders are worse off than the head-enders for the 
following reasons: 
(1) some water is lost through seepage before reaching the tail-
enders 
(2) the last segment of the watercourse is still urilined 
(3) there is an unevenness in the surface of the watercourse: in the 
middle reaches, there is a depression where water tends to 
accumulate during the course of irrigation 
(4) the groundwater is also of a quality inferior to the head reaches 
where some percolation from the canal washes down the salts 
Coping strategies of the tail-enders include the following: 
1) buy tubewell water from the head reaches and convey it to the 
tail reaches 
2) sow cotton, millets and sorghum and wait for rains 
3) skip irrigation in one season (kharif) and accumulate water 
shares so that one crop (wheat) can be grown'in the rabi 
season. In kharif, concentrate on crops such as millet, cotton 
and sorghum 
In the year preceding my fieldwork, some tail-enders had sown 
sugarcane but it could not mature, for want of water.2 0 
The location of a farmer's fields at different points along the 
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watercourse translates into a different set of opportunities that he 
has in terms of crop choices. At the tail reaches, only two crops can 
be grown and the rotation followed is wheat/cotton, wheat/ millet 
or wheat/sorghum. The head -enders follow this practice: they 
harvest wheat in April/May. They sow sorghum between then and 
the onset of the monsoons (July/August). In July/August, they 
sow paddy. They harvest paddy in October and sow wheat in 
November/December. Thus, they take three crops on the same 
piece o f land. In the middle reaches farmers grow sugarcane and 
three other crops by following a rotation of 
wheat/sorghum/paddy. 
Equity across large and small farmers: does elitist domination spill 
over into water distribution? 
In the case of the Rampur WUA, I did not notice any evidence of 
elitist domination extending into the water distribution process. 
Even when members of the Executive Committee deviated from 
the warabandi schedule, it was on the basis of a time exchange or a 
water sale. I did not notice evidence of their forcefully taking other 
members' water shares. During my observation of the water 
distribution process, there were episodes where Executive 
Committee members bought the water time-share of another 
member, or borrowed it to return it the next time. Further, farmers 
who otherwise complained about the Executive Committee 
members themselves asserted that this domination did not spill 
over into the water distribution process. "They can not take our 
water share... nobody can force it on us..we will not let them", they 
would assert, sometimes angrily. 
According to the village elderly, there used to be chaos before 
the warabandi schedule was made.2 1 They report that when there 
were no water distribution rules in the form of warabandi, some 
large and powerful farmers would dominate the water distribution 
process. After the' introduction of warabandi, there is more 
structure and order to human interaction as far as resource sharing 
is concerned. 
The manner in which warabandi works in the fields - through 
mutual negotiation and the adjustment of watches - makes it a self-
monitoring system. The only deviations from the warabandi 
schedule are on the basis of convenience and bhaichaara. I f one 
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Water Distribution in the case of the Lakshmi Narayan WUA 
There are three cropping seasons in Maharashtra: the rabi season 
or the winter crop season from October 15 to February 28, the hot 
weather season from March 1 to June 30 and the kharif or rainy 
season period from July 1 to October 14. In the rabi season, 
farmers irrigate wheat, chickpea and sugarcane. In kharif they 
irrigate pearl millet, sugarcane, sorghum, cotton, lentils and some 
fruits and vegetables. In the hot weather season, they irrigate 
mainly groundnut and sugarcane.22 
Rabi is the main irrigation season. Kharif is the rainy season 
and farmers also take water from the rains and the role of irrigation 
is largely supplemental in this season. Typically, in the Mula Minor 
No. X case, in the rabi irrigation season, there are three to four 
rotations, in the hot weather season, there are two, and in the 
Kharif season, there is only one. 
The Water Users Association calls for applications from the 
farmers (both members and non-members) for supplying water 
immediately after getting the information from the Irrigation 
Department on water availabihty for each season. This water 
does not need water, when his turn is, he sells his share or lends it 
to somebody else; but there is no interlocking of these transactions 
with other transactions such as credit, or agricultural equipment or 
inputs. 
Tholas shape irrigation practices only to the extent that families 
belonging to one thola have their lands lying on a certain location. 
A farmer belonging to any thola does not necessarily have a certain 
access to water. While time exchanges are more common among 
the members of a thola, they do cut across tholas and categories of 
farmers. Thus, in my assessment, the water share defined in terms 
of a time slot is meanmgful, in that it is recognised as a proper 
water right. It is this right that is sold, bought, lent, borrowed, or 
exchanged. This right is the basic unit of transaction. However, the 
time exchange has its basis in the notion of bhaichaara, or 
friendship/brotherhood. 
Thus, in the case o f the Rampur WUA, the inequity in water 
distribution is mainly through the head/tail difference at the oudet 
level as a result of technical factors related to the canal and the 
better quality of groundwater available at the head. 
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availability is in terms of the sanctioned quota agreed upon in the 
memorandum of understanding between the Irrigation Department 
and the WUA. When there is less water in the Mula dam, this quota 
is to be proportionately cut. The allocation, as also mentioned in 
the earlier chapters, is: .434 million m 3 for Kharif cropping season, 
1.058 million m 3 for rabi and .283 million m 3 for hot weather. 
These quotas are fixed to irrigate 94 hectares in kharif, 120 hectares 
in rabi and 62 hectares in the hot weather season.2 3 
The Secretary of the WUA issues a notice to all members and 
non-members indicating the date by which they are required to file 
their applications.24 These applications are made in a prescribed 
form. The farmers are required to indicate the crops that they wish 
to irrigate and the area under each. It is important to note that 
there are no crop restrictions applicable to the irrigators in the 
WUA case, unlike the cases with normal shejpali This is a fall-out 
o f the terms and conditions expressed in the Memorandum of 
Understanding between the Water Users Association and the 
Irrigation Department.2 5 
The applications are scmtinised. After scrutiny of applications, 
sanctions are issued for water supply if the farmer has paid the 
previous charges. The applications are arranged oudet-wise. The 
total quantity of water requested is compared with the sanctioned 
quota or the quantity o f water agreed to be released by the 
Irrigation Department (in case o f short replenishment in the 
reservoir). In case the water quantity required can be 
accommodated from the available water, all the applications are 
sanctioned, provided the past dues have been paid. If, however, the 
demand is more, a proportionate cut is applied in sanctioning the 
water for irrigated crops. 2 6 
Demands are arranged oudet-wise and the period of supply for 
each oudet is worked out considering the A I / D C (area irrigated 
per day cusec) as 2.4. However, the A I / D C ratio is modified 
considering the distance of the fields from the oudet to allow for 
seepage losses. This adjustment is called the correction factor. The 
water is supplied at one cusec at the rate o f 10 hr per ha. The entire 
discharge from one oudet is allotted to one farmer at a time. 
The number of oudets required to be opened on each day of 
the 'on' period is worked out to calculate the discharge in the 
minor, and adding the seepage losses at 12% or one cusec 
(whichever is more), the discharge required at the head of the 
minor on each date is worked out for placing the indent with the 
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Irrigation Department 
The sanctions are again arranged oudet-wise, and the oudet 
that has to run for the longest period is first identified. The minor 
is required to be run for this period. Thus, the period for which the 
minor is run is not necessarily the same period as that for which 
the canal is to be run; but within the schedule o f the canal, this 
period corresponds to the period for which the oudet with the 
largest demand is run. The WUA requests the number of days and 
the exact dates for which the minor is to be run within the 
schedules of the main canal. The other oudets which are required 
to be run for shorter periods are clubbed in such a way that the 
total running period of the clubbed oudets is the same or less than 
the longest period. The number of oudets that would be rurming 
on each date is then identified. 
The Paatkaris o f the WUA then prepare individual schedules 
for the supply of water to farmers. This is known as the pali patrak. 
A schedule is prepared for each oudet. These schedules show the 
name of the farmer, gat number, area sanctioned, area to be 
irrigated during the rotation, time allotted, and the starting and 
completing time for irrigation. The final water distribution 
schedule, the pali patrak, is put on the notice board of the office o f 
the water users association.27 The oudet that has the greatest 
demand is opened first, since it needs to run for the longest time. 
Water to the field is delivered indicating the time allocation with a 
constant discharge of one cusec. 
Each farmer is issued an irrigation pass indicating the time 
from which he has to take water. On each oudet, distribution starts 
from the tail and each farmer takes water one at a time. So, for 
instance, if a farmer is issued a pass from 10 a.m. to 6 p.m., it 
authorises him to take water uninterrupted during this time. This is 
the basis of his 'water right' or entidement. When his turn is over, 
he invites the next farmer to take water, as indicated in the 
palipatrak. Some times, farmers also exchange their turns. If, for 
example, a farmer's turn is from 10 a.m. to 4 p.m. and his land is 
still not ready for irrigation, he can exchange his slot with another 
farmer. This happens outside the formal distribution schedule 
prepared by the water users association and is based on the mutual 
understanding among the irrigators.28 
The Paatkari monitors the water distribution system and keeps 
the keys of the outiets along the minor. The keys of the minor head 
oudet stay with the Canal Inspector from the Irrigation 
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Department. The Paatkari is paid by the WUA. All water 
applications are submitted to him before the start of the season. He 
gives a notice of the water distribution schedule ten days in 
advance. The keys of the oudets are retained by the Paatkaris.29 
They also supervise that farmers complete the irrigation in the 
allotted time and keep a watch on irrigation offences and are 
supposed to report irrigation offences to the WUA. 
As the water distribution proceeds, the oudets are opened to 
accommodate a discharge of 1 cusec and a red mark put on the 
Parshall flume serves as a benchmark for measuring the 
discharge.30 When the irrigation rotations are over, the Paatkari 
shuts the gate and puts a lock to prevent tampering. Thus, as also 
explained in chapter 4, this technical innovation of installing 
measuring devices and the institutional innovation of the WUA 
Paatkari to monitor these discharges essentially overcomes an 
operational weakness of the system, namely, that the oudets require 
constant adjustment and measurement for mamtaining discharges. 
I did not notice incidences of breaking the lock on the oudets 
or o f water thefts during my association with the WUA. According 
to the Canal Inspector of the WUA, the farmers do not manipulate 
to increase the discharge. The Paatkari measures, so there is no 
need to manipulate discharge, either at the head of the minor or 
along the minor. I f the farmers broke the pipe, they would have to 
repair it. So it would pose a burden on the farmers and the WUA. 
Thus, three functionaries of the WUA play an important role 
in the water distribution process as it proceeds: the Secretary, and 
the two Paatkaris. The Secretary essentially performs a liaison 
function with the Irrigation Department, receives water 
applications from farmers and issues water passes and sanctions. 
He also informs farmers about rejections and sanctions. He also 
performs other functions such as keeping records of the meetings 
of the WUA and entertaining visitors. 
The Paatkaris prepare the water distribution schedules for each 
rotation and each oudet. This is transmitted to the Irrigation 
Department through the Secretary. The Paatkaris prepare the water 
distribution schedule for the minor and the oudets, open the 
oudets for one cusec flow, monitor the water distribution process 
and report irrigation offences. 3 1 
The role of the Canal Inspector from the Irrigation 
Department is to release water at the minor head. His role ends 
there. A gauge patti (standing wave flume) is installed at the minor 
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head to measure discharges. 
A panchanama is supposed to be issued on additional area 
irrigated over and above sanctioned, unauthorised irrigated area 
and area that could have been irrigated from wastage. However, in 
practice, it is not usually issued, since it is considered 
"psychologically damaging. " 3 2 Those who take water out of turn or 
without applying for it, are charged double the normal rate. I refer 
to one case below, in which a farmer took water out o f turn and 
was made to pay double the normal rate for irrigating cotton. 
What does scarcity by design mean for the Lakshmi Narayan 
WUA? 
The formation of the Lakshmi Narayan WUA enabled the 
irrigators to get more water than the designed allocation (see Box 
2.1 in chapter 2). Thus, this WUA was very much a preferred 
WUA. When the new allocation is considered along with the 
rainfall, water is actually "not scarce" on the Minor No. X . It is, in 
fact, enough for a crop like sugarcane. 
Besides, other features resulting from the memorandum of 
understanding conferred several benefits to the WUA. In the non-
transferred canals, the Irrigation Department gives preference to 
crops such as wheat, pearl millet and groundnut. The area o f 
sugarcane that may be irrigated on the canals is sought to be 
controlled. One implication of forming the WUA has been that 
there are no crop -restrictions and the farmers are free to plant and 
irrigate sugarcane or any other crop. 
As indicated in the Memorandum of Understanding, the WUA 
has been allotted quantities of water for each season. During scarce 
periods, the Irrigation Department proportionately cuts the 
amount. The Lakshmi Narayan WUA usually demands the entire 
volume of water allocated according to the MOU (IIM(A)-IWMI 
1999). Within the overall rotational plan and its allocation, the 
WUA requests the delivery of water according to its own schedule 
during the season. The WUA can request the discharge and days o f 
delivery of water in each rotation. This ability to control deliveries 
allows them to match the crop water requirements more closely 
with water supplies. The Canal Inspector, of the Irrigation 
Department releases water to the canal when requested by the 
WUA waterman. This facility is not available to members of the 
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Mula Minor No. Y or the other non-transferred canals. The 
IIM(A)-IWMI (1999) study showed that the duration of the 
rotation and the discharge at the head of the minor showed greater 
variation and range on the Mula Minor No. X than on the Minor 
No. Y , showing that the WUA had taken advantage o f the greater 
flexibility that management turnover conferred.3 3 
Another provision is that the water not taken by the WUA 
during the rabi season may be used in the hot weather season after 
a 3 0 % deduction for evaporation losses. This facility is useful for 
the irrigation of sugarcane, particularly if ground water levels are 
low and for the cultivation of high value crops. The WUA has 
taken advantage of this facility several times beginning in 1991-92 
(IIM(A)-IWMI 1999). This facility, again, does not exist for the 
non-transferred canals. 
There have been several changes in the area irrigated and area 
under different crops since the formation of the WUA. The net 
area irrigated increased from 190 ha in 1989-90 to 361 ha in 1995-
96 (IIM(A)-rWMI 1999). The gross area irrigated rose from 257 
hectares to 580 hectares. The quantities o f water received by the 
WUA after the transfer in 1989 are also much higher than before 
transfer (ibid). Further, the WUA is able to use most or all o f its 
annual allocations. Over the period 1985-1995, the irrigation 
intensity on Minor No. X increased from 55% to about 100%. 
Major changes have also taken place in the cropping pattern in 
the command of the WUA (ibid.). The area under sugarcane 
increased from 15% to more than 50% of the gross irrigated area. 
The area under wheat, which used to be a major crop earlier has 
come down from 30% to 15%, though it is still the most important 
rabi crop. The area under oilseeds has also reduced substantially 
from about 35% of the gross irrigated area to less than 3 % in 1994-
95. 
The primary reason for the increase in the area in the Mula 
Minor No. X case is the expansion in the area cultivated in the 
kharif and summer/hot weather seasons. There has also been an 
increase in the area under sugarcane cultivation, because the 
restrictions on sugarcane area that apply to the non-transferred 
canals disappear. The WUA permits farmers to use canal waters to 
irrigate sugarcane. The flexibility in the cropping pattern and the 
greater confidence farmers have regarding the irrigation schedule 
has encouraged farmers to undertake relatively remunerative 
sugarcane cultivation. 
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On the flip side, it could be argued that one expression of the 
'scarcity by design ' in the case of the Lakshmi Narayan WUA is in 
terms of the sanctioned quotas. The season-wise volumetric 
quotas, while they provide a legitimacy to a 'collective' water right, 
provide the outer limit within which the farmers' requests are to be 
sanctioned. The WUA members confirmed that they got what they 
applied for; that is, their requisitions were met within the 
sanctioned quotas, as long as they filled the application form in 
time and had paid their previous dues. One reason that this system 
works is that not all their requirements are met from the canal 
Farmers typically supplement canal irrigation by irrigation from 
bawdis. Similarly, when the canal irrigation is off, in between the 
rotations, they irrigate through their bawdis. This is especially true 
for fruits and vegetables, which require waterings much more 
frequendy than the set schedules of the canal can provide.3 4 
Thus, as in the warabandi cases, one way of coping with 
'scarcity by design' is to meet the gap through ground water 
irrigation. This is also one of the conditions of possibility in the 
WUA, that is, one of the reasons that this system works is that all 
demands do not depend upon it. Similarly, for pearl millet in the 
kharif season, farmers typically wait for the rains. The crop needs 
water 15-20 days after sowing in June/July; they irrigate from the 
canal only when rains fail to deliver. It usually needs 2 waterings 
before its harvest in November or December. 
The other expression of scarcity is when the sanctioned quotas 
are proportionately cut when there is shortage in the reservoir. For 
instance, in the year 2001, there had been 15% of average annual 
rainfall. One fall-out of this "scarcity" was that during rabi 2001-02 
there would only be 2 rotations instead of the usual 3-4. 
Equity in the Case of the Lakshmi Narayan WUA 
In the case of the Lakshmi Narayan WUA, the total number o f 
farmers on the Mula Minor No. X is 400, out of which 112 own 
less than 1 hectare, 206 between 1 to 2 hectares and 82 farmers 
own more than 2 hectares. Thus, at the outset, there is some 
inequality in the land-holding size. 
Starting off with 114 members initially, the number of 
members had risen to 350 by 1999, when I started research on this 
WUA. The main reason cited by the new members for joining was 
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a financial incentive: non-members had to pay 30% more than the 
members for taking water from the minor. The main reason given 
by the others for not taking the membership is that they have their 
own bawdis.35 Among the members of the water users association, 
the largest land-holding size is 3.15 hectares and the smallest land-
holding size is .06 gunthas, or 3x2 meters (one guntha is 33 feet x 33 
feet). 
As in the case of the Rampur WUA, the first benchmark that I 
used for gauging equity was to study the cropping pattern along the 
minor. I focussed mainly on the tail reaches and contrasted them 
with the middle and head reach farmers. I made sure that my 
farmer interviewees cut across different groups and communities: 
the numerically and socially stronger Dahatondes and Jawles and 
the smaller groups of Christians, Muslims and other Maratha 
communities. I interviewed farmers belonging to both the villages 
served by the minor, Gowda and Hastinapur. 
Sugarcane is grown both at the head and the tail reaches; 
wheat/pearl-millet is the dominant rotation at the head as well as 
the tail reaches. In fact, there is one farmer who has 12 acres o f 
land at the tail, all devoted to sugarcane cultivation. He irrigates 
mainly through the canal. The only difference observable in the 
cropping pattern is in terms of fruits. However, this difference is 
because of the variation in the soil type. The soil at the tail reaches 
is o f the heavy, black cotton type unfit for fruit cultivation. It is 
suited only to the cultivation of such crops as sorghum, pearl-
millet, wheat, cotton and sugarcane. 
A related issue, though, is that most of the land of the 
Marathas and Malis, the socially and numerically powerful, is 
located along the head reaches. Another issue is that farmers also 
depend upon groundwater, especially for fruits and vegetables, and 
access to groundwater is an important factor shaping the cropping 
pattern along with the soil type. There was one farmer near the tail 
reaches who said that he grew only chickpea in the rabi season and 
no wheat and sugarcane, because he did not have access to a bawdi. 
Farmers' perceptions 
The second criterion I used for gauging equity was my own 
observation of the process and assessing farmers' perceptions. In 
my own observation of the irrigation and water distribution 
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process along the minor No.X, I did not notice a case o f a 
complaint in whether the water was distributed equitably. All 
farmers were satisfied with the distribution process and there was 
no complaint. The farmers said that they received water in the 
quantities that they applied for, as long as they applied in time and 
paid their dues as well. When the distribution starts, the Paatkaris 
supervise water release in oudets and adjust the gates to ensure 1-
cusec flow and lock the gates to prevent tampering. A red mark is 
put on the Parshall flume that is used to indicate the release of 1 
cusec. I made some random observations o f the process while it 
was on and found it to work satisfactorily. 
However, there was one incident during my association with 
the WUA in which Gharonde Guru, the brother of Gharonde Sir, 
took water out of turn for irrigating groundnut in the kharif season 
of 2000.This case was discussed in the meeting of the Executive 
Committee held in August 2000 and it was decided that he would 
have to pay double the normal rate for irrigating for groundnut.36 
In the case of the Lakshmi Narayan WUA, another level of 
equity is in terms of the comparison of water distribution before 
and after the formation of the WUA. I have shown in chapter 4, 
how before the formation of the WUA, the Paatkaris had to be 
bribed to open the gates, both at the head of the minor as well as 
along the minor. Since the powerful and the elite had a greater 
capacity to bribe the officers, that pattern was inequitable. T o that 
extent the removal of the opportunity for illicit payments at present 
could be considered an equity enhancing effect of the formation of 
the WUA. 
Equity is, however, a more important issue along Minor No. Y , 
located 2 km away in the same village, and where the same 
conditions exist as did on the Mula Minor No. X before the WUA 
was formed. On this minor, resource appropriation has been pre-
empted by the rural elite.37 The difference between the Mula Minor 
No. Y and Mula Minor No. X cases is that in the latter, there is a 
more institutionalised mechanism where defaulters are penalised; 
on the other hand, in the Minor No. Y case, these practices 
themselves have acquired more of an mstitutionalised dimension. 
On the Minor No. Y , the water distribution is more inequitable 
since it favours the pre-emption of the resource by the rural elite. 
This occurs at two levels. The first is the ability of the elite to 
exercise power through illicit payments for water and the second is 
through a flagrant violation of rules, for example, to take water by 
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building obstructions along the minor (picture 6.4). 
PICTURE 6.4 Building diversions along the minor 
A conceptual critique of the basis of water distribution 
My critique on the equity front in both the above cases is at a 
more fundamental, conceptual level. Both in warabandi and 
shejpali, the water distribution principle is not equitable since it is 
based on land, command area and/or crops grown. This translates 
into practice as follows: 'you can only have so much water, because 
you have only so much land'. On the other hand, it could be based 
on a principle where all would get water irrespective of their land-
holding. This could either be an equal water right to all households, 
or in proportion to the size of the family, with some per capita 
requirement. The pattern of water distribution, as practiced in the 
case of the Lakshmi Narayan WUA, as also in the warabandi 
system practiced in Rampur and elsewhere in Haryana, reproduces 
the inequaUty that is created by the pattern of land ownership. A 
system of water distribution that is based on the land-ownership 
pattern is inequitable. 
In Haryana, the Jaats are the strongest numerically, socially and 
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economically. They have the most land (a rough estimate according 
to the village Patwaari was that 85% of the land in the Sitapur 
village belongs to the Jaats). Since warabandi confers water rights in 
accordance with the size of the land holding, they get most access 
to water. Tying a water right to land perpetuates the already 
existing skewed pattern of resource ownership and social and 
economic domination. Social and economic power as measured by 
position in the caste hierarchy and asset ownership is, thus, 
reproduced in access to water. 
Analysing the Irrigator-Engineer Interface 
Before concluding this chapter, I provide some more insights on 
the engineer-irrigator interface as captured through my fieldwork. 
The irrigator-engineer interface is yet another means through 
which the irrigators' access to water is mediated. The usual 
stereotype of the irrigation bureaucracy in the irrigation literature is 
that o f the rent-seeking bureaucrat or the engineer not trained in 
aspects of social and human organisation. Observations of the 
irrigation process provide a viable opportunity to examine other 
dimensions of the farmer-bureaucracy interface more closely. 
In this section, I present a typology of the irrigation engineer as 
captured through the irrigator-engineer interface (see box 6.2). This 
typology does present the irrigator-engineer interface as yet another 
means through which the irrigators' access to water is mediated. 
Here, too, irrigators differ in their ability to mobilise social 
relationships in the pursuit o f their goals. Besides, a closer analysis 
of these forms of interaction may be useful in analysing the role of 
the irrigation engineer as an agent of change, as well as farmers' 
perceptions of it. Reform in irrigation requires action on the part 
of both these actors. 
B o x 6.2 Typologies of the Irrigation Engineer as captured through the 
Irrigator-Engineer interface 
The facilitator 
The facilitator is the irrigation engineer who a farmer turns to for help 
and advice. He is a friend who gives advice on how to handle a 
difficult situation. For instance, the case of the farmer presented below 
(Case A) who went to the Irrigation Office at Rohtak for help when 
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he could not get enough water for his fields. He was advised to build a 
small bandha (embankment) around his oudet. 
Case A 
I headed along the Sitapur minor. I asked this farmer, Balbeer Singh, 
to show me the oudet. There was a graduated scale along the opening; 
when the outlet is run at no.7, it is a sign that the government is giving 
full water, he said. At No. 5 or No.6, it means that it is saving water. 
No. 8 is the right share of farmers at that point. Rarely does the water 
flow at that level. There is also a penalty for breaking the oudet. It 
could be Rs 25 per kila, or any multiple thereof, depending upon the 
mood of the EXEN or the SDO. The rate can be increased and the 
penalty is to be paid at the time of filling the maal. Once he went to 
Rohtak with a group of 5-10 farmers in order to complain about 
water. The SDO suggested that he should build a bandha; when that 
did not work, he broke the oudet (from the way he described it, it 
seemed that it was an open flume). When the farmers are honest, they 
install an open flume, otherwise they install an iron cast oudet, he said. 
The nahari patwari came and inspected the situation. He had to pay 
the fine along with the abiana. The officer was in a good mood so he 
did not fine much; otherwise he could have fined even more 
Similarly, when I was sitting in the CADA office one day, two farmers 
approached the CADA officer for advice (Case B below). 
Case B 
As I stepped out of the CADA office, two farmers were getting out of 
the office. They had earlier spoken to Mr. Sharma who had suggested 
that they speak to the SDO instead. They said that somebody had filed 
a case against them on the grounds that the lining of the watercourse 
was blocking the supply of water to his land. They had to appear in the 
court and they came to ask Mr Sharma for advice. My understanding 
was that Mr Sharma was very sympathetic towards them and advised 
them to go and attend the hearing and to then see what happens. The 
two men were very scared but finally went back consoled and 
comforted. The SDO as well as Mr Sharma advised them that the best 
thing to do would be to attend the case and see what happens. If there 
was a problem, they could come back to them .... 
The gracious provider 
When a farmer applies for a rice shoot, it is his hope that it will be 
sanctioned. Thus, his perception is.." I have applied for a rice shoot, 
now it is up to SDO saahib to sanction it..if he wants, he can sanction 
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it. we will have to see..' Thus, a farmer's ability to irrigate depends 
upon the agency of the Engineer. This role also came out when I 
asked farmers how long the canal would be run. They would 
say.."that depends upon the wishes of the government." 
The whimsical tyrant 
An irrigation engineer is a whimsical tyrant, a person whose wishes 
will decide how much a farmer will be fined for breaking the oudet. 
A person whose wishes and "mood" determine the penalty (Case A, 
above). 
The bribe taker 
When there is a gated control structure, there is an avenue for bribe 
taking. In the Mula Minor No. X case, the Paatkaris that operated the 
gates before the formation of the WUA would fall in this category. 
This is an opportunity created by a certain kind of water distribution 
technology. In the warabandi cases, such opportunities are limited, 
because gated control structures exist only at the level of the 
distributary. However, the form that bribe-taking takes in warabandi 
irrigation is when the beldaar is bribed for allowing the farmers to 
insert a siphon for taking water out of his turn. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has described the water distribution process in the 
oudet commands of the WUAs that I studied. In a system of water 
distribution that is in principle, centrally controlled, farmers seek to 
improve their control over water supplies through a number of 
strategies; by engaging in time exchanges, digging tubewells or by 
buying ground water, applying for a rice shoot and by interfering 
above the oudets as well as by tampering with oudets. The analysis 
o f their coping strategies shows that they mobilise different 
normative systems to overcome a constraint of water scarcity. The 
analysis of equity in warabandi irrigation suggests that there is 
inequity in water distribution at the oudet level because o f technical 
factors related to the canal and the variation in the quality of the 
groundwater. However, even while there is elite domination at the 
level o f the working of the WUA, it does not spill over into the 
water distribution process. 
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Notes 
1 See the assessment of the warabandi system in chapter 2. 
2 For a similar discussion of responses in Pakistan, see Wahaj (2001). See 
also Bandaragoda and Rehman (1995), Bandaragoda and Firdousi (1992) 
and Merrey (1986b). 
3 See the discussion on legal pluralism in chapter 1. 
4 For instance, in the chak under the Rampur oudet, each kila of land is 
allocated 14.5 minutes of irrigation. 
5 This is similar to the notion of biradari observed by Bandaragoda and 
Firdousi (1992) and Merrey (1986a, 1986b) in Pakistan. Bandaragoda and 
Firdousi (1992) describe biradari as a socially evolved institution that 
forms part of the institutional framework for water management in 
Pakistan. This kinship relationship serves important economic and social 
functions in rural life, and tends to promote cooperation and conflict 
resolution. Merrey (1986b) notes that roles and norms through which 
irrigation is carried out are embedded in the larger social structure 
especially the kinship-based biradari system and an appreciation of this 
embeddedness is necessary in designing irrigation management 
interventions. See also a discussion of the concept of izzat, or honour, in 
Merrey (1986a). See also Wahaj (2001). 
6 Similarly, a farmer that I spoke to said that his elder brother had brought 
The analysis of water distribution in shejpali reinforces the 
theme of chapter 4. The operation of shejpali requires a number o f 
operations and procedures to be carried out, and there is a case for 
transferring these functions to irrigators to improve the manner in 
which these practices are carried out. It is interesting to note that in 
the Lakshmi Narayan case, the formation of the WUA enabled the 
irrigators to get much more water than the designed allocation. 
Hence, the WUA has emerged as a means of getting more water. 
The WUA formation improves the control of the farmers over the 
quantity and timing of water supply. These possibilities are absent 
in warabandi irrigation. 
The analysis of equity in the two WUAs suggests that in 
shejpali, WUA formation can potentially have equity-enhancing 
effects by bringing a measure of order to how water is distributed. 
There is a possibility that WUA formation curbs opportunities for 
illicit payments and secures greater equity across head and tail 
reaches. In warabandi irrigation, the effects of WUA formation on 
equity in water distribution are likely to be very limited; in fact, they 
would be negligible. 
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up his son and daughter, all because of his bhaichaara -with him. 
7 Taking water for a longer period of time enables a farmer to get the full 
irrigation spread out properly in the plot of land. Thus, the possibility of a 
deviation on the basis of bhaichaara based organisation makes it possible 
for a farmer to make his water right more effective by making field 
application more efficient. 
8For Pakistan, Bandaragoda and Rehman (1995) note that modified 
rotation schedules display a greater degree of flexibility. Water users along 
a watercourse change their turns to suit their preferences and 
convenience. 
9 For Pakistan, Bandaragoda and Firdousi (1992) note "the overriding 
effect of socially evolved informal institutions over the application of 
formal rules and management decisions" (Bandaragoda and Firdousi 
1992: xv). " . . .The tradition of biradari in many parts of Pakistan remains 
a strong social norm, often operating against the formal rules of 
irrigation" (Bandaragoda and Firdausi 1992: 24). See also Meinzen-Dick 
and Bakker (2001): local norms and practices may differ from all of the 
other types of "water law". 
1 0 In Rampur village, this rate varies anywhere from Rs 4000 to Rs 10000 
per kila for a year, depending on the quality of the land. The land located 
near the canal commands the highest price, as much as Rs. 10, 000 per 
kila. 
1 1 Another practice among farmers who do not need water when their 
turn is on is to keep the oudet closed. This is prohibited under the 
Haryana Canal and Drainage Act of 1974. 
1 2 Bandaragoda and Rehman (1995) make the same observation for 
Pakistan, namely, that for the canal surface water supply to the 
watercourse, exchange is more common than selling. Meinzen-Dick 
(1996a) notes that sales in canal water are less common than sales in 
groundwater. 
1 3 This amount is independent of the quantity. It is an hourly rate. 
1 4 I wanted to measure the seepage loss towards the end of my fieldwork, 
but work had started on remodelling the watercourse, and the watercourse 
was in a topsy-turvy condition, so I would no longer get a measure of 
what was normally lost on the way. 
1 5 This is expressed as the concentration range of total dissolved solids in 
milligrams per litre. 
1 6 The pipe makes the canal and the hawdi communicating vessels. 
1 7 This means that the discharge depends on the upstream water level 
only. In this case, it depends on the water level in the distributary. 
1 8 Interview with Gauge Reader at the head of the Sitapur Minor, 
September 19,2000. 
1 9 The blue bull, the largest of the antelopes, is so called because it 
resembles a bull, and has a blue colour. 
2 0 The tail-enders do not sell their water share. Tail-enders' reliance on 
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tube well water is also quite high. They have to leave their land fallow 
when the water does not reach them effectively. Some land is left fallow 
for want of water. 
2 1 It was difficult to get a date exactly on when warabandi came to the 
village. The village elderly often said that the introduction of warabandi 
coincided with the time that watches were introduced. Before that, the 
time for taking water was approximated by the position of the sun and the 
moon. 
2 2 There are 2 varieties of sugarcane; Adhsali, an 18-month crop, that is 
sown in July-August and harvested in November-December and Sum, a 
12- month crop, planted in November and harvested in November-
December. Both jowar and bajri are staple food crops in Maharashtra. 
They are grown for subsistence. Wheat is grown both for subsistence as 
well as for the market. Sugarcane and groundnut are commercial crops. 
2 3 A comparison of the allocated quotas with the designed allocation on 
the MRBC as well as the designed allocation in the Rampur WUA was 
presented in chapter 2. 
2 4 Unlike in warabandi irrigation farmers have an option to apply or not to 
apply for water in a season. 
2 5 Refer to the terms and conditions presented in the Memorandum of 
Understanding that is signed with WUA formation between the WUA and 
the Irrigation Department in chapter 3. 
2 6 Normally, smaller demands of up to .5 ha are admitted in full, and cuts 
are applied to the demands for larger areas. 
2 7 Earlier a notice was also put on the individual outiets. But it was often 
torn by village children. So, the practice was discontinued. 
2 8 It is interesting to note that with the specification of the time for which 
a farmer is to take water in this system, it comes very close to how the 
warabandi system works on the field (below the outlet) in North West 
India. In fact, during my interviews with the farmers, when I asked one of 
the farmers how he took water, he pointed to his watch and said, 
"according to time." 
2 9 When the WUA is not formed, this task is done by the Paatkari from 
the Irrigation Department. 
3 0 This Parshall flume is located on the downstream side of the pipe 
outiets. 
3 1 Their duty is also to repair and maintain the field channels. Repairs 
include desilting and deweeding. They also submit item-wise accounts 
and state the quantity of material used for construction on each field 
channel and minor and inform the society's office of any repairs needed 
to maintain the design flows in the field channels and to carry out repairs 
after approval (Lele and Patil 1994). They keep daily water accounts. At 
the end of the rotation, they prepare a completion report on water used: 
Oudet and area wise, area irrigated, AI/DC, seepage losses, etc and 
submit to the society's office. The WUA hires labour for cleaning the 
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watercourses. 
3 2 This point emerged in an interview with one of the Paatkaris of the 
WUA. I was sitting in a teashop and interviewing him. As soon as I 
mentioned about the panchanama, there was sort of a furore. It seemed to 
be a real act of shame and dishonour to be issued a panchanama. 
3 3 I f all canals were given the same treatment as Mula X, the operational 
schedule at the system level would automatically become more rigid. It 
would have to be streamlined, as large canals need more time to adjust to 
changed quantities. Therefore, the flexibility in the Mula minor No. X 
case depends on the fact that it is one of the few WUAs working on these 
conditions. 
3 4 There are 142 groundwater structures in the command of the Minor No 
X. It is important to note that most of these wells were dug after the 
project waters were introduced: at present, too, they gain from recharge 
through the canal waters. 
3 5 This is a paradox since most of this well water is from recharge from 
the canals. 
3 6 See chapter 4. 
3 7 See chapter 5. 
7 
Reform in Indian canal irrigation has been considered "necessary 
and inevitable" (Mollinga 2000: 91). In this book it has been 
shown under what conditions WUA formation would be an 
appropriate strategy for irrigation reform. It has also been shown 
that collective action in canal irrigation is shaped by technology and 
social relations. Collective action is a sociotechnical process. In the 
following sections of this chapter, the main conclusions of this 
book are summarised. In the first part of this chapter, the main 
policy conclusions are presented. In the second part, the theoretical 
framework is revisited. The chapter concludes with a discussion of 
some avenues for further research on protective irrigation and on 
irrigation management reform. 
An Agenda for Reform in Canal Irrigation 
Proposals for reform in Indian canal irrigation usually cut across a 
range of closely related themes. There is an emphasis on correcting 
the incentives facing the users and providers of water through 
pricing, financial accountability, autonomy and privatisation, and 
water rights reform and market creation (Saleth 1996a, 1996b; Rao 
and Gulati 1994; Mitra 1996, 1998). Other recurring themes are 
securing greater co-ordination and integration within the water 
sector as well as its mamstreaming into overall development 
programmes, making technical improvements in system 
management, and devolution of functions and powers to user 
groups to secure decentralisation (Mollinga 2000; Vaidyanathan 
1999). One limitation of these proposals is that they tend to be 
Conclusion 
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uniform, taking technology as a black box. On the other hand, a 
different range of policy options will be effective under warabandi 
and shejpali irrigation, taking account of the differences in the 
technology for water distribution. 
Pricing 
Pricing irrigation water to reflect its scarcity value through the 
elimination of subsidies has been a major theme in canal irrigation 
reform (GOI 1987; Gulati and Chadha 1999). It is argued that 
underpricing of agricultural inputs creates wasteful use. However, i f 
the policy goal is efficiency and water saving, as it usually is, then 
pricing will be an ineffective tool in the warabandi irrigation of 
Northwest India (Punjab, Haryana and Uttar Pradesh). Here, a 
farmer draws a fixed water share (regardless of the price that he 
pays). A farmer's appropriation of water is limited by the warabandi 
system of water rationing, and mediated by borrowing on die basis 
of bhaichaara. Raising the price of water will not, per se, cause a 
farmer to use less of it.'Similarly, if the goal is resource generation 
for the upkeep of systems, then, under the present institutional set-
up, it would be ineffective. Resources go into the state exchequer, 
rather than into the State Irrigation Department. Thus, pricing of 
irrigation water will be an ineffective tool for canal irrigation 
reform in Northwest India, where the warabandi system of 
irrigation is present. The more effective strategies for water saving 
and equity would have to focus on preventing farmers from taking 
more than their protective share of water, by tampering with 
oudets, for instance, so that tail-end farmers receive their 
entitlement (as in the case of Sitapur). This is more o f an 
accountability issue that calls for responsible governance at the 
local level. Pricing in itself, will not be a potent tool to accomplish 
these goals. 
The switch from crop/area basis o f pricing to volumetric 
pricing may not be a practical one in the warabandi system, though 
it is a practical strategy in shejpali. With gated pipe oudets, the 
installation of measuring devices such as the V-notch and the 
standing wave flume make it possible to implement volumetric 
deliveries and pricing to user groups below the oudets. In Haryana, 
with ungated pipe oudets, open flumes and APMs, that are 
designed to receive a proportionate discharge of water from the 
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main system, volumetric supplies to user groups may not be a 
practical strategy. I f the formation of user groups and volumetric 
supplies has to be introduced in the warabandi areas, it would have 
to be at the level of the distributary.2 
Irrigation Management Transfer 
It has been shown in this book that the scope of functions that can 
be transferred to water users is very limited in warabandi irrigation. 
In the shejpali areas of Western India, with gated pipe oudets, there 
is a possibility that WUAs take over the water distribution function, 
improve water control, and curb opportunities for illicit and extra 
water payments. There is also a possibility of changing control 
relations between the users and the bureaucracy and putting in 
place a set of mutual accountability relationships. In the warabandi 
areas, on the other hand, the scope for transfer o f powers to users 
or for changing control relations between the users and the 
Irrigation Department is much more limited. As shown in chapter 
4, WUA formation will have very limited effects on water 
management and distribution practices in warabandi irrigation, 
except when allocation and distribution at higher levels would 
come under farmer governance. 
Property rights and market creation 
The creation of water markets through the institution of well-
defined, tradable property rights is often advocated as a policy 
option in canal irrigation. The premise is inspired by fundamental 
neo-classical economics: well-defined, secure property rights in 
water, will, through an invisible hand, lead to a situation where 
water is allocated to the highest valued uses and a price will emerge 
that is a market clearing equilibrium price. Further, this price, when 
it is constituted through the interface of the forces of demand and 
supply, will convey the scarcity value of water (Rosegrant and 
Binswanger 1994; Meinzen-Dick and Mendoza 1996; Anderson 
and Snyder 1997). 
The case for market creation through a regime of wen-defined, 
tradable property rights is built on many grounds. Firsdy, it is 
argued that excessive resource depletion and environmental 
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degradation are the result of misleading price signals, which result 
from the absence o f markets in resources and environmental assets. 
Establishment of secure property rights should lead to the 
emergence of markets and scarcity prices for the resource in 
question. With exclusive and secure property rights, resource 
depletion is internalised (Panayotou 1994). Once the water rights 
systems are set up, it is argued, water markets in water scarce areas 
will establish the market value o f water, which is also a reflection 
of the opportunity cost of water (Kemper and Olson 2000). 
Secondly, secure property rights are advocated on grounds that 
they could empower users (Rosegrant and Binswanger 1994). 
Security of tenure could lead to long term investments in water 
saving, cause users to consider the opportunity costs of water and 
to use it efficiendy, and gain additional income from the sale o f 
water and internalise externalities. It would be more responsive to 
changes in water values as demand patterns and comparative 
advantage change. Thirdly, it is argued that when water can be 
made available to meet demand through water markets, it reduces 
the need for constructing cosdy supply oriented infrastructure and 
leads to a more rational and economically viable allocation of water 
resources (Kemper and Olson 2000). 3 
These arguments are challenged by the sceptics of markets 
(Young 1986; Bolding, Mollinga and Straaten 1995; Moore 1989). 
It is argued that water markets of the kind envisioned by neo-
liberal enthusiasts would not emerge in canal irrigation. Several 
factors restrict trade in water; the inhibiting supply characteristics 
include mobility, economies of large size, uncertainty and variations 
in supply and availability o f alternative sources of supply. Other 
factors include high costs o f storage and conveyance and high 
transaction costs relative to likely gains from potential exchange. 
Apart from economic values, communities associate a certain sense 
o f security and control with water over and above its direct 
economic significance, which may cause the emergence of a market 
to be 'sluggish'.4 
Under conditions o f protective irrigation, where water is 
'scarce by design', as in the case of warabandi irrigation in Haryana, 
the possibilities of water markets emerging are very limited. While 
there are some sales, they are confined geographically. The basis o f 
a water sale is a surplus. A farmer chooses to sell his water right 
only after he has met his own requirements. When a farmer's water 
right is inadequate relative to his requirement, as is the case here, 
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there is no saleable surplus. Thus, the basis for the sale o f a water 
right is limited. 
Farmers have a psychological resistance to selling their water 
share. It is something that is just "not done". When a farmer does 
not need his water share, he chooses to lend it instead of selling it. 
This is because lending his water share creates a basis for a future 
claim, since the borrower is obliged to return it. Further, where 
groundwater supplies are inadequate and/or of an inferior quality, 
as they are in the case of the Sitapur and the Rampur villages, 
dependence on canal irrigation shall continue to be high. Thus, 
while theoretically the argument in favour of market creation may 
sound neat and appealing, this argument acquires a new dimension 
when placed in the context of the design characteristics of canal 
irrigation. 
Proposals for water rights reform and market creation need to 
take account of existing notions of property rights, rather than start 
from a premise that no property rights exist, or that they are ill-
defined or insecure. Any new system of water rights that is 
imposed will articulate with existing systems and notions of water 
rights. It is important to be conscious of how this articulation 
would take place, and what its effects are likely to be. 
Presented below is a matrix for policy reform in Indian canal 
irrigation. It summarises how the potential for reform varies with 
the design across warabandi and shejpali irrigation. 
A policy matrix for reform in Indian canal irrigation 
Policy 
Instrument 
Water 
Distribution Effective Practical 
System 
Comments 
Pricing shejpali Yes Yes Introduction of 
volumetric supplies to 
user groups and 
installation of measuring 
devices at the head of 
gated pipe outlets is 
possible. This can create 
incentives for efficient 
water use if fixed quotas 
are agreed upon and 
incentives for savings 
introduced (e.g. water 
saved in this season can be 
used in the next). 
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warabandi No No Volumetric pricing cannot 
be introduced. Oudets are 
designed to receive 
proportional supplies 
from the main system. An 
increase in the price of 
water will not cause the 
farmers to use less of it. 
Rights shejpali Yes Yes Well-defined water rights 
Reform at the level of user groups 
can be instituted by 
agreeing on quotas 
(according to season, e.g.) 
to be supplied to them. 
The users can then evolve 
a basis for sharing water. 
•warabandi No No Water rights already 
exist at the level of the 
community (chak) and 
the individual (the war 
share, or awsara). 
IMT warabandi No Yes At the moment, water 
user associations are being 
formed below the outlet. 
At this level, there is an 
effective warabandi system 
and there is cooperation in 
cleaning the watercourses 
and field channels. The 
management problems are 
above the outlet. 
shejpali Yes Yes User groups taking over 
the control over gated 
outlets can improve their 
control over water and 
make the bureaucracy 
accountable by entering 
into a contract for 
volumetric water supplies. 
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Analysing policy implementation 
Chapter 3 examined the process of policy implementation for 
estabhshing WUAs in Haryana and Maharashtra. The experience o f 
these states was briefly compared with that of other Indian states 
where PIM reforms are at different levels of formulation or 
implementation. 
The major critique of the PIM process in Haryana is that (1) it 
is not part of an overall irrigation sector reform strategy (2) it does 
not result in any redefinition of control relations between the users 
and the bureaucracy and (3) it does not involve the Irrigation 
Department. 
At the moment, PIM is an ineffective strategy in Haryana. 
There is no perceptible change in the equation between the farmers 
and the Irrigation Department and there is no reorientation of the 
bureaucracy. In a system that is predominandy supply driven and 
centrally controlled, there is no improvement in the control that 
farmers have over the avaflability of water. Neither is there an 
improvement in resource generation, nor an effect on the savings 
o f water. The only benefit comes from lining the watercourse that 
reduces the seepage losses. This, however, is a technical 
improvement resulting from lining the watercourse but does not 
have anything to do with the formation of the water users 
association. 
The issue that deserves emphasis is that the more important 
management challenges in Haryana are above the watercourses: 
tampering with outiets, inserting siphons to extract more than the 
protective entitlement and bribing the employees of the Irrigation 
Department for being allowed to do so. By focussing on 
institutional change exclusively below the oudet, the Irrigation 
Department has evaded the real management issues. There is some 
complacency in the state within the Irrigation Department on 
grounds that there is no need for PIM since the warabandi system 
itself is a form of farmer participation. The point that needs 
appreciation is that warabandi is a system of water distribution, in 
which farmers are involved. There is a need for reform, but it is 
needed at a level that is different from where it is concentrated 
now. Whether this should be achieved through a greater 
accountability of the Irrigation Department or by building farmers' 
organisations at that level is another question. However, the way 
warabandi works, through a centralised operation, does limit the 
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effective transfer o f control that is possible to the farmers. 
Warabandi is more difficult to decentralise than shejpali.5 
A contrast between the Lakshmi Narayan WUA and the 
Sitapur WUA suggests that forming WUAs in a desperate bid to 
replicate small scale community irrigation systems or as project 
implementation vehicles is futile unless there is control over the 
main system and a balance between the rights and obligations of 
the Water Users Associations is struck.6 Technical and institutional 
reform below the oudet is meaningless in the absence of effective 
management of the main system. The point raised by Wade and 
Chambers (1980) about managing 'the blind spot' is indeed relevant 
in the case of the Sitapur WUA. 
Chapter 3 has examined why PIM does not spread in the state 
of Maharashtra. Maharashtra has a rich tradition of cooperatives, 
known for their number, viability, variety and durability (Attwood 
and Baviskar 1995a, 1995b). In such a state, why does PIM not 
spread at the rate at which cooperation spills over in all other 
agrarian sectors? Within the state, there is resistance among the 
actors - the bureaucracy as well as the farmers - who stand to gain 
from the status quo and resist efforts at WUA formation. NGOs 
have made efforts to replicate PIM initiatives. However, they are 
limited in their ability to push them forward beyond a certain scale. 
The PIM "model" in the shejpali system in Maharashtra is a 
more meaningful one than in Haryana in that it seeks to alter the 
relationship between the users and the bureaucracy and creates a 
relationship of mutual accountability between them. Further, it 
seeks to improve the control that farmers have over water 
availability. The stumbling block in Maharashtra is the absence o f a 
consistent strategy or policy approach, which leaves much to 
chance and to the discretion of the concerned officers. 
There is a wide variety of factors promoting management 
transfer across the states of India; there is as much variety in the 
extent of functions transferred to user groups as well as the modus 
operandi o f effecting turnover (Brewer et al. 1999; Hooja and Joshi 
2000; Parthasarathy 1998; Mollinga 2001b). However, a critical 
question, that has received very little attention, and which deserves 
much more place in the discourses on the subject, is whether the 
formation of water users associations does result in the creation of 
mutual accountability relations between the users and the 
bureaucracy. That is, does this effort make the bureaucracy 
accountable to user groups by improving their control over water 
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supplies, or do WUAs essentially remain arms of the bureaucracy 
carrying out functions delegated to them, with litde or no matching 
powers and rewards?7 
Another important question is whether state governments are 
clear about why they wish to implement PIM reforms and whether 
there is some internal reflection of what PIM seeks to achieve. 
When a policy or a "model" is imported from abroad, or pushed 
down a government's throat as a reform conditionality in an effort 
to replicate success elsewhere, it is likely to face impediments when 
it does not find support among the affected constituencies, as has 
been the case in Haryana and Maharashtra. 
However, as shown in chapter 3, the experience with PIM 
reforms in the states of Gujarat and Karnataka has some interesting 
insights to offer. In Karnataka, the formation of Sahayog, an 
N G O , provides a platform where reform proposals are debated 
and negotiated (Mollinga 2001b). This has served as a mechanism 
to monitor the implementation process. Gujarat has some 
interesting experiences to offer through the initiation of Process 
Documentation Research (Parthasarathy 2000; Shashidharan 2000). 
Both these mechanisms provide useful means of a feedback 
process on the implementation of PIM reforms. They are a 
welcome move from the quantitative targets resorted to by the 
bureaucracy to monitor farmer participation in "their" programmes. 
In India, Andhra Pradesh has provided an example of a big 
bang approach to management transfer, much on the lines of 
Mexico and Turkey (Peter 2000; World Bank 1999b; Parthasarathy 
1998). What the Andhra 'model' has to offer in terms of learning is 
not so much the scale and the much hyped about 'political will ', 
but that there is an effort to integrate different elements of the 
reform process into a holistic strategy. Creating resource user 
organisations, a threefold increase in the price of water, reorienting 
user-bureaucracy relationships and improvements through physical 
rehabilitation have been carried out as elements of a 
comprehensive reform approach. This is where the Andhra 
experience contrasts with that particularly of Haryana. 
That there is an integration of different elements of reform 
places the experience of Andhra Pradesh in much the same line as 
that of Maharashtra. The difference is in the approach. Unlike 
Andhra's drastic, big bang approach, Maharashtra's slow, but steady 
approach emphasising gradual expansion of the numbers and 
geographical coverage of WUAs means that it would take a long 
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time before PIM is on a scale that makes a tangible difference to 
the accomplishment o f policy objectives such as resource 
generation, improving financial recoveries or lowering the 
administrative burden on the Irrigation Department. The 
experience o f Maharashtra and the neighbouring state of Gujarat is 
similar in that they both move through gradual N G O initiatives at 
organising farmers for management turnover, when in both states 
farmers have themselves experimented with institutional forms in 
other sectors that have been replicated steadily in their surrounds. 
On the PIM front, however, as in other states, farmers have only 
been the recipients of reform (Mollinga 2001b). A general critique 
of the PIM policy process is that the process itself has not been 
participatory enough (Mollinga 1998a, 2001b). 
A Theoretical Framework for Institutional Analysis in Canal Irrigation 
The theoretical framework for this book, as noted in chapter 1, 
highlights two levels of interaction (1) between the users and the 
bureaucracy, mediated by technology, social relations and rules for 
water distribution and (2) among the users, where, too, the 
interactions are mediated by technology, social relationships, and 
rules for water distribution.8 
Technology, water control and self-governance 
It has been shown in this book that technology, or design, is an 
important element in analysing the organisational behaviour and 
dynamics of water users associations. Design influences the extent 
to which water management and distribution practices can change 
through WUA formation and the extent to which the relationship 
between the users and the bureaucracy can be altered. Therefore, it 
has implications for the extent to which decentralisation can be 
effected in canal irrigation and vibrant, self-governing resource user 
organisations can develop to that effect. 
The design characteristics of canal irrigation have implications 
for (1) the extent of devolution of powers to user groups and (2) 
the extent to which turnover of control can be effected through 
Irrigation Management Transfer. For these reasons, the discussion 
of technology is important in discussions of Irrigation Management 
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Transfer, and technology should be seen as a key element in a 
theoretical framework for the study of WUAs. 
Influence of patterns of social organisation and reproduction of 
power relations 
This research suggests that understanding social relations, patterns 
of social organisation and power structures within a community is 
essential for understanding the processes of local resource 
management. General patterns of social organisation, such as 
organisation by castes and groups, local politics and domination by 
those already in positions of prestige and power find expression in 
the processes of local water management. In the case of the 
Executive Committee of the Lakshmi Narayan WUA, membership 
drew from mainly the upper caste Marathas (Dahatonde, Jawle, 
Shelke and Ukeerde). These castes are the more powerful castes in 
the village, numerically and in terms of land ownership. Similarly, in 
the case of the Rampur WUA, the society is organised into tholas 
or ancestral family units. The membership of the Executive 
Committee was constituted by drawing representation from each 
thola. The activities of the WUA were dominated by 
representatives of the tholas who were numerically the strongest on 
the watercourse. 
This research also generates some insights on the role of WUA 
leadership in the processes of local water management. This role is 
exercised by (1) convincing farmers of the benefits of collective 
organisation (2) bearing the organisational burden in terms of 
negotiating for management transfer and (3) lobbying for change 
and representing the case of farmers to the Irrigation Department. 
Further, the local leadership often comes from people who are 
already influential in the local society. In the case o f the Lakshmi 
Narayan WUA, leadership came from people who also held, or had 
held in the past, positions on other influential village bodies, such 
as the village multi-purpose co-operative credit society, the 
sugarcane co-operative factories and the village Panchayat. Two of 
the present members also have political affiliations. In fact, one of 
them has, at some point of time or the other, held positions in 
virtually all the village level organisations: the sugarcane co-
operative factory, the multi-purpose village credit co-operative 
society and the village Panchayat. 
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A perspective on rules and law 
Rational choice theorists who study local resource management lay 
much emphasis on rules for resource management and 
appropriation (Ostrom 1990, 1992; Tang 1991, 1992). This 
research supports the view that rules are important in that they 
serve to enable and constrain human behaviour; however, they are 
mainly mobilised as resources by individuals to achieve particular 
objectives. Besides, individuals differ in their ability to mobilise 
rules as resources. This ability is shaped by social relationships. 
An mter-disriplinary perspective on rules in canal irrigation 
also shows that rules are an expression of a certain configuration of 
technology and social relations. In warabandi irrigation, for 
instance, the water distribution rule o f sharing water in proportion 
to the size of the land-holding is a particular system of rationing 
scarce water that defines water rights in proportion to the size of 
the land-holding. Further, this water distribution 'rule' is mediated 
through lending and borrowing on the basis o f bhaichaara, and to 
that extent is embedded in social relations. A different design 
principle in shejpali is associated with a different definition of a 
water right. 
Understanding local power relations is essential for 
understanding the processes o f local water management. In the 
case of the Rampur WUA, leadership is concentrated among three 
position holders. They are three large farmers who take part in the 
auction of the village Panchayat land and lend money to other 
smaller farmers and provide agricultural implements and tractors 
on hire. Their lord-like position in the WUAs is an extension of 
their lord-like position outside the WUA and their location in 
village networks that allocate resources and agricultural inputs. 
They share information and power mutually, to the exclusion of 
others. They use the resources of the WUA to further their own 
interests or to get the watercourses serving their fields repaired. 
Their location in village networks enables them to evade 
accountability to WUA members. There is a constant sense o f 
distrust between the management committee and the other 
members of the water users association. When there is a local level 
mechanism for the management of water, it may not necessarily 
mean that this structure is egalitarian, transparent and accountable. 
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The analysis of warabandi irrigation points to the existence of 
legal pluralism in water distribution, that refers to the existence of 
several, often contradictory normative orders pertaining to the 
same social field (Benda Beckmann, F von 1988, 1999; Spiertz 
2000; Merry 1988; Griffiths 1986; Spiertz and Wiber 1996, Bruns 
and Meinzen-Dick 2000). The analysis of the water distribution 
process under warabandi suggests that there is more than one 
normative system that forms the basis of water distribution. While 
a farmer's water right is defined by the time for which he is to take 
water in the warabandi schedule, farmers deviate from this 
schedule and justify the deviation on the basis of bhaichaara based 
organisation.9 
Along a continuum of bureaucratically driven, user-based and 
market allocation, Meinzen-Dick and Mendoza (1996) explain the 
water distribution process under warabandi as being 
bureaucratically driven. However, this research suggests that the 
water distribution process under warabandi is an interface of 
bureaucratically driven and user-based modes of distribution. 
Further, when there are some localised sales, all three forms of 
water allocation can co-exist. I have also explained the emergence 
of the institution of time exchanges at the interface of the technical 
characteristics of canal irrigation and plural legal repertoires. 
An Agenda for Further Research 
I conclude this chapter with a discussion of the areas where there is 
scope for further research. 
Reorienting the bureaucracy 
An important focus in the literature on water users associations has 
been on the effects of PIM on cost recovery, financial viability and 
agricultural productivity. This is not surprising since the pressures 
for reform have been driven by a need to redefine the role of the 
state, generate resources and conform to pressure from multilateral 
organisations and donors. Thus, research has focussed on the 
conditions under which WUA formation could take place in canal 
irrigation.10 There is a need for further research in understanding 
the spirit of reform behind PIM. This would call for qualitative, 
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process-based research that seeks to capture the processes through 
which policies for WUA estabhshment are implemented. 
Further research is needed in understanding the interface 
between users and the bureaucracy and whether the nature of this 
relationship undergoes a transformation with the formation of 
water users associations. The role of the irrigation bureaucracy in 
PIM processes needs to be further examined. A question that 
perhaps needs much more careful attention is whether the 
formation of the water users association makes the bureaucracy 
accountable to water users, and improves the effectiveness with 
which water is supplied. 
Accountability and processes of local water management 
Another area for further research could be in understanding the 
management processes o f water users associations to gauge 
whether local level governance structures are institutions of mass 
civil society participation. Within a community that manages a 
natural resource like water, there is a case for research on who 
participates, who takes major decisions and whether local level 
governance structures are transparent and accountable to their 
members. The observations and analysis of the processes in the 
Rampur WUA support the contention that there may be a myth 
about community. The grass is not always green at the roots. A 
methodological impEcation from this point as well as the preceding 
one is that there is a case for quaEtative, process-based research 
that seeks to capture interactions in different arenas, at different 
levels and among different actors. 
Coping with scarcity by design 
There is scope for further research in understanding how farmers 
cope with scarcity under protective irrigation systems in India. In 
both the shejpaE and the warabandi cases, there are coping 
mechanisms. In the shejpaE case, this mainly takes the form of 
supplementing through irrigation from weEs. In the warabandi 
case, time exchanges, supplementing through groundwater 
irrigation, buying a water share or tampering with outiets are 
responses to a system of water rationing. In particular, the forms 
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that they take are influenced by prevailing patterns of social 
relationships (such as bhaichaara in the warabandi case, that forms 
the basis o f a time exchange). Further research and documentation 
of the coping mechanisms under conditions of protective irrigation 
is, therefore, another area for further research. 
Mamstrearning discussions on technology 
Discussions on technology need to be mainstreamed into 
discussions on Participatory Irrigation Management and irrigation 
sector reform. Policy-makers and academics need to be conscious 
o f the implications of technology - the design characteristics of 
canal irrigation as weE as the physical manifestations of it, such as 
oudets and hydrauEc structures - for reform proposals. In other 
words, the black box of technology needs to be opened with far 
greater seriousness in debating canal irrigation reform proposals. 
Analysing the irrigator-engineer interface 
There is a case for ethnographic research and analysis of the forms 
that the irrigator-engineer interface can take. This is essential 
because the irrigation bureaucracy can be a catalyst of change and 
to that extent understanding the forms of interaction between the 
irrigators and the bureaucracy is essential. The case o f the Mula 
Minor No. X WUA presented in chapter 4 suggests that there is a 
way out of the 'anarchy syndrome' in canal irrigation (Wade 1988). 
The instaEation of volumetric devices at the head of the minor 
leads to the creation of mutual accountabiEty relations between the 
irrigators and the irrigation bureaucracy and the 'prisoners' dilemma 
situation' can be overcome. Assessing the prospects for reform in 
canal irrigation, thus, requires us to take a more positive view of 
the bureaucracy itself as a faciEtator of change, as weE as the 
technological and social conditions under which this may happen. 
Notes 
1 Simply put, under warabandi irrigation, water consumption cannot be 
tied to the price of water, because entitlements are expressed as shares 
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and not as volumes. 
2 That may not be viable considering the large areas served by 
distributaries. Effecting volumetric supplies to farmer groups at that level 
will require co-ordination across oudets. 
3 Reidinger (1994) argues that three conditions must hold for water 
markets to function effectively: water rights must be clearly specified and 
legally enforceable, water supplies should be reliable and delivered on a 
volumetric basis and there must exist some form of water users 
organisation. 
4 See also the discussion on the impacts of market-oriented reform 
policies in Mexico (Kloezen 2002). Kloezen argues that cost-recovery, 
financial autonomy and water pricing and marketing need to be seen as 
sorio-political constructs. The behaviour of actors in settings of market 
creation is not purely guided by conditions of economic rationality, but 
also shaped by social and political factors. For a similar analysis of the 
mixed effects of market creation in Chile, see Bauer (1997). Bauer shows 
how sales in canal water tend to be limited on account of several 
geographical, local and cultural factors. 
5 See also the discussion of the concept of hydraulic decentralisation in 
Mollinga (1998a). 
6 See also Hunt (1989), Ambler (1994), Goldensohn (1994), Byrnes 
(1992), Mollinga (1998b) and Maloney and Raju (1984). 
7 See also Narain (2000). 
8 This could be contrasted with new institutional economics approaches 
to collective action that focus essentially on rules for resource 
appropriation and management. See, for instance, Ostrom (1990, 1992) 
and Tang (1991,1992). 
9 That there are normative repertoires outside state law that shape the 
process of water distribution is also seen elsewhere in the literature 
(Meinzen-Dick 2000a; Moench 1998; Vermillion 2000; Merrey 1986a, 
1986b). 
1 0 See, for instance, Uphoff (1986), Meinzen-Dick (1996b, 2000b), Ambler 
(1994), Maloney and Raju (1994), Gulati, Meinzen-Dick and Raju (1999), 
Meinzen-Dick, Raju and Gulati (2000, 2002), Brewer et al. (1999), Shah 
(2000), Verrniffion (1999), and Kolavalli and Brewer (1999). 
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Summary 
This research is on water users associations in canal irrigation. The 
policy objective of this research is to contribute to debates on 
Irrigation Management Transfer and irrigation reform. The 
theoretical objective is to contribute to an inter-disciplinary 
understanding of water users associations as shaped by technology, 
or the design of canal irrigation and social relationships. From this 
perspective, there are two sub-questions: First, what are the 
implications of the design of canal irrigation for estabhshing WUAs 
and second, what are the internal organisational dynamics o f 
WUAs, or how do WUAs behave as organisational entities? 
T o answer these questions, research was carried out in two 
Indian states. The first was Haryana, in Northwest India, that has 
the warabandi system of water distribution, and the second was 
Maharashtra, in Western India, that has the shejpali system of water 
distribution. 
The first issue investigated in this research is whether, and how, 
technology -or the design of canal irrigation - matters in estabhshing 
WUAs. The physical layout of a system places requirements on the 
operational and organisational structure. That shapes the nature of 
human organisation that fits with the design of canal irrigation. The 
levels and nature of control that irrigation system operation confers 
influence the extent to which control relations can be changed 
between the users and the bureaucracy. The warabandi system of 
water distribution has a different potential for reform through WUA 
estabHshment than does shejpali 
The second issue is the embeddedness of the processes of local 
water management. This pertains to the internal organisational 
dynamics of water users associations. In this context, aspects as the 
internal power structures among members, WUA leadership, 
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domination by village elite, and equity in participation and water 
distribution have been examined. 
The third issue is the implementation of policy reforms aimed at 
establishing WUAs. In both the study states, Haryana as well as 
Maharashtra, the implementation of policy reforms for estabUshing 
WUAs has been studied. One of the assessments is that there are 
wide variations in the perceptions of the concerned actors about 
WUA formation. Another assessment is that some actors support 
and push these initiatives forward; others retard i t The pace of 
reform is shaped by the outcome of the interactions among them. 
The theoretical contribution of this research is in generating 
insights into the processes of collective action and local water 
management To that extent, this should be relevant to those 
supporting, catalysing or examining local level action for resource 
management-donors, flinders, NGOs, government agencies, and 
academics. From a policy perspective, this research would be 
relevant to those studying the implementation of irrigation sector 
reforms and establishing water users associations. 
The research design relies predominantiy on qualitative research 
tools, such as participant observation or ethnography, semi-
structured interviews, key informants, and studies of written records. 
It involves comparative studies. 
This book has seven chapters. Chapter 1 provides a review of 
the research questions and issues examined as well as a discussion 
of research design and methodology. It summarises the main 
contributions of this research in relation to the existing literature 
and the prevailing understanding of water users associations. 
In chapter 2, the warabandi and shejpali systems of water 
distribution are described. This serves two objectives. First, this 
chapter describes what these forms of water distribution entail. The 
second objective of this chapter is to provide a brief review of the 
state of research in these two systems. It provides the 
technological context of this research. 
In section 1 of this chapter, the concept of protective irrigation 
is introduced. The chapter describes its genesis as a specific form 
of irrigation under colonial times with certain policy objectives, 
namely, to supply limited quantities of water over large areas to a 
large number of farmers, to guard against crop failure and social 
and political unrest, rather than to match water supply with crop 
water requirements. The technical design, organisational and socio-
economic characteristics of protective irrigation are discussed. 
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In Section 2, the warabandi system of irrigation prevalent in 
Northwest India and Pakistan is introduced. A preliminary 
discussion of its basic premises and operation is presented. Some 
of the literature on the experience with warabandi is reviewed to 
assess its merits and demerits. In Section 3, the historical evolution 
of the forms of protective irrigation in Maharashtra is traced. The 
shejpali system of water distribution is described. It is compared 
with the block system. 
The chapter concludes in section 4 with a discussion of some 
of the discourses surrounding protective irrigation. The relevance 
of this understanding to appreciating irrigation management 
concerns in general, and for this research in particular, is explained. 
Chapter 3 is the first of the empirical chapters. This chapter 
provides the legal and policy framework under which the WUAs 
that were selected for research function. It describes the process of 
policy implementation for WUA establishment in Haryana and 
Maharashtra. 
An overview of the policy environment for WUA formation in 
both the states is presented. This is followed by a discussion of the 
implementation process. The perceptions o f different actors 
involved are described. The bottienecks in policy implementation 
are discussed. This is followed by a comparison of the experience 
of both these states with other states where policies for WUA 
establishment are at different levels of formulation or 
implementation. It is shown that very litde effort has been made in 
these states for garnering support for the policy intervention, or for 
ensuring that the necessary resources are available. This is 
necessary not only here, but also elsewhere, where reform is being 
contemplated. 
Together, chapters 2 and 3 provide the technological and 
policy context of the discussion of the case studies that follow in 
chapters 4, 5 and 6 and the discussion of the potential for irrigation 
reform that is presented in chapter 7. Further, the issues that are 
presented in chapter 3 get strengthened in chapters 4, 5 and 6 
through the more intensive observations across 3 WUAs that were 
selected for the main research phase. 
Chapter 4 addresses the research question: how does 
technology, or the design of canal irrigation, matter in estabhshing 
WUAs? It is shown that discussions of technology are important in 
the debates on Irrigation Management Transfer, since the design of 
canal irrigation influences the extent to which water management 
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and distribution practices can be changed through WUA formation 
and the extent to which control relations between the users and the 
bureaucracy can be altered. 
The process and motivations guiding WUA establishment as 
well as the effects of WUA establishment on water management 
and distribution practices are described. A contrast is presented 
between two water users associations. In the former case, the 
formation of the water users association is aimed at improving the 
control of the farmers over the availability of water and securing a 
greater accountability of the Irrigation Department to the farmers. 
The formation of the WUA is designed as a strategy to empower 
farmers, as control over system operation moves from the 
bureaucracy to the water users association. The Irrigation 
Department enters into a contract with the water users association 
for supplying volumetric quotas o f water for each season as per the 
schedules drawn by the latter. The formation of the WUA has 
specific effects on water management and distribution practices 
that were similar to those conceived of by the initiators o f the 
turnover process. It is carried out through a step-by-step process 
with the support of an N G O . 
In the latter case, there is no intention of changing control 
relations between the users and the bureaucracy. Control continues 
to vest outside the WUA, technically in the main system and 
organisationally with the irrigation bureaucracy. There is no 
reorientation of the bureaucracy. There is no change in the balance 
of power between the bureaucracy and the farmers. The WUA is 
assigned some functions, but there are no corresponding powers or 
rights. The WUA is litde more than an arm of the bureaucracy with 
no shift in the balance of power between the two. The effects of 
WUA formation on water management and distribution practices 
are very limited. 
It is shown that this difference relates to the technology for 
water distribution. The warabandi system of water distribution that 
is prevalent in Haryana itself limits the scope for functions that can 
be transferred to irrigators, and the extent to which control 
relations between the users and the bureaucracy can be altered. 
Chapter 5 focuses more closely on the following of the 
research questions, namely on an exploration of the organisational 
dynamics o f the water users associations studied. The embedded 
nature of the processes o f local water management is described. 
The organisational dynamics of the third of the studied WUAs are 
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presented. It is described how they relate to other aspects of social 
organisation-the division of society into social units, domination by 
local elite, the reproduction of power relations inside the water 
users association and the embedded nature of conflicts. It is shown 
that understanding the internal processes of social organisation, 
domination and subordination, power relations and local conflicts 
is necessary for understanding the processes of local water 
management. Further, decentralisation can breed new centres of 
control and totahtarianism, though they may be located at a 
different, though, more local, level. Patterns of elite dominance 
can prevent the emergence o f collective action among the members 
o f t h e W U A . 
T o understand the internal dynamics of the water users 
associations, it was necessary to look at the internal processes of 
water distribution and at equity, from that perspective. This is the 
subject of the next chapter, chapter 6. In this chapter, irrigation 
practises among the members of the WUA in the warabandi cases 
in Haryana are first described. These practices are described as a 
response to a regime of 'scarcity by design'. Empirical observations 
regarding equity within the command of the oudet are presented, 
and the responses of tail-enders in coping with inequity are 
described. In chapter 5, a reference has been made to the 
domination of the WUA by the village elite; in this chapter, it is 
examined if this domination spills over into the water distribution 
process. Finally, a discussion of the water distribution process and 
of equity in the WUA in the shejpali case is presented. 
In chapter 7 the summary and conclusions of this research are 
presented. It is shown that understanding the technical design 
characteristics of canal irrigation is important for understanding the 
prospects for policy reform initiatives. The potential for reform 
varies with the technology for water distribution. Shejpali and 
warabandi systems have a different potential for reform. Three sets 
of policy reform measures are described: water rights reform and 
market creation, pricing, and Irrigation Management Transfer. The 
chapter concludes by discussing some avenues for further research 
on protective irrigation and irrigation management reform. 
Nederlandse Samenvatting 
Dit is een onderzoek naar de rol van watergebruikersgroepen 
(Water Users Associations, WUA's) bij kanaalirrigatie. Het 
onderzoek beoogt een bijdrage te leveren aan het debat over 
Irrigation Management Transfer en hervormingen in de 
irrigatiesector. In theoretische zin beoogt het bij te dragen aan 
mterdisdplinaire benadering van de invloed van technologie op 
watergebruikersgroepen, met andere woorden, het analyseert de 
manier waarop een irrigatiesysteem is ontworpen haar weerslag 
heeft op de sociale verhoudingen. Vanuit dit perspectief kom ik tot 
twee subvragen: Ten eerste, wat is de weerslag van het ontwerp van 
een irrigatiesysteem op de vorming van WUA's, en ten tweede, wat 
is de interne organisatiedynamiek van WUA's, dat wil zeggen, hoe 
gedragen WUA's zich, gezien als organisaties? 
Om die vragen te kunnen beantwoorden heb ik onderzoek 
uitgevoerd in twee deelstaten in India. Allereerst Haryana in 
noordwest India, waar voor de waterverdeling het warabandi-stésé. 
gemeengoed is, en ten tweede Maharashtra in west-India met het 
shejpa/i-stehel. 
Het eerste onderzoeksthema belicht de vraag of en hoe 
technologie — dat wil zeggen, het ontwerp van irrigatiestelsels - van 
invloed is op de vorming van WUA. De fysieke context van een 
stelsel stelt eisen aan de operationele en organisatiestructuur. Dat is 
vervolgens weer van invloed op de manier waarop mensen zich 
organiseren in relatie tot het ontwerp van het kanaalirrigatiestelsel. 
De niveaus en wijze waarop een irrigatiesysteem wordt beheerd is 
van invloed op de mate waarop je iets aan de verhoudingen tussen 
gebruikers en bureaucratie kunt veranderen. Het mrabandi-stelsei 
heeft een ander potenteel om hervormingen door de oprichting van 
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watergebruikersgroepen te realiseren dan shejpali. 
Het tweede thema is de inbedding van lokaal waterbeheer. Dit 
thema heeft betrekking op de interne organisatiedynamiek van 
Water Users Associations. In deze context is gekeken naar aspecten 
als de interne machtsverhoudingen tussen leden van de WUA, de 
leiding, overheersing door de elite in een dorp, en de mate waarin 
participatie en waterverdeling eerlijk is geregeld. 
Een derde thema is de implementatie van beleidshervormingen 
waarbij WUA's worden opgezet. In beide case studies, Haryana en 
Maharashtra, is dit bestudeerd. Een van mijn bevindingen is dat de 
percepties van de kant van de betrokken actoren over de oprichting 
van WUA sterk uiteenlopen, en dat sommige actoren dit soort 
initiateven steunen en stimuleren, terwijl andere ze tegenhouden. De 
interactie tussen die groepen bepaalt hoe snel de hervormingen zich 
kunnen voltrekken. 
De theoretische bijdrage die dit onderzoek levert bestaat uit het 
genereren van inzichten in collectieve-actie-processen bij lokaal 
waterbeheer. Dit kan relevant zijn voor mensen die initiatieven voor 
lokale actie voor lokaal waterbeheer steunen, als katalysator fungeren 
of onderzoeken -donoren, financiers, NGO's, overheidsinstanties en 
academici. Vanuit beleidsperspectief zou dit onderxoek van belang 
kunnen zijn voor hen die de implementatie van hervormingen in de 
irrigaüesector steunen en Water Users Associations willen opzetten. 
Het ontwerp van onderzoek berust voornamelijk op kwalitatieve 
methoden en technieken als participerende observatie of etnografie, 
halfgestructureerde interviews, gesprekken met belangrijke 
informanten en documentonderzoek. Het betreft vergelijkend 
onderzoek. 
Het boek telt zeven hoofdstukken. In hoofdstuk 1 behandel ik 
de probleemstelling en onderzoeksthema's als ook het 
onderzoeksontwerp en de methodologie. De belangrijkste 
uitkomsten van dit onderzoek worden er in samengevat in relatie 
tot de literatuur en gangbare inzichten in het functioneren van 
watergebruikersgroepen. 
In hoofdstuk 2 beschrijf ik twee soorten waterverdeling: 
warabandi en shejpali. Dit dient twee doelen: aangeven wat deze 
vormen van waterverdeling inhouden en een bondig overzicht 
bieden van de stand van onderzoek voor deze systemen. Dit vormt 
de technologische onderzoekscontext. 
In paragraaf 1 van dit hoofdstuk wordt het concept protective 
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irrigation voor het voetlicht gebracht. Het hoofdstuk behandelt de 
ontstaansgeschiedenis ervan als specifieke vorm van irrigatie in het 
koloniale tijdperk dat tot doel had voor een groot aantal boeren een 
beperkte hoeveelheid water beschikbaar te maken over een groot 
landbouwareaal. Het technisch ontwerp, de organisatie en de socio-
economische eigenschappen van protective irrigation komen aan de 
orde. 
In paragraaf 2 wordt het warabandi-stelsel in Noordwest-India 
en Pakistan geïntroduceerd. De basispremissen en werking komen 
aan de orde. De paragraaf biedt een greep uit de literatuur over de 
voor- en nadelen van warabandi. In paragraaf 3 achterhaal ik de 
wordingsgeschiedenis van vormen van protective irrigation in 
Maharashtra. Het shejpa/i-systeem komt aan bod in vergelijking met 
het blokstelse. 
Paragraaf 4 sluit het hoofdstuk af met een bespreking van het 
discour rond protective irrigation. Ik leg erin uit waarom dit van 
belanmg is voor kwesties rond het beheer van irrigatiestelsels in het 
algemeen en voor dit onderzoek in het bijzonder. 
Hoofdstuk 3 is het eerste empirische hoofdstuk. Het behandelt 
het juridisch beleidskader voor de WUA's die ik voor mijn 
onderzoek heb geselecteerd. In dit hoofdstuk beschrijf ik hoe de 
implementatie van het beleid voor de vorming van WUA's 
verloopt. De percepties van de verschillende actoren komen erin 
aan de orde, en de knalpunten voor beleidsimplementatie. Daarna 
volgt een vergelijking tussen de ervaringen die in beide deelstaten 
zijn opgedaan en die in andere staten waarin op verschillende 
niveaus beleid wordt gemaakt en geimplemneteerd voor de 
vorming van watergebruikersgroepen. Het blijkt dat er in desze 
staten maar heel weinig moeite is gedaan een draagvlak te scheppen 
voor deze beleidsinterventie, en zeker te stellen dat de vereiste 
middelen beschikbaar zijn. Dit is niet alleen hier van belang maar 
ook elders waar men over hervormingen nadenkt. 
Hoofdstuk 2 en 3 vormen samen de technologische en 
beleidscontext voor de case studies in hoofdstuk 4, 5 en 6 en voor 
hoofdstuk 7, waarin het potentieel voor irrigatiehervormingen 
wordt behandeld. Tevens worden de thema's die in hoofdstuk 3 
aan de orde komen onderbouwd in hoofdstuk 4, 5 en 6 met behulp 
van grondigere observaties in de drie WUA's die voor de 
belangrijkste onderzoeksfase zijn geselecteerd. 
Hoofdstuk 4 behandelt de onderzoeksvraag: op welke manier 
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is technologie, o f het ontwerp van kanaalirrigatie, van belang bij het 
opzetten van WUA's? Het laat zien dat het van belang s de rol van 
technologie te betrekken bij het debat rond Irrigation Management 
Transfer, aangezien de manier waarop het kanaal wordt ontworpen 
van invloed is op de mate waarin het opzetten van 
watergebruikersgroepen een verandering kan bewerkstelligen in de 
praktijk van waterbeheer en —verdeling en de de verhoudingen 
tussen gebruikers en bureaucratie. Het hoofdstuk beschrijft de 
beweegredenen die ten grondslag liggen aan de oprichting van 
WUA's en de effecten daarvan op de praktijk van waterbeheer en -
verdeling en de praktijk ervan. Twee WUA's worden met elkaar 
gecontrasteerd. In de eerste gevalsstudie is de watergebruikersgroep 
opgezaet met het doel de boeren meer controle te geven over de 
beschikbaarheid van water en de machtsoverdracht het Ministerie 
van Irrigatie aan de boeren te vergroten. Het is een strategie om 
boeren meer macht te geven, naarmate de controle over het 
systeem van de bureaucratie naar de WUA verschuift. Het 
Ministerie van Irrigatie gaat een contract aan met de WUA waarin 
voor elk seizoen de levering van waterquota wordt geregeld volgens 
een door de WUA opgesteld plan. Het effect dat de oprichting van 
de WUA sorteert op de praktijk van waterbeheer en -verdeling lijkt 
sterk op wat de initiatiefnemers van de overdracht voor ogen 
hadden. Het proces verloopt stap voor stap, en wordt door een 
N G O begeleid. 
In het tweede geval is er geen sprake van een wijziging in de 
conttoleverhoudingen tussen gebruikers en bureaucratie. De 
controle blijft in technisch opzicht bij het hoofdstelsel, qua 
organisatie blijft de irrigatiebureaucratie de touwtjes in handen 
houden. De bureaucratie oriënteert zich niet anders, de 
machtsverhouding tussen gebruikers en bureaucratie blijft gelijk. 
D e WUA krijgt enkele functies maar geen bijbehorende rechten en 
bevoegdheden. De WUA is weinig meer dan een tak van de 
bureaucratie. De oprichting van WUA's heeft dan ook maar heel 
weinig effect op de praktijk van beheer en verdeling. 
Ik laat zien dat dit onderscheid te maken heeft met de technologie 
achter de waterverdeling. Het warabandi-systeem dat in Haryana de 
overhand heeft kent maar beperkte ruimte toe aan het soort 
functies dat kan worden overgedragen en de mate waarin de 
machtsverhoudingen tussen gebruikers en bureaucratie kunnen 
worden veranderd. 
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Hoofdstuk 5 gaat dieper in op de volgende onderzoeksvragen: 
een verkenning van de organisationele dynamiek van Water Users 
Associations, waaronder die van de derde hier onderzochte WUA. 
Het hoofdstuk beschrijft de manier waarop lokaal waterbeheer is 
ingebed — hoe ze zich verhouden tot andere aspecten van de wijze 
waarop de maatschappij is georganiseerd: de manier waarop de 
maatschappij in eenheden is opgedeeld, de lokale elite heerst, de 
machtsverhoudingen worden gereproduceerd binnen de Water 
Users Association en conflicten maatschappelijk zijn ingebed. Een 
goed begrip van de manier waarop lokaal watermanagement werkt, 
vereist inzicht in de interne dynamiek van maatschappelijke 
organisatie, overheersing en onderwerping, machtsverhoudingen en 
lokale conflicten. Decentralisatie kan tot gevolg hebben dat nieuwe 
controlepunten ontstaan en tot totalitarisme leiden, zij het op een 
ander, meer lokaal niveau. De manier waarop de elite heerst kan 
collectief handelen van de WUA-leden in de weg staan. 
Om de interne dynamiek van de Water Users Association goed 
te begrijpen was het belangrijk de interne processen te beschouwen 
en vanuit dat perspectief naar kwesties rond rechtvaardige 
verdeling. Dit is het thema van hoofdstuk 6, waarin allereerst de 
praktijk van irrigatie bij de leden van de watergebruikersgroepen in 
het warabandi-systeem in Haryana wordt beschreven in reactie op 
een regime van 'ontworpen schaarste'. Het beschrijft hoe de 
controle over verdeelwerken raakt aan 
rechtvaardigheidsvraagstukken. Werd in hoofdstuk 5 al gerefereerd 
aan de manier waarop de lokale elite WUAs domineren, in dit 
hoofdstuk wordt bekeken of die overheersende rol zijn weerslag 
vindt in het waterverdelingsproces. Tenslotte komen dezelfde 
vragen van eerlijke waterverdeling in het shejpali-systeem. 
In hoofdstuk 7 geef ik samenvatting en conclusies van dit 
onderzoek. Ik laat zien dat een goed begrip van de technische 
karakteristieken van de wijze waarop een kanaal wordt ontworpen 
van belang is voor een juiste inschatting van de kansrijkheid van 
initiatieven tot beleidshervorming. Het potentieel voor 
hervormingen varieert naar rato van de technologie voor 
waterverdeling. Zo herbergen shejpali en warabandi niet hetzelfde 
potentieel voor hervorming in zich. Ik beschrijf drie 
maatregelenpakketten: waterrechten en marktwerking, prijsstelling, 
en Irrigation Management Transfer. Aan het eind van het 
hoofdstuk worden enkele richtingen aangegeven voor nader 
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onderzoek naar protective irrigation en hervormingen binnen de 
irrigatiesector. 
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